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A bstract
The subject of this thesis is to explore the interaction between the political setting, 
and stabilisation and reform outcomes in emerging economies. It is motivated by 
the observation that during the last decades numerous governments in emerging eco­
nomies have made major efforts to achieve macro-economic stability and advances 
in economic reforms; necessary changes in economic policy, however, frequently cre­
ated strong political opposition from those particular interests that stood to lose 
from them, and thus often failed to be implemented.
This thesis contributes to the study of the most important questions in this con­
text, namely why and how countries slide down the path to macro-economic chaos, 
and under which conditions attempts to reverse the economic free-fall will be suc­
cessfully pursued. Moreover, which are the reforms needed to improve the situation 
fundamentally, and how they can be successfully implemented given the political 
constraints. More specifically it studies the structural reasons leading to high infla­
tion, and the requirements to achieve sustainable price stability. It then turns to 
major areas of economic reform, namely privatisation and improved governance. It 
studies how the political setting influences privatisation outcomes, and shows that 
press freedom is an important tool in fighting corruption, and thus in improving 
governance. It finally takes a concrete example, namely Russian regions, to study 
the impact of differences in the political setting and reform efforts, as well as other 
structural variables, on the economic outcomes.
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During the last decades numerous governments in emerging economies have under­
taken efforts to achieve macro-economic stability and advance economic reforms. 
The reason for the former was often that the macro-economic situation had de­
teriorated to a point where the country was on the brink of economic collapse, for 
example expressed by bursts of extreme inflation. The rationale for economic reform 
was that for macro-economic stability to be sustainable, the structural features of 
the economy had to be substantially altered. Not unexpectedly, however, changes 
in economic policy often created strong political opposition. Those particular in­
terests that stood to lose from the policies necessary to stabilise the macro-economic 
situation, or from the changes structural reforms would bring, tried to block change.
The general subject of this thesis is to explore the interaction of the political 
setting with stabilisation and reform outcomes in emerging economies. Important 
questions in this context are why and how countries slide down the path to macro- 
economic chaos, and under which conditions attempts to reverse economic free-fall 
may be successfully pursued. Moreover, which are the reforms needed to improve 
the situation fundamentally, and how can they successfully be implemented given 
political constraints? More precisely, we investigate the structural reasons leading to 
high inflation, and the requirements necessary to achieve sustainable price stability. 
We then turn to two major areas of economic reform, namely privatisation and im­
proved governance. We investigate how the political setting influences privatisation 
outcomes, and show that press freedom is an important tool in fighting corruption,
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and thus in improving governance. We then use the concrete example of Russian 
regions to investigate the impact of differences in the political setting and reform 
efforts, as well as other structural variables, on economic outcomes.
In the following survey we give a brief overview of the main contributions related 
to problems of inflation crises and stabilisation policies, as well as to issues of struc­
tural reform. The parts of the survey addressing political economy issues of reform 
will concentrate on general reform issues, and on those areas of reform to which this 
thesis contributes, namely privatisation and improving governance.
Chapter 1
Survey: The Political Economy of 
Macro-Economic Crises and 
Structural Reform
1 E xplain ing inflation crises and p o litica l obstacles  
to  m acro-stabilisation
1.1 Understanding policies that lead to  macro-econom ic in­
stability and high inflation
It is not particularly controversial to state that a large number of countries in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe at certain moments pursued economic policies that 
led to large decreases in social welfare1. However, traditional economic models 
were unable to explain this aberrant choice without assuming a large degree of 
irrationality on behalf of politicians. This obviously unsatisfactory situation gave
Hn order to keep in focus we do not go into detailed country studies here, but refer the reader 
to the very extensive literature on the subject. Dornbusch/Edwards 1994 provide a good starting 
point.
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rise to formal political economy explanations. This literature often explains bad 
economic decision-making by invoking prisoner dilemma type situations. Typically 
a plurality of groups or institutions draws resources from a common pool. Moreover, 
while each party fully profits from the resources it obtains, it bears only a fraction 
of the costs that are connected with their generation, as these costs are socialised. 
Thus, in spite of the fact that overstretching the resource potential of the common 
pool generally creates a negative externality, and thus everybody would be better 
off under general restraint, each group will end up overdrawing resources as long as 
possible.
These prisoner dilemma type situations can, for example, occur in pure monetary 
games2, where excessive money printing by multiple monetary authorities leads to 
excessive inflation. A situation of multiple monetary authorities arises typically in 
badly designed monetary unions. The monetary union following the break up of the 
Austro-Hungarian empire is the example par excellence of such a situation3.
However even when a currency union is designed in which a single central bank 
holds the authority of money creation, situations of excessive money growth with the 
resulting increases in inflation can occur. This is the case when members of a cur­
rency union can run excessive deficits or obtain overly generous loans from national 
branches of the central bank or other public banks (that are often de facto under 
the control of national politicians) that eventually will have to be covered by money 
creation. A good example is the case of the monetary union following the break 
up of the Soviet Empire4. While the authority to print bank notes stayed with the 
Russian Central Bank, other national central banks extended generous loans to ail­
ing state enterprises that were rarely expected actually to be repaid5, creating large 
amounts of quasi-money, and refinancing themselves afterwards from the Russian
2Aizenmann 1992, 1998
3 See Dornbusch 1992
4 See Cheikbossian 2001
5To be fair, it should be mentioned that the Russian Central Bank actively took part in this 
game by handing out huge amounts of soft loans to Russian state enterprises.
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Central bank. Needless-to-say, that inflation skyrocketed and the currency union 
broke up fast.
Finally even monetary mismanagement within a single country can be explained 
along these lines. If a country is federally structured, or more generally if polit­
ical power is sufficiently decentralised, local branches of the central bank or other 
regional public banks are often de facto under the influence of local politicians. 
They may thus be used to finance excessive public spending or unprofitable projects 
that politicians are interested in for electoral reasons, trusting that the central bank 
would bail them out should the need arise.
Slightly more general, although basically of the same flavour, are situations where 
non-cooperative behaviour in the presence of a common pool problem leads to budget 
deficits that are eventually monetised. In such a situation different interest groups, 
for example lobbies, “spending” ministries, or regions compete for transfers from a 
weak central government that result in budget deficits which ultimately have to be 
financed by money emission6.
In such a framework even positive economic shocks can - via an increase in 
distortive fiscal redistribution - lead to lower growth7.
While non-cooperative behaviour provides a good explanation of why crises oc­
cur, it is by itself unable to deliver cycles where periods of high inflation altern­
ate with stabilisations that deliver temporary low inflation, as often observed in 
Southern cone countries such as Argentina or Brazil8. One possibility is to explain 
such cycles by explicitly considering changes in monetisation levels9. In a situation, 
where different interest groups extract transfers from a weak government financed 
by money emission, economic agents try to shield from inflation tax by avoiding 
local currency. Thus the inflation tax base decreases, and supposing that demands
6Velasco 1997, 1998a,b. See Rodden et al. 2003 and Fernandez-Arias et al. (forthcoming) for 
empirical evidence on bailouts of sub-national entities by central government.
rTornell/Lane 1999
8 See Kiguel/Liviathan 1994 for a description of these phenomena.
9Mondino et al 1996
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for transfers stay constant in subsequent periods, the government progressively has 
to raise the inflation tax rate, that is, inflation. At the same time the tax base con­
stantly diminishes as higher inflation leads to even more financial adaptation, that 
is a preference for other means of payment or saving to the detriment of the local 
currency Thus rising inflation and demonetisation go hand in hand, until inflation 
rates reach a point where the negative externality from inflation is so strong that 
cooperative behaviour becomes a dominant strategy. Only then can stabilisation be 
achieved. However, once inflation has fallen, monetisation levels will increase again. 
Hence non-cooperative behaviour becomes the dominant strategy again, and a new 
inflation-financial adaptation spiral is set in motion.
An alternative explanation10 for cyclical changes in inflation rates sees “mega­
inflation” periods as having the same function as price wars in models of oligopolistic 
competition under imperfect monitoring. Those periods of generalised suffering have 
for effect to restrain the greed of the groups that compete for oligopoly rents, i.e. 
seigniorage. In this interpretation the occurrence of “mega-inflation” outbursts are 
a sort of disciplining device to enforce periods of more moderate inflation.
However, while non-cooperative behaviour of different social actors provides a 
good explanation of suboptimal policy outcomes, it leads to a new puzzle. Policy out­
comes in comparable countries from the same region facing similar macro-economic 
environments have often differed substantially. Given that common pool problems 
potentially exist in all countries, we need to explain why some countries avoided 
bad economic management, whereas uncooperative behaviour resulted in economic 
chaos in others.
The pattern of how the competition for political power takes place, as well as 
the rules of everyday policymaking and the structure of the administration seem to 
play important roles11. So far it has been shown, both theoretically and empirically,
10Zarazaga 1996
11 See Alesina/Perotti 1995a for a survey on the determinants of budget deficits, and von Hagen 
2006 on the political economy of fiscal institutions.
Chapter 1 : Survey 14
that countries that are politically more unstable and polarised, or where society is 
more fractionalised suffer from higher deficits and inflation rates12. Election systems 
may play a role, in the sense that systems with a tendency to produce weaker gov­
ernments, e. g. more representative systems, could be a reason for higher deficits13. 
More generally, lack of political competition seems also to be connected to worse 
fiscal outcomes14, possibly because countries with more intense political competition 
are more likely to adopt institutions that address the common pool problem15.
Moreover it seems that “divided governments”16 have more difficulty achieving 
the necessary adjustments when facing adverse economic shocks17. Finally countries 
where budgeting procedures are more "centralised"18 and give finance ministers 
“strategic dominance over spending ministers” and “limit the amendment power of 
parliament” usually show stronger fiscal discipline19.
1.2 Understanding delays in addressing inflation crises and 
other unsustainable macro-imbalances
So far we have focused on the structural reasons that lead to inflation crises and 
other unsustainable macro-policies. A different, though obviously related, question 
is why once the severity of the situation has been recognised by everybody and 
there is general agreement on the need for policy changes, stabilisation may still 
be delayed. One answer is simply a dynamic interpretation of the aforementioned
12 See e.g. Alesina/Tabellini 1990, Tabellini/Alesina 1990 and Cukierman et al 1992 for theoret­
ical explications, and Edwards/Tabellini 1991a,b, Roubini 1991, Cukierman et al 1992, Edwards 
1993, Alesina/Perotti 1995b, Alesina et al. 1999a, and Annett 2000 for empirical support.
13Grilli, Masciandro and Tabellini 1991
14 See Skilling 2001 and Wibbels 2003 for empirical evidence.
15 See Haller berg 2004.
16For example, coalition governments.
17Poterba 1994, Alt /Lowry 1994, Roubini/Sachs 1989
18A budget process is regarded as "centralised" if it contains incentives for policymakers to 
internalise the common pool externality of decisions (see von Hagen 2005).
19 See von Hagen 1992, von Hagen/Harden 1994, and Hallerberg/von Hagen 1998 for emprical 
evidence for European, Gleich 2003 and Ylaoutinen 2004 for Eastern European, and Alesina et al 
1999b for Latin American countries.
Chapter 1 : Survey 15
common pool problem20. Interest groups repeatedly play non-cooperatively, which 
effectively delays stabilisation and leads to a continuous aggravation of the crisis. 
The deepening crises, however, negatively affects the interest groups’ payoffs from a 
non-cooperative strategy. Thus stabilisation is delayed until the continuation value 
of the noncooperative strategy drops below the one for cooperation.
It has equally been argued that governments may optimally choose a delay in 
reform, as they need to improve their reputation to ensure the reform’s success. 
Such a reform delay can be an optimal strategy in a situation of multiple equilibria, 
where the attained equilibrium depends on the perception of the governments’ reform 
credentials21.
Arguably the most influential view sees stabilisation delay resulting from an 
unresolved conflict of how to share the costs between different social groups22. In a 
situation where the cost of not stabilising inflicted on the different social actors is 
unknown to outsiders, a “war of attrition” takes place. Stabilisation is delayed to 
reveal how much longer another group is willing to bear the pain of not stabilising. 
This goes on until the group that suffers most from the delay of stabilisation finally 
capitulates and accepts to bear a more than proportional cost of the stabilisation. 
In this kind of framework it can equally be shown that crises help in achieving 
stabilisation23. This results from the fact that a larger crisis signifies a higher cost 
of waiting for the combatants, and leads thus to a quicker solution of the war of 





23Drazen/Grilli 1993. See Rodrik 1996 for a critical assessment of the claim that crises speed up 
reform.
24This result concerning the usefulness of crises in speeding up stabilisation stays valid if one 
introduces the possibility of bargaining on stabilisation costs between the groups involved in a war 
of attrition (Hsieh 2000).
25Martinelli /  Escorza 2004 provide theoretical, and Seddon Wallack 2004 empirical backing for 
this claim.
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A more basic view sees stabilisation delays as resulting from the human tendency 
to postpone unpleasant things as long as possible. More precisely, stabilisation 
delays arise naturally when agents discount the future sufficiently, so that the cost of 
stabilising immediately outweighs the potential discounted future benefits26. Finally, 
stabilisation delay can equally be explained by a combination of the above-mentioned 
tendency to postpone unpleasant things, with the desire of some agents to prepare for 
a coming stabilisation in order to minimise their losses27. In this spirit, a “populist 
coalition” between rich and poor agents can have an interest to pursue unsustainable 
policies and postpone stabilisation: Under the assumption of capital being mobile 
in the long run, but not in the short run, the rich gain from the delay as it allows 
them to shift part of their assets abroad. Thus when taxes have to be levied to 
finance stabilisation, they will be less affected, being able to evade taxation to a 
large degree. The poor, assumed not to pay taxes and to gain from redistribution 
as long as economic activity is high, are also in favour of postponing adjustment. 
The losers in such a scenario are the middle-class, as they will have to bear a more 
than proportional part of the cost of the adjustment once it is undertaken.
1.3 Understanding the distributive effects o f crises and sta­
bilisations
In addition to the finding that delays in stabilisation can be explained by distributive 
conflict, it is interesting to study the impact of both inflation crises and macro­
stabilisations on income distribution. Apart from the three class setting mentioned 
above, where a delay in stabilisation is detrimental to the interests of the middle- 
class, it can be shown that in a two class setting with rich and poor, both inflation 
and stabilisation often have a negative distributive impact on the poorer parts of
26See Laban/Sturzenegger 1994.
27Perotti, R., 1992
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society28. More precisely this results from the fact that richer agents have an advant­
age in using “financial adaptation” (which encompasses all forms of capital flight 
and currency substitution), and thus suffer less from inflation tax than the poor. 
Moreover, as the negative distributive impact on the poor increases with higher in­
flation levels, their bargaining power decreases with rising inflation. Thus, supposing 
that successful stabilisation necessitates agreement among the different social groups 
on how to share the costs, the lower strata of society will not only suffer most from 
high inflation, but will finally also have to bear the largest part of the stabilisation 
effort29.
In the second chapter of this thesis we use a three class setting to show that 
the distributive impact of inflation depends on circumstances. When monetisation 
levels are high, inflation typically redistributes away from the rich towards the lower 
classes of society. With decreasing monetisation levels, and depending on income 
distribution, there can either be situations where inflation mainly affects the poor30, 
or “populist coalitions” that “squeeze” the middle-classes31. Moreover, we show 
that demonetisation is potentially helpful for stabilisation, and in the long-term 
likely to lead to lower inflation rates, as with lower potential inflation tax income 
the intensity of distributive struggle diminishes. Thus financial integration and 
learning, by largely reducing the cost of substituting away from a weak currency, 
and hence allowing for very low monetisation levels, help in achieving and sustaining 
low inflation equilibria. Low monetisation comes however at a cost, namely an 
increased risk of hyperinflation if budget deficits, caused, for example, by strong 
adverse economic shocks, axe monetised.
28Sturzenegger 1997, Sturzenegger/Laban 1994
29Laban/Sturzenegger 1994.
30 As in Sturzenegger 1997 and Sturzenegger/Laban 1994.
31 As in Perotti, R. 1992.
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2 Im plem enting  structural reform
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2.1 How to  overcome political obstacles to  reform
In the previous section we have considered the reasons that lead to unsustainable 
macroeconomic situations, such as inflation crises, and the problems that may occur 
in stabilising. In this section we will look more specifically at reform. We will con­
sider structural obstacles to reform in general, and how to overcome them. Moreover 
we will address the question of which groups are most likely to be in charge of suc­
cessful reforms. We will then concentrate on specific areas that have been high on 
the fist of priorities of reformers in developing countries over the last decades. We 
will discuss two important structural reform areas in more detail32, to which the 
third and fourth chapter of this thesis contribute. These are privatisation, which 
has arguably played the most prominent role in structural reform programs during 
the last 15 years, and improving governance by decreasing corruption, which might 
be among the most important issues of this decade.
One of the most puzzling questions is why, even if there is a majority of the 
population that would benefit from reform, it may not take place. It can be shown 
that it is ex-ante uncertainty over the winners from reform that leads to a “status 
quo bias”33. So how can the status quo bias in particular, and resistance to re­
form in general, be overcome? One school of thought stresses the need for speedy, 
comprehensive reform34. While arguments vary, the common “political economy” 
theme of this literature is generally feasibility: periods where meaningful reform can 
be implemented are scarce and short, and thus reformist governments should get as 
much done as possible and as quickly as they can. Advocates of more gradualist ap­
proaches to reform broadly argue that progressive strategies are less costly in social
32For a general overview of the political economy of structural reform in OECD countries see 
Hoj et al. 2006.
33Fernandez/Rodrikl991
34 See Sturzenegger/Tommasi 1998 for a discussion.
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terms, and that gradualism thus increases sustainability35. Moreover, feasibility and 
sustainability can be increased by gradualist “unbundling”36 of reforms that divide 
the opponents of reform, thus giving the government the possibility to deal with 
one group at a time37. The experience of successful, even if slow, gradual economic 
reform in Russia between 2000-03 may be a good demonstration of the potential 
effectiveness of this “divide and rule” approach. It has however been argued38 that 
such a strategy works only when reform simply requires majority support, but fails 
when it requires the support from many large particular interests, that have an ef­
fective power to veto reform plans, as has often been the political reality in Latin 
American countries. In such a setting only “bundling” of reform is politically feas­
ible. Only a comprehensive “bundled” reform package can induce “veto-players” , 
who would prevent any partial reform affecting them negatively, into supporting the 
general reform plan, at least as long as potential losses from some reform measures 
are overcompensated by gains from others.
Another obstacle to reform has obviously been the credibility both of reform 
plans and policy-makers. For many reforms success depends critically on their cred­
ibility, as there are multiple equilibria that depend on agents’ self-fulfilling expect­
ations. For example, even a credible disinflation plan that would be successful if 
people believed in it, is almost sure to fail as soon as it is perceived as incredible 
by the population, thus ex-post confirming the negative expectations. However, in 
situations where the credibility of reform is low because economic agents doubt the 
true commitment of a government to reform, a reformist government can signal its 
commitment by “overshooting” on reform, that is going faster or further than would
35 See e.g. Dewatripont/Roland 1991&1995, Mehlum 2001 and Dehejia 2003. Popov 2007 argues 
that the debate about the speed of the liberalisation (shock therapy versus gradualism) was to a 
large extent misfocused as the crucial importance of strong institutions for good performance was 
overlooked.
36 That is going ahead with different parts of reform at different points in time.
37 Wei 1997a
38Martinelli/Tommasi 1997
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normally be optimal39.
Another mechanism that can help in overcoming political obstacles to reform is 
when large policy switches are proposed by characters that a priori are unlikely to 
propose such reforms. Examples for this are the market-oriented stabilisation and 
reforms enacted under Menem in Argentina and Fujimori in Peru, who both came 
to power on explicitly populist election platforms. The logic behind this feature 
of declared populists that successfully implement strong market-oriented reforms is 
that when voters are not fully informed, the identity and political orientation of 
the one proposing the reform contains important information. The idea is that if 
someone proposes reforms that are far from his own preferences, this proves to the 
population the urgent need for these changes. Once the electorate understands the 
crucial importance of the reforms on the agenda, there will be much less opposition. 
As a consequence, characters that a priori are unlikely to undertake painful reforms 
have under certain circumstances a much higher chance of successfully implementing 
them40. Moreover, arguments along this line can rationalise why politicians block 
reforms while in opposition that they intend to implement once in office41.
Finally it is interesting and puzzling to observe that in many crises situations the 
elites in power initiated “reforms from within” that actually worsened their situation 
compared to the status quo ante42. An explanation for this phenomenon can be 
obtained when one sees crises as the outcome of a common pool problem where 
competing elites have “over-extracted” rents from society. In such crisis situations, 
however, reform does not occur because some of the ruling elites expect to be better 
off after reform. Rather, once it has become clear that the status quo is no longer 
tenable, reforms are used as a defense mechanism against other powerful groups, 
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An example for such a “reform from within”, where supporters of reform willingly 
accepted to be worse off, is trade liberalisation in some Latin American countries. It 
has been argued that these reforms were supported by the inefficient manufacturing 
sector, in spite of the fact that it was going to lose under foreign competition, as 
reforms were considered the only way to tame the power of the trade unions, and 
thus to avoid far worse outcomes43.
2.2 Privatisation - W hy and how should it be done ?
One of the most important reforms that has been undertaken mainly in the eighties 
and the beginning of the nineties is privatisation. While at the beginning of the 
eighties the case for private versus public ownership was not that clear cut44, the 
economic consensus has shifted towards favouring private ownership in a majority 
of situations45. This shift has been a result of the empirical evidence46 showing 
improved economic performance under more widespread private ownership, both on 
the micro- and macro-levels.
Once a consensus for the desirability of privatisation was achieved, major norm­
ative questions that were passionately discussed concerned the achievability, design 
and sustainability of privatisation. The results of these debates obviously depended 
on the objectives the government was pursuing with privatisation. Commonly stated 
objectives were to raise revenue, and/or to foster enterprise restructuring in order 
to increase economic efficiency.
43 See Tomell 1998.
44Megginson/Netter 2000 include a short survey on the large literature justifying the supremacy 
of public ownership.
45 See Hart et al 1997 for an excellent discussion on the boundaries of private and public 
ownership.
46 For an excellent starting point on the empirical literature and the recent history of privatisation 
see again Megginson/Netter 2000. The empirical evidence is, however, not unanimously in favour 
of private ownership (see e.g. Sabirianova et al. 2005 or Djankov and Murell 2002). It seems, 
however, relatively uncontroversial that under efficient private ownership outcomes are better than 
under state ownership
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When a government is mainly interested in privatisation revenues, several reas­
ons have been advanced in favour of a partial privatisation. Market oriented gov­
ernments, it has been argued should use it as a commitment and signalling device. 
Partial privatisation, provided that control is effectively transferred to the private 
sector, allows governments to credibly commit to keeping their hands off the privat­
ised companies, as political intervention would reduce the future sales value of the 
equity stake retained47. Given that this leads to a diminished risk for potential 
buyers, the government can obtain a better price.
Another question that has been addressed is how to maximise privatisation rev­
enue from enterprises that are experiencing economic difficulties. Two different 
arguments have been advanced for partial privatisation under such circumstances. 
In choosing partial privatisation, governments might be able to strategically exploit 
a political constraint forbidding privatisation at negative prices. By choosing the 
stake that is offered for privatisation in such a way that in an unconstrained bar­
gaining game with a potential buyer it would fetch a negative price (that is the 
government would have to pay a subsidy to sell), the government uses political con­
straint to strengthen its bargaining power, and thus to achieve a sale at a higher 
price48. Moreover keeping minority stakes in the privatisation of inefficient compan­
ies is similar to keeping a minority stake in the sale of companies during bankruptcy 
procedures, which has been shown to allow the creditors (=the seller) to capture a 
larger share of the rents of the buyer49.
While from a pure efficiency point of view enterprises should generally be sold 
to the highest bidder, privatisation design, especially in the context of transition, 
has been complicated by the fact that there often were no politically acceptable 
and financially viable buyers for state enterprises. As there was a perceived need 
to advance privatisation to foster restructuring, attention focused on the degree to
47Perotti 1995
48Bennet et al. 2001
49Cornelli/Felli 2000
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which state assets should be given away in so called “mass privatisations”, and how 
this should best be done.
Apart from feasibility, the advantages of mass privatisation were perceived to 
be the creation of both a private sector of a critical mass that would guarantee its 
economic viability, as well as a constituency for reform that would ensure the sustain­
ability of privatisation. It was however immediately stressed that there would be a 
trade-off, as increased political support might come at the cost of less restructuring, 
resulting from the fact that core owners are less inclined to invest when their equity 
stake is smaller and potential gains have to be shared with others that obtained 
shares during mass privatisation50. It has been argued that, in spite of this effect, 
investment and restructuring may actually increase with more mass privatisation, 
provided widespread share ownership diminishes expropriation risk sufficiently51.
When designing mass privatisation, a key question has been whether to give 
away state assets to insiders in the firm or spread them widely over the population. 
While both are obviously second best solutions, supporters of widespread privatisa­
tion have argued that insider privatisation would increase the riskiness for the asset 
owners (as their labour income and asset wealth would be tied to the same company). 
Thus agents would ask for more insurance, which would imply more redistribution, 
and thus ultimately more expropriation52. On the other hand, supposing that man­
agers cannot be replaced (at least in the short-term), as was often the case at the 
beginning of transition, it has been argued that giving effective control to managers 
and making them residual claimants on profits would be an efficient strategy to 
induce restructuring. Only when incumbent managers could not afford to acquire a 
sufficient amount of shares and it was politically impossible to hand them over the 
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de facto control over cash flows to management53. In any case, as some economists 
have argued in the Russian case, giving assets to insiders may in some situations be 
the only possible way of buying the necessary political support for privatisation54.
Which way to privatise best is ultimately an empirical question which, in ad­
dition, may vary depending on circumstances. While it seems uncontroversial that 
selling assets at realistic prices has fostered the best results, the current empirical 
evidence on “second best” privatisations is more ambiguous. It has become clear 
that one of the aims of mass privatisations, be it by vouchers or insider privatisa­
tion to workers, namely to spread wealth widely over the population, has failed in 
most transition countries where this approach was chosen. Reasons vary, but ulti­
mately come down to the fact that in situations where property rights in general 
and minority shareholder rights in particular are poorly defined and defended, small 
shareholders will be expropriated by larger shareholders or management in one way 
or another. Setting up institutions that are supposed to defend minority shareholder 
rights in such a poor institutional and legal environment (for example banks or in­
vestment funds) has proven to be of little use, as those institutions, often poorly 
regulated, mainly pursued their own interests at the population’s expense.
As regards efficiency of mass privatisation methods in transition economies, they 
have generally allowed the birth of a private sector, even if not always of the “western 
European” style that had been expected. Moreover, privatised enterprises have in 
general outperformed their state counterparts, regardless of the means of privatisa­
tion55. With regard to the different second best privatisation methods, the empirical
53B6s/Harms 1997
54Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1995
55 See e.g. Brown/Earle 2000 and Brown et al. 2006. This finding is not unaminous, however. 
The aforementioned studies, while finding significant positive effects of privatisation for enterprise 
performance for most transition countries under investigation, find only very weak evidence for 
Russia (and only with very long time lags). Sabirianova et al. 2005 e.g. show that in Russia 
and the Czech Republic in the 1990s privatisation to domestic owners did not markedly improve 
efficiency. Djankov and Murell 2002 also find that in transition countries commercialised state 
ownership was superior to some forms of private ownership, though generally remained inferior to 
relatively concentrated private ownership by outsiders.
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evidence is scarce and ambiguous. While insider privatisation is sometimes blamed 
for having brought slightly worse results in efficiency gains, giving away enterprises 
at huge discounts to political proteges, as happened in Russia and Ukraine, may 
have brought economic efficiency gains at the cost of political inefficiency.
2.3 Privatisation - How has it been done ?
In recent years, in addition to the normative aspect of how best to privatise, interest 
has increasingly focused on positive issues, namely how and why governments actu­
ally privatise. Empirical work using data from a large number of countries has shown 
that assets are generally underpriced during privatisations (and especially more un­
derpriced than similar initial public offerings)56. Moreover right-wing governments 
tend to sell state assets at much larger discounts than their left-wing counterparts57, 
and try to spread share ownership more widely among domestic voters58. This has 
been interpreted as proof that privatisations, apart from officially stated goals such 
as increasing efficiency, raising revenue or increasing stock market liquidity59, are 
mainly undertaken for strategic political reasons to shift the political preferences of 
the population. More precisely “Machiavellian” right-wing governments would un­
derprice privatised assets to increase the wealth position of the middle-classes, thus 
changing their political preferences and inducing them to support more right-wing 
policies60.
Another example of how governments can use strategic considerations in privat­
isation programs concerns the choice between share-issue privatisation as opposed 
to direct asset sales in auctions. It has been shown that some governments have 
dominantly used share issue privatisations at the beginning of their privatisation
56Underpricing can be general, or targeted to a specific group (e.g. retail investors). See Kelo- 
harju et al. 2004 on this issue.
57 Jones et al 1999
58Bortolotti/Pinotti 2003
59 On the effect of privatisation on stock market liquidity see e.g. Bortolotti et al. 2007.
60Biais/Perotti 2001
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programs, which could be explained by their desire to create a broad ownership 
structure that would render future re-nationalisation more difficult61.
In the third chapter of this thesis we establish a minimal, but relatively general 
framework of how to think about privatisation from a political economy perspect­
ive. This model allows for strategic privatisation initiatives, but at the same time 
considers other political economy and standard economic motives for privatisation. 
It has the advantage of being able to explain not only the stylised facts that a “Ma­
chiavellian” privatisation approach can convincingly answer, but also the stylised 
facts where this approach remains unconvincing. Furthermore our model makes it 
possible to address broader questions related to privatisation, as for example the 
connection between privatisation and the efficiency of a country’s tax system. We 
show that inefficient taxation decreases the likelihood of privatisation to be politic­
ally feasible, and argue that inefficient taxation systems are partly responsible for 
the lack of enthusiasm of the poor for privatisation that has been observed in many 
less developed countries.
2.4 Understanding and fighting Corruption
In spite of the considerable progress made on macro-stabilisation and privatisation 
in a large number of countries, economic performance has not always been as strong 
as would have been expected. Driven by this fact the focus has recently shifted to the 
importance of good institutions for sustainable growth and development. Fighting 
corruption has thus become a number one priority in a large number of countries 
and for the international donor community
While until the beginning of the nineties there was no consensus in economic 
literature about the overall effect of corruption (being “grease” or “sand” in the 
wheels of the economy), it has recently been established empirically that corrup­
61Perotti/Guney 1993
Chapter 1 : Survey 27
tion has almost exclusively negative effects62. In cross-country studies focusing on 
the link between corruption, investment and growth, corruption has generally been 
found to entail significant costs63. Without aiming to give a complete fist of its 
potential negative consequences64, corruption has also been shown to decrease for­
eign direct investment and to bias foreign capital inflows towards short-term money, 
which increases the likelihood of a country suffering from financial crises65. Cor­
ruption reduces government spending on, as well as return to education66, while 
the performance of government projects has been proven to be by far superior in 
countries with more developed civil liberties (that are highly correlated with lower 
corruption levels) 67. Corruption was also found to increase the death toll of natural 
disasters68. It has been shown that the size of the underground sector is larger in 
countries with higher levels of corruption and red tape, thus restricting the possib­
ility of governments to obtain resources69. On the national level, a study of the 
economic performance of Italian regions found corruption to have led to a decrease 
in growth, both directly, and by decreasing the productivity of public investment 
expenditures70. Corruption has also been shown to decrease traffic safety in India71.
Given the overwhelming empirical evidence on its negative consequences, fighting 
corruption has become an important task. In principle this fight can be done in two 
ways, directly and indirectly. The direct way is for governments to tackle corruption 
in their countries “from above”, by trying to clean up bureaucracies. Pressure 
from international donors, for example making aid payments dependent on “good 
governance” , can provide additional incentives for reluctant governments to join the
62 For an overview of the relevant literature see Aidt 2003 as well as Jain 2001.
63See Mauro 1995/1998, and Paldam 2002.
64 For a survey on the economic costs of corruption see Dreher/Herzfeld 2005.
65 Wei 2000/1997b
66 Mauro 1998 and Le Van/Maurel 2007
67Isham, Kaufman, Pritchett 1997
68Escaleras et al. 2006
69 Friedman et al 2000
70 Del Monte/Papagni 2001
71 Bertrand et al. 2006
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crusade. However, both because governments are not always sincerely interested 
in fighting corruption (they are potentially its largest beneficiaries), and because 
corruption is an entrenched problem, it has been proposed to aim for structural 
changes instead.
It has been shown that countries with higher rents, both from natural resources 
and lack of competition, suffer from higher corruption levels72. Corruption is higher 
in countries with a “bad” bureaucratic structure, especially non-meritocratic hir­
ing73, and low civil sector wages74. Finally corruption is higher where human capital 
is low75, and in societies where women are less present in parliament, the administra­
tion or the labour force76. There has equally been tentative evidence, that countries 
with weak and politically dependent judicial systems suffer from higher corruption 
levels77. Thus the main indirect measures proposed to fight corruption have been 
to foster economic competition by opening up the economy to trade, to introduce 
meritocratic hiring and fair wages for the state administration, to increase education 
and the participation of women in the workforce and government, and to increase 
the independence of the judiciary.
Chapter 4 of this thesis contributes to the joint research effort to determine indir­
ect ways of fighting corruption. We show theoretically that the impact of education 
on corruption depends on the capacities of civil society to monitor government. If 
those capacities are well developed, education decreases corruption, whereas it may 
lead to higher corruption if civil monitoring is low. We show empirically that while 
more basic forms of education do improve corruption even in countries that lack 
press freedom, increases in higher education only have a positive impact on corrup­
tion in countries that profit from a sufficient amount of press freedom. We also show
72Ades/DiTella 1999
73Rauch/Evans 2000
74 See Van Rijckeghem/Weder 1997 for an empirically based discussion of this issue.
75Ades/DiTella 1997a
76Swamy et al 2001
77Ades/Di Telia 1997b
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empirically that corruption and press freedom are strongly related.
Chapter 5 of this thesis finally econometrically investigates the importance of 
political economy and structural reform issues in a concrete example, namely Rus­
sian regional growth performance for the period from the start of transition to 
2004. It has been motivated by the striking disparity in the development of Russian 
regions, and its aim is to study to what degree regional differences in the politico- 
institutional setting, and reform efforts can explain hugely differing growth rates. 
We furthermore investigate what other variables can explain these differences in 
economic performance. For this we use panel data for 77 Russian regions from 1994- 
2004, and apart from the impact of politico-institutional variables and indicators 
of economic reform, we study the impact of initial conditions, including economic, 
geographic and structural features, on regional growth performance.
Chapter 2
The Political Economy of 
Inflation, Demonetisation and 
Redistribution: Can there be 
Sustainable Stabilisation in the 
Presence of Distributive Conflict?
From the point of view of macroeconomic stabilisation the last decade of the 20th 
century has been highly successful. While in the late 1980s and early 1990s a large 
number of Latin American and a majority of Eastern European Countries experi­
enced periods of high, if not hyperinflation1, by 2000 high inflation was, with few 
exceptions, defeated around the globe. Inflation rates were in the single digit range 
in a majority of countries, and in the low double digit range in most of the others. We 
use a political economy perspective to explain the success of stabilisation attempts 
in the last decade of the 20th century, especially compared with attempts in earlier
!For an overview of "Modern Hyper- and High Inflations" see Fischer et al. (2002).
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decades, where failures abound. Inflation is regarded as the outcome of distributive 
conflict that leads to large budget deficits which are eventually monetised. In the 
context of a voting model that investigates the relationship between inflation, mon­
etisation and distributive conflict, we investigate how financial innovation influences 
individuals’ capacity to shield from inflation tax, and thus changes the structure of 
the political inflation game. It is argued that it is precisely these structural changes 
that have led to a decrease in the intensity of distributive conflict, thus creating a 
political environment which has allowed stabihsation to succeed on a broad front2.
Our emphasis on an unresolved distributive conflict as the ultimate reason un­
derlying high inflation contrasts with the traditional two main approaches in macro- 
economic literature. The optimal taxation approach sees the inflation rate as the 
choice of a government that optimally sets tax rates arbitrating between different 
distortionary taxes, one of them being inflation tax3. What might be called the 
“Phillips curve explanation” regards inflation as the consequence of a deliberate 
attempt of governments to reduce unemployment and boost national production. 
In its rational expectations version, this approach comes down to explaining infla­
tion as resulting from a credibility and commitment problem of government, and 
the standard solution generally proposed is to create an independent central bank4. 
The main shortcoming of these approaches is that they fail to provide convincing 
explanations of high inflation. Optimal taxation models can produce high inflation 
only by assuming that high inflation has low efficiency costs -which it clearly has
2It could be argued that the success of stabilisations during the 1990ies resulted mainly from 
a benign world economic environment or improvements in institutional features, such as more 
independent central banks. While these aspects undoubtedly did help in some cases, successful 
stabilisation programmes were started both in periods of global economic recession and growth. 
Moreover, institutional features are to a large degree endogenously determined by the political 
process. Thus increasingly independent central banks, when they are not simply thought of as the 
solution of a time inconsistency problem, should reflect a generally increased inflation aversion, 
becoming thus the reflection rather than the cause of more fundamental changes.
3see e.g. Mankiw 1987
4 see Barro/Gordon 1983
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not5-, or that all other taxes are extremely distortionary, something empirically un­
reasonable in all but the most underdeveloped countries. Credibility type models are 
unable to generate high inflation, not to mention hyperinflation, unless one assumes 
governments to have an irrational distaste of unemployment.
The present work addresses the main shortcoming of these approaches, the neg­
lect of political and distributive struggle in explaining deadlock situations that cause 
bad economic policies. It belongs in this respect to the strand of formal political 
economy models which use prisoners dilemma constellations to explain suboptimal 
policy choices, such as unsustainable budget deficits or high inflation. Aizenmann 
(1992) for example describes a seigniorage game within a monetary union, where 
the fact that local monetary authorities can capture the benefits of money emis­
sion and socialise the costs, inevitably leads to high inflation. Alesina and Drazen 
(1991) provide an explanation for stabilisation delays in economies characterised by 
strong initial macro-imbalances. Using a two person war of attrition type of game 
where each party tries to push the burden of stabihsation on the other party, they 
argue that stabilisation only occurs once one of the groups has become sufficiently 
weakened to admit defeat and shoulder the burden of stabilisation. As we think that 
outcomes of political power struggles are rarely final, this paper provides a different 
explanation for lasting stabihsation that focuses on structural changes in the eco­
nomic environment. The spirit of the model, however, is similar to Alesina/Drazen: 
distributive conflict leads to policy choices on inflation and stabihsation that are 
suboptimal from a social welfare point of view, but nevertheless prevail as they al­
low for redistribution. This idea is equally developed in Sturzenegger and Laban 
(1994), where the inflation tax is used to finance a transfer from the rich to the poor, 
although the rich have the possibility of using an inflation tax evasion technology 
to escape this tax. We refer to this technology as “financial adaptation”. It encom­
passes currency substitution, capital flight, and more generally any means by which
5 see Bruno/Easterly 1998 for empirical evidence?
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an agent reduces his exposure to or use of the local currency. Sturzenegger/Laban 
show that inflation increases when financial adaptation by the rich rises, leading to 
a distributive shift at the expense of the poor.
Financial adaptation is equally key to explaining inflationary processes is Mondino 
et al (1996). They show that in the presence of a fixed budget deficit the simple 
possibility for agents to substitute away from the local currency can create dynam­
ics that lead to rising inflation. More precisely they describe a prisoners’ dilemma 
situation where interest groups continuously lobby for transfers. These demands 
leads to a fixed budget deficit that a weak government finances by money creation. 
Individuals react to increased inflation by using financial adaptation more intens­
ively which decreases the inflation tax base. Thus inflation has to be raised to higher 
levels each period to finance a budget deficit of a given, constant size. Consequently, 
currency substitution deepens further, which in turn leads to higher inflation in the 
next period, and so forth.
While Laban/Sturzenegger and Mondino et al. are the closest in spirit to our 
work, the model presented here improves on them in two important dimensions. 
First, we consider an explicit political decision mechanism that makes it possible 
to explain why redistribution, and thus inflation, occur at all, and to determine 
endogenously the direction of the transfers. Second, we endogenise the level of 
redistribution (the budget deficit) which has to be financed by the inflation tax. 
Supposing the size of the budget deficit as given seems a reasonable assumption 
only in the short-term. In the medium and long run the budget deficit is clearly a 
choice variable of the government and should be treated as such, that is it should 
be endogenously determined in a political equilibrium. Regarding inflationary pro­
cesses not only as short-term phenomena, but potentially as long-term processes is 
demonstrated by the example of Latin American countries like Argentina and Brazil 
that suffered from high inflation for decades.
In the present paper, a voting model with heterogeneous agents that differ prin­
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cipally in their capacity to generate income, is developed. Agents vote on inflation 
tax which is a proportion of income and redistributed in a lump sum fashion. One 
may think of this as a vote for a certain level of redistribution or a size of a fiscal 
deficit, which can only be covered by inflation tax6. An explicit cost of inflation is 
assumed. Agents can learn how to avoid paying inflation tax, but tax evasion has 
a cost which increases with the level of evasion. At the beginning of the period, 
each agent determines his optimal level of tax evasion, rationally, thus correctly, 
anticipating the inflation tax rate. It is supposed that richer individuals have an 
advantage over less wealthy individuals in acquiring the evasion technology. After­
wards, an election takes place and the most preferred tax rate of the decisive voter 
is implemented.
It is shown that depending on parameter values, as e.g. the cost of financial 
adaptation, or simply people’s expectations, varying political coalitions with differ­
ent inflation outcomes can be obtained in this setting. When financial adaptation 
technology is very costly, one typically finds coalitions between less-well-off agents, 
attempting to redistribute in their own favour from richer agents who cannot avoid 
inflation tax. When financial adaptation is sufficiently cheap, the political outcome 
differs depending on income distribution. If the society is in a certain sense more 
inegalitarian then extreme coalitions including rich agents (who manage to insulate 
themselves by and large from the inflation tax) and poor agents form to “squeeze the
6 As inflation tax is only one specific -  though somewhat peculiar -  form of taxation, our basic 
model could in principle also be applied to other contexts of (income) taxation where the possibility 
of tax evasion exists. However, from a political economy perspective results are likely to be more 
interesting if sufficiently large parts of the population have the potential for substantial tax evasion 
(or large changes in evasion behaviour), with almost complete tax avoidance being a realistic option 
for them. This clearly holds in the case of inflation tax, probably because many ways of avoiding 
inflation tax are both not illegal and have, under reasonable legislation, no vocation for being so. 
Whether widespread and large-scale tax evasion - with the possibility of almost complete avoidance 
for large parts of society - is a realistic feature for many other forms of taxation (including income 
tax) is at least questionable. Moreover, the exact way the cost of financial adaptation (i.e. tax 
evasion) is specified here may not be optimal for other forms of taxation, and the extensions of 
the basic model in section 3 are clearly specific to inflation tax and would not make much sense in 
most other contexts.
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middle-classes”. Conversely, in more egalitarian societies, as well as in inegalitarian 
ones when the cost of inflation tax evasion is sufficiently close to zero7, one may 
get situations in which rich agents and the middle-class (both sufficiently safe from 
inflation tax) form a coalition against the poor.
The result that the redistributive impact of inflation is somewhat ambiguous 
seems to fit nicely with the contradicting observations and results found in literature 
on this subject. The regressiveness of inflation tax has recently received qualified 
empirical support by Easterly/Fischer (2001), who show that less wealthy agents 
consider inflation a larger problem, and that on average, inflation increases inequal­
ity. However, there is also some evidence about cases where inflation was used to 
redistribute towards the lower strata of society8, with the Argentine populist periods 
under Peron (1946-55 and 73-75) probably being among the best known episodes.
In our model, agents’ preferences with respect to inflationary redistribution de­
pend on the degree to which financial adaptation is available and affordable. Dis­
tributional implications result thus not only from different levels of inflation tax 
evasion, but equally from different inflation rates in political equilibrium, the latter 
being determined by financial adaptation technology. Another interesting feature of 
the model is the fact that there are multiple equilibria in the level of inflation tax, 
and changes in inflation can be entirely driven by changes in expectations. This 
is closely related to Saint Paul/Verdier (1997) who show that politico-economic 
redistribution models can generate multiple equilibria in taxation when economic 
parameters are such that the tax base of the decisive agent is more elastic that 
the average tax base. In the present framework, a reduction in the cost of finan­
cial adaptation shifts political coalitions and may induce a dramatic change in the 
elasticity of the inflation tax base of the decisive voter, generating the possibility of 
multiple equilibria.
7 Such an outcome depends on the poor being strongly constrained in their ability to use financial 
adaptation.
8 See Easterly/Fischer (2001) for references.
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Moreover, we investigate the impact of external shocks or budget adjustment 
traps on inflation depending on the level of financial adaptation in the economy. It 
is shown that economies with a high level of financial adaptation axe significantly 
more sensitive to shocks or budget adjustment traps, and their risk of hyperinflation 
is consequently dramatically increased. In the last part of this chapter, the model 
is made dynamic by endogenising the cost of acquiring financial adaptation techno­
logy. Stabilisation occurs when permanent high inflation and decreasing costs for 
financial adaptation technology have led to such an erosion of the inflation tax base 
that further inflation financed redistribution becomes useless, and the distributive 
struggle ends. However, as long as inflation tax evasion^ossibilities remain limited 
for some parts of society, high inflation can occur even with low overall levels of 
the tax base. Hyperinflation, though not necessary, can be helpful for permanent 
stabilisation insofar as it speeds up the erosion of the inflation tax base.
Based on this model, we argue that the main difference between stabihsation 
attempts in the last decade of the 20th century and those in earlier decades are 
increased and cheaper financial adaptation mechanisms that allow agents to substi­
tute away from a weak currency. Learning certainly played a role in this process, 
but we think that the critical difference came from the fact that, starting towards 
the end of the 20th century, globalisation and especially integrated financial mar­
kets increasingly allowed for fast and low cost currency substitution. As financial 
adaptation became widespread, monetisation ratios in countries with high actual or 
past inflation reached extremely low levels9. Moreover in those places where they 
stayed somewhat higher or recovered with stabilisation, agents are ready to switch 
out of the local currency at the first sign of trouble. This significantly limits the 
amount of inflation tax that can be obtained by printing money. Redistributive
9In 1997 monetisation measured as M l/G DP in Argentina and Russia for example (both coun­
tries that suffered from very high inflation in the early 1990ies) was respectively 6.6% and 10.5%. 
On the contrary in the Czech Republic (a country that has managed to avoid high inflation in recent 
history) this ratio was 25.4%, roughly the same level as Germany (24.8%) or France (23.8%).
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conflict over the inflation tax revenues has thus often become meaningless, creating 
in many countries the basis for successful stabilisation and sustained low inflation.
1 T he general m odel
We use a standard political economy voting model, where the political process is 
interpreted as the formation of coalitions that use their power to redistribute income 
in their favour. Agents are heterogeneous, that is from N distinct classes, where 
for convenience, each class is assumed to have the same large number of identical 
individuals that is normalised to 1. Agents from different classes vary in their 
capacity to generate income. This difference may arise from differences in physical 
capital (physical capital is thought of as inflation proof assets, such as enterprises or 
machines) or human capital. An agent with (human and physical) capital h has a 
per period income of R(h), where R(.) is supposed to be monotonically rising in h. 
Later on, for analytical convenience, the general framework is restricted to a three 
class setting in order to solve explicitly for the political outcome.
All individuals decide on the inflation tax rate r  in a general vote. As inflation 
can be obtained from the inflation tax rate by a simple transformation, that is 
7r =  f inflation and inflation tax are equivalent from the point of view of our 
model. This is why inflation tax or the inflation tax rate are sometimes abusively 
referred to as inflation or the inflation rate. The vote on inflation can alternatively, 
and more realistically, be thought of as a vote on a certain level of redistribution, or 
the size of a fiscal deficit, which can only be covered by printing money. Inflation 
tax revenues are assumed to be redistributed in a lump-sum fashion where every 
individual obtains exactly the same amount. Apart from simplicity, this neutral 
specification avoids the risk of discretionary results in function of the redistribution 
scheme assumed. Redistribution thus occurs as agents pay higher or lower levels of 
inflation tax. In spite of a lump-sum fashion redistribution scheme, redistribution
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via inflation tax is not without cost. There is a real cost of inflation10 L (t ) that 
rises over-proportionally with the level of inflation > 0 and ^  > 0 ) .  As a 
consequence of this real cost assumption, an outcome where redistributive struggle 
gives rise to inflation is not Pareto-optimal, though every individual is acting so as 
to maximise his personal utility. Actually one can think of this situation as a sort 
of multi-person prisoners’ dilemma situation.
In order to concentrate on determining inflation, we do not take into account 
government expenditures and government revenues other than those derived from 
inflation tax. This can be rationalised by the observation that it is often politically 
much easier to obtain inflation tax, as there is generally no need for parliamentary 
approbation to raise it, making it a very convenient tool for redistribution11. As 
of deficit finance, for simplicity it is assumed that the country is already highly 
indebted and that the government has no access to further credit.
Agents can learn how to avoid paying inflation tax, and we will refer to this as 
financial adaptation. One can alternatively think of financial adaptation as capital 
flight, currency substitution, or any technology which reduces the role of the local 
currency as a medium of exchange or stock of value. There is a cost C to reach 
a certain sophistication of financial adaptation, which then makes it possible to 
evade a specified part of the inflation tax bill. While there is no specific money 
demand function in our model, agents’ decisions on their level of financial adaptation 
implicitly determine their money demand12. In general financial adaptation is more 
intensively used by agents with high income as they have more to gain from a 
reduction in their inflation tax rate. However, with decreasing costs of financial
10 Microeconomic foundations of this assumption are provided e.g. by Tommasi (1994) and 
DeGregorio/Sturzenegger (1994).
11 The use of inflation tax could equally be explained by arguing that people in power do not 
want to use less distortionary taxes in order to constrain future incumbents who might not share 
their policy preferences in their spending possibilities (see Cukierman et al. 1992).
12An agent’s money demand is basically the share of his income for which he does not dispose 
of financial adaptation, and which is hence subject to inflation tax.
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adaptation this advantage diminishes. More precisely, an agent’s cost of financial 
adaptation C((p{,ai) is assumed to increase with the intensity of its use > 0 ,
> 0), and to decrease with his ability a* to access it. This ability, in turn, is 
positively correlated with human capital, that is a,i = a(hi).
This specification captures the idea that financial adaptation is relatively cheaper 
for agents with better education (and thus higher income)13, but its cost rises more 
than proportionally when individuals want to make more intensive use of it. The lat­
ter tries to formalise the observation that it is relatively easy to perform important 
transactions without using the domestic currency whereas it becomes increasingly 
difficult and costly to make people accept non-domestic currency in everyday oper­
ations (like, for example, buying food).
The cost of financial adaptation technology is later endogenised by assuming that 
it is decreasing in the general level of its use, thus it may be democratised over time: 
it becomes cheaper if it is more widely used and people learn about it from their own 
and others past experiences’. This framework captures two major stylised facts quite 
well, namely that with rising income people pay a lower percentage of their income 
in the form of inflation tax, and that with rising inflation money demand usually 
decreases. At the beginning of a period, every agent determines his optimal level 
of financial adaptation, anticipating rationally, thus correctly, the inflation tax rate. 
Then there is a vote on the inflation rate, and the election outcome is consequently 
implemented.
An individual i who chooses the level of financial adaptation </>■ has the following 
net revenue
RN{h) = R(hi)(l -  (1 -  f a r  -  L(t )) + } j T -  C ^ ,  ai). (2 .1)
The first term describes what is left of the individual’s gross income R(hi) once
13See Sturzenegger (1997) for microeconomic foundations of this feature.
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effective inflation tax payment and the dead weight loss of inflation L(r) have been
deducted. The second term characterises the transfer each agent obtains. As total
to capture over-proportionally rising costs of higher inflation, with the parameter 
a  describing how costly inflation is for a given economic environment14. The cost
and straightforward way of capturing more than proportionally rising costs with 
increased levels of financial adaptation, and declining costs with an agent’s ease a 
of using financial adaptation technology. The parameter c describes the cost level 
of financial adaptation in a country in general.
Thus each individual i tries to maximise his net revenue (supposing for simplicity 
a linear utility function15), that is
The timing is now the following: In the first step, every agent determines his 
preferred level of financial adaptation technology, rationally anticipating the future
14Widespread indexation, for example, would be a means of reducing a.
15 To keep the model explicitly solvable we assume that agents are risk neutral and their utility is 
simply their amount of disposable income. By supposing agents to be risk averse in an environment 
of some uncertainty our results would be strengthened as the process of currency substitution would 
be speeded up.
population equals N , each representative agent obtains of the total inflation tax 
revenues T  which are equal to
N
(2.2)
The third term of equation 2.1 finally depicts agent z’s cost of financial adapta­
tion.
For simplicity the revenue is assumed to be a linear function of income R(h) = h. 
Moreover the dead weight loss from inflation is specified as L(r) = | r 2, a simple way
function for financial adaptation is set as Ci{4>^ai) — again a very simple
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inflation rate. In the second step there is a general election, in which every agent 
votes for his preferred inflation rate, given the global level of financial adaptation 
resulting from the first step. The election delivers a decisive voter whose preferred 
inflation rate is implemented.
The model is solved by backward induction. First, for a given level of financial 
adaptation for each agent pi, the preferred inflation tax rate of the decisive voter d 
is characterised as the solution of:
In the first stage, each agent is small enough to think that his level of currency 
substitution has no impact on the inflation rate to be decided thereafter. Thus the 
evasion decision is determined by the maximisation of his net income, given the 
inflation rate r e he anticipates:
where TB is the total inflation tax base.
Taking the first order conditions of these two maximisation problems one ob­
tains16:
M ax hd(l -  {l-<pd)rd -  ^ r 2d)) + -  -^-J?d . (2.4)
L j—i
4>i =4>i =  hi°*Te (i = 1...N) and =
T .  hj I - h d-  ( 52 hjcfij J +(f>dhd
N  ______ N
obtains
Substituting for (f)j (j=l-..N) and defining h := "P hj , ah2 := Y laj^ j  one
16 In both cases second derivatives are negatives., so the first order conditions indeed describe 
maxima.
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This equation characterises the tax rate chosen by the decisive voter as the sum 
of two terms. The first one reflects the usual motive for redistribution. The poorer 
the decisive voter with respect to the mean, the larger the inflation tax. The second 
term reflects the impact of expected inflation r e on the inflation tax preferred by 
the decisive voter. Typically if the decisive voter has more ability to evade inflation 
than the average, the coefficient in front of r e is positive and the higher the expected 
inflation, the higher the preferred inflation tax rate. The reason is that the decisive 
voter has already insulated himself through financial adaptation from the inflation 
tax, and therefore is more willing to vote for a high inflation tax. On the other 
hand if the decisive voter has less ability than average to escape the inflation tax, 
the coefficient of the second term is negative and the higher the anticipated inflation 
tax, the smaller the preferred inflation rate. The reason is that the decisive voter is 
bearing more of the burden of redistribution than average. Hence he is in favour of 
less inflation.
Summarising our results, a political equilibrium  under ra tional expecta­
tions is thus a set of values (< ,^t) that fulfills the following four conditions:
1. Each individual’s financial adaptation decision is optimal given the inflation 
rate he expects. This implies that for each individual the level of financial adaptation 
maximises equation 2.5, that is:
<t>i = =  1-.JV). (2.6)
2. Expectations are rational, that is the expected inflation rate is equal to the 
actually implemented rate:
T e =  T d . (2.7)
3. The implemented inflation rate, given r e =  r d and each agent’s financial adapt­
ation decision, is optimal for the decisive voter (that is r d maximises 2.4), which
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leads to:
Ti  =  c(fr_2_M  (2.8)
ahdC + ah2 — adhq
4. d is actually the decisive voter in a general election over the inflation rate.
To compute the political equilibria one has to proceed in the following way: 
Supposing that x is the decisive voter one must first compute the optimal financial 
adaptation decision of all agents and the optimal inflation of x, the decisive voter. 
Then it must be verified that this really is a political equilibrium, i.e. that the decis­
ive agent will actually be chosen in the election (or determine the conditions under 
which that will be the case). To find all equilibria this exercise has to be conducted 
for each possible decisive voter, that is for N cases. In most cases the model can 
thus only be solved by simulations for specified parameter values. However if N=3, 
that is when there are three distinct classes, the algebra remains tractable, and the 
explicit solution of the theoretical model in a three class setting is presented in the 
following section.
2 E xp licit solu tion  o f th e  m odel in  a  th ree class 
se ttin g
For notational suggestiveness the three different classes will be referred to as poor, 
middle-class and rich, where an agent’s income rises from poor to rich, that is hp < 
hM < hR. As preferences are “well behaved” in the three class case, both the median 
voter theorem as well as the more recent citizen-candidate model (Besley/Coate 
1997) will lead to the same political outcomes17. For convenience,we will thus use 
the median voter approach as the computations are significantly simplified18.
17 As long as we consider one candidate equilibria with sufficiently small entry costs.
18 The median voter theorem applies as - given the exogeneous transfer rule - the policy space is 
one-dimensional and utility functions are strictly concave.
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For d to be the decisive (=median) voter in a rational expectations equilibrium, 
obviously all agents must expect the most preferred inflation rate of d, to be the 
inflation outcome. For this to be a political equilibrium it must be verified that d is 
effectively the median voter, that is either that T_d(r<i) > Td(rd) > T-d'(jd) or that 
T—d' (j~d) > Td{rd) > (rd)• -d and -d’ are the non-decisive voters and where r^ r^ ) 
is the preferred inflation tax rate of i given that the financial adaptation decision has 
been made knowing that the inflation tax rate will be r e =  t^. As what interests 
us is how political equilibria change with variations in the possibility of financial 
adaptation, we will seek to establish for which values of the parameter c (describing 
the cost of financial adaptation) political equilibria occur.
In the following it is assumed that the middle-class agents are poorer than the 
mean, that is Hm < h, and that h2M < h2. Both are empirically reasonable assump­
tions in most countries. Furthermore, the former is a standard assumption in most 
political equilibrium models, and the latter a condition that for reasonable choices 
of the parameters follows from the former. In order to be able to calculate explicit 
solutions one has to simplify the parameter a, that describes the ease with which 
individuals can use financial adaptation technology. More precisely it is supposed 
that ap = 0 and clm =  olr — «, which is a somewhat simplifying way of stating that 
people with higher capacity have easier access to financial adaptation technologies19.
We use the term "rich squeezing" for constellations where both middle class 
and poor favour a higher inflation tax than the rich, with a corresponding political 
outcome that transfers income away from the rich. "Middle class squeezing" and 
"poor squeezing" are the equivalent situations with income transfers away from, 
respectively, the middle classes or the poor. PDV, MDV and RDV stand for the 
poor (respectively the middle class or the rich) being the decisive voter. MP, PR 
and MR are simply parameter values (precisely defined below).
19 Though this simplification might seem somewhat strong, it does not alter the qualitative results 
of our model as simulations by the author have shown.
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In order to calculate the political equilibria, one must show under which condi­
tions each possible decisive voter (that is the poor P, the middle-class M and the 
rich R) will actually be the decisive voter. For example, to find political equilib­
ria with the middle-class being the decisive voter, one has to show that one of the 
“political equilibrium conditions” holds, that is either tp (tm ) > 
or t r {tm) > r M(rM) > tp (tm ), where Ti(M) is the preferred inflation tax rate 
of i, given that everybody has made his financial adaptation decision anticipating 
that M will be the decisive voter. We refer to the first case as “rich squeezing” , 
and the second as “poor squeezing” . In strict analogy the “political equilibrium 
conditions” for a poor individual to be decisive are t m (t p ) > Tp{rp) > t r (t p ) or 
t r (tp) > tp {tp) > tm (tp ), and for a rich voter tp (tr ) > t r (tr ) > t m {tr ) or 
tm (tr ) > t r (t r ) > t p (tr). As previously, we refer to the case in which rich and 
poor individuals have the lowest preferred inflation rate as rich and poor squeezing 
respectively, and to the cases where the middle-class is the most inflation averse as 
“middle-class squeezing”.
We take the “political equilibrium conditions” for a middle-class and a poor 
individual to be the decisive voter, and do somewhat tedious but straightforward 
calculations thus obtaining the following relations:
rp{rM) > t m {t m ) <=> c > ^ — hp^ M  _  ^ L ( :=  MP)  (2.9)
— hpjah ori
t r {t m ) >  t m (t m ) ^ c <  — -------------£ - ^ ( : =  M R )  (2 .10)
ah
T r ( t P )  >  T p ( T p )  &  C <  y j -  -  - y ( : =  P R )  ( 2 - 1 1 )\hR —  hp)ah ah
> tp {t p) c < M P (2.12)
Chapter 2 : The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilisation 46
When looking at possible equilibria where a rich individual is the decisive voter, 
one has, for “technical” reasons, to make another differentiation. Let us first suppose
clItP* ah2that c < a —(:= Cr ), under which circumstances one obtains the following two 
relations:
r p { j R) >  t r ( t r ) o c <  P R  
> t r ( t r )  &  c <  M R  
If on the contrary c > Cr , one obtains the relations:
t p { t r )  >  t r ( t r )  <=> c >  P R  (2.15)
t m{ t r )  > t r ( t r ) e > c >  M R  (2.16)
This means, for example, that the “political equilibrium conditions” for a rich 
squeezing equilibrium with M as the decisive voter, t p (tm ) > t m {tm ) > 
translate into the cost of financial adaptation c being c >  M P  and c > M R . It 
has to be verified now whether (or for which parameter constellations) these two 
conditions can be fulfilled simultaneously. In addition, political equilibria are only 
considered if c> = 0, as a negative cost of financial adaptation is clearly unreason­
able. It turns out that for a non-negative cost of financial adaptation in political 
equilibrium the implemented inflation (tax) rate is always non-negative.
To be able to conclude for which values of c, the cost parameter of financial 
adaptation, the above conditions hold, one must know the relative position of MR, 
MP, PR and Cr.  Straightforward (though tedious) calculations show that if hMhR < 
hphR +  hpJiM , a condition that can be interpreted as describing a more egalitarian 
income distribution, MP, MR>0; PR<0; C r  >MR and PR<MR<MP. If hMhR > 
hphR +  hphM , that is income distribution is more inegalitarian, than MP, MR<0,; 
PR>0; C r  >PR and MP<MR<PR. For a given case (egalitarian/inegalitarian so­
(2.13)
(2.14)
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ciety) and c in a specified interval one can determine whether there is a pohtical 
equilibrium, and if there is, who is going to be the decisive voter, and which inflation 
tax rate will be implemented.
Proposition 1 For c sufficiently small, there always are "comer solution" equilib­
ria of the npoor-squeezing " type with the rich being the decisive voter. These equilib­
ria are characterised by maximal inflation tax evasion of the rich and typically also 
the middle classes, and relatively high levels of inflation.
Proof. When for sufficiently small c the optimal financial adaptation decision 
by rich and the middle becomes constraint by the upper bound (the maximum 
possible financial adaptation is (f)R = <pM = 1 which means complete inflation tax 
evasion; note that </>P =  0 by assumption), the optimal tax rate of the decisive 
voter becomes independent of the theoretically optimal level of financial adaptation 
(which as above 1 is unrealisable). The preferred inflation tax rate of the decisive 
voter is therefore simply obtained by substituting the different maximum values for 
4> in 2.4, and deriving the optimal tax rate, which leads to T%orner = 3^ .  It is 
easily shown that for the rich being the decisive voter this potentially is a political 
equilibrium, as r Rorner = = T(f f rner, and with the poor being against
any inflation (as it only redistributes in their disfavour), the optimal inflation rate 
of the rich is indeed between the preferred rates of the poor and middle classes. 
For which values of c can such a corner solution equilibrium occur? As the optimal 
evasion decision compatible with an expected inflation rate of r Rorner = is 
(j)l =  , i=M,R, we can easily calculate the values of c for which ^  > 1
for i=M,R. We obtain the conditions that c < ^e- and c < As < 1,
the second condition is the binding condition such for (f)R = (f)M = 1, and we will 
therefore define ccorner := • It can easily be shown that ccorner < Cr,  implying
that corner solution equilibria can only occur up to a certain cost of tax evasion
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(which intuitively makes sense)20.B
Proposition 2 I f  hj^hp > hphji + hph,M, that is in a relatively “inegalitarian” 
society, there are urich squeezing” equilibria where a middle-class individual is the 
decisive (median) voter whatever the cost of financial adaptation c> 0. I f  the cost of 
financial adaptation is 0 < c < PR, there are also “■middle-class squeezing” equilibria 
with a poor agent being the decisive voter, as well as “middle-class squeezing” interior 
solution equilibria with a rich agent being the decisive voter. There are no other 
interior solution political equilibria.
Proof. We know that in a relatively ’’inegalitarian” society MP, MR<0, PR >0,C r>PR  
and MP<MR<PR.
Middle Class Decisive Voter : For ”rich squeezing” equilibria with a middle class 
individual as decisive voter it must hold that t p (t m ) > tm (tm ) > which
using equations 2.9 and 2.10 is equivalent to c>MP and c>MR. As MR and MP 
are both negative, these conditions hold for any (non-negative) cost c of financial 
adaptation. For ’’poor squeezing” equilibria with a middle class individual as decisive 
voter it must hold that > t~p (t m ) , which using equations 2.9
and 2.10 is equivalent to c<MP and c<MR. As MP and MR are negative, there are 
thus no non-negative c for which these conditions are fulfilled, consequently in the 
’’inegalitarian” case there cannot be poor squeezing equilibria with a middle class 
individual as decisive voter.
Poor Decisive Voter : For ’’rich squeezing” equilibria with a poor individual as 
decisive voter it must hold that t m (t~p ) > Tp(rp) > Tp(rp), which using equa­
tions 2.11 and 2.12 is equivalent to c>PR and c<MP. As MP<PR this is im­
possible, thus this type of equilibrium does not exist in this case. For ’’middle
20It is, unfortunately, analytically not possible to further gain interesting evidence concerning 
the position of ccorner with respect to the points MR, PR or MP, as these positions depend on 
exact parameter values. Obtained equations are also usually to complex to allow for meaningful 
interpretation of the different constellations of parameter values.
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class squeezing” equilibria with a poor individual as decisive voter it must hold that 
t~r (t p ) > Tp(rp) > tm (t p ), which using equations 2.11 and 2.12 is equivalent to 
c<PR and c>MP. As M P<PR there are thus equilibria for non-negative c, that is 
in the interval [0,PR].
Rich Decisive Voter : For ’’middle class squeezing” equilibria with a rich indi­
vidual as decisive voter it must hold that t p (tr) > t r (t r) > t m (t r), which under 
the assumption that c < C r  and thus using equations 2.13 and 2.14 is equivalent to 
c<PR and c>MR. As M R<Cr there are thus equilibria for non-negative c, that is 
in the interval [0,PR]. Under the assumption that c > C r ,  and thus using equations 
2.15 and 2.16, one obtains the conditions that c>PR and c<MR. As MP<PR this 
is impossible, thus this type of equilibrium does not exist.
For ’’poor squeezing” equilibria of the interior solution type with a rich individual 
as decisive voter it must hold that t m ^ r) > tr (t r ) > t p (t r ), which under the 
assumption that c<Cr and thus using equations 2.11 and 2.12 is equivalent to c>PR 
and c<MP. As M P<PR this is impossible, thus this type of interior equilibrium 
does not exist. Under the assumption that c > C r ,  and thus using equations 2.15 
and 2.16, one obtains the conditions that c<PR and c>MR. However as we know 
that C r>PR , there are no non-negative c that fulfill all three conditions, thus this 
interior equilibrium does not exist. ■
P roposition  3 ///imAr < hphR + hphM (that is a relatively “egalitarian” society), 
“rich squeezing” equilibria with a middle-class individual as decisive voter occur 
when the cost of financial adaptation c>  M P. Moreover, there are rich squeezing 
equilibria with a poor individual being the decisive voter if 0 < c < M P. I f  the cost 
of financial adaptation is 0 < c < M R, there are “poor squeezing” interior solution 
equilibria with a middle-class individual as decisive voter, as well as “poor squeezing” 
interior solution equilibria with a rich agent being the decisive voter. There are no 
other interior solution political equilibria.
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Proof. We know that in a relatively "egalitarian” society MP, MR>0, PR<0, 
C r>MR  and PR<MR<MP.
Middle Class Decisive Voter : For ’’rich squeezing” equilibria with a middle 
class individual as decisive voter it must hold that tp (tm ) > t m (t m ) > 
which using equations 2.9 and 2.10 is equivalent to c>MP and c>MR. As MP>MR 
(and both are positive), these conditions hold for any cost of financial adaptation 
c>MP. For ’’poor squeezing” equilibria with a middle class individual as decisive 
voter it must hold that t r (t m ) > t m (t m ) > t~p (t m ), which using equations 2.9 
and 2.10 is equivalent to c<MP and c<MR. As MR<MP, these conditions hold for 
any non-negative cost of financial adaptation c<MR.
Poor Decisive Voter : For ’’rich squeezing” equilibria with a poor individual 
as decisive voter it must hold that t m (tp) > Tp(rp) > t r ( tp ) ,  which using 
equations 2.11 and 2.12 is equivalent to c>PR and c<MP. As M P>PR and PR 
negative this conditions hold for any cost between 0<c<MP. For ’’middle class 
squeezing” equilibria with a poor individual as decisive voter it must hold that 
t r {t p ) > rp (rp ) > r M(rp), which using equations 2.11 and 2.12 is equivalent to 
c<PR and c>MP. As M P<PR this is impossible.
Rich Decisive Voter : For ’’middle class squeezing” equilibria with a rich in­
dividual as decisive voter it must hold that t p (t r ) > t r (tr ) > t m (tr), which 
under the assumption that c<Cp and thus using equations 2.13 and 2.14 is equi­
valent to c<PR and c>MR. As PR<MR this is impossible. Under the assumption 
that c>Cp, and thus using equations 2.15 and 2.16 one obtains the conditions that 
c>PR and c<MR. As Cp>MR this is impossible. For ’’poor squeezing” equilibria 
of the interior solution type with a rich individual as decisive voter it must hold 
that t m {t r ) > t r (tr) > Tp(Tp), which under the assumption that c<Cp and thus 
using equations 2.11 and 2.12 is equivalent to c>PR and c<MP. As MR<MP, these 
conditions hold for any non-negative cost of financial adaptation c<MR. Under the 
assumption that c>Cp, and thus using equations 2.15 and 2.16 one obtains the
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conditions that c<PR and c>MR. As PR<MR this is impossible. ■
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Proposition 4 The inflation rates in the political equilibria as specified in proposi­
tions 2 and 3 for, respectively, a poor, a middle-class or a rich individual being the de­
cisive voter, are t p d v  = , t m d v  = andrRDV =’ r u v  a h pc+ a h 2 ’ a h Mc+ ah 2 - a h 2M n u v  a h Rc+ ah 2 - a h 2R
The corresponding levels of financial adaptation of individuals i are respectively
^PDV =  f i w  =
ahpc-\-ah2 1 uhMC+ahP—alij^ 1 a h Rc+ ah 2—ahR
equilibria as specified in proposition 1 with a rich being the decisive voter and finan­
cial adaptation decisions being <fR = (f)M =  1 and (f)P = 0, inflation is r (f^ y er = ^ f *—
Proof. Follows directly from equations 2.8 and 2.6, as well as the proof of Pro­
position 1. ■
The results can be summarised in the following graphs (note that these graphs 
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Inegalitarian case
X/
R DV (comer sol.)
Poor Squeezing
>M DV: M DV: Rich squeezing c*=£> Rich squeezing
P DV, R DV:
=£> Middle class squeezing 
R DV (comer sol.):
=£> Poor squeezing
These graphs show the cost level of financial adaptation on the horizontal, and 
the inflation (tax) rate on the vertical axis. M DV (R DV, P DV) designate the 
intervals where there are equilibria with a middle-class (rich, poor) individual being 
the decisive voter. Both graphs clearly show the existence of equilibria bifurcations 
when financial adaptation technology parameter, c, changes. In both the egalitarian 
and the inegalitarian case, for large values of c (that is when financial adaptation 
is very costly to implement), a middle-class agent is to be the decisive (=median) 
voter and a unique equilibrium prevails. The poor agents would favour more inflation 
whereas the rich would prefer less. For a slightly lower c one has, in the egalitarian 
case, equilibria where a poor agent is going to be the decisive (=median) voter. 
In this case middle income agents favour higher inflation and high income agents 
prefer low inflation. These are thus the cases where poor and middle-class agents 
form a coalition to redistribute income to them from the rich (“Rich Squeezing”). 
Rich agents cannot prevent this as the cost of financial adaptation technology is
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still too expensive to allow extensive use of it. As long as the rich cannot evade the 
inflation tax it is optimal for the other agents to form a coalition against them, as 
redistribution from the rich is the most profitable option for everybody else.
For sufficiently low values of c, that is when the use of financial adaptation 
technology is widely practised by rich agents, these same agents can eventually 
overcome the coalition formed against them. This becomes possible as redistribu­
tion from them becomes less beneficial as they can avoid paying inflation tax to a 
large extent. In a more egalitarian society there might emerge a coalition between 
high and middle income agents to redistribute income away from the poor (“Poor 
Squeezing”) with relatively moderate inflation rates, and typically with a middle 
class individual being the decisive (=median) voter (though in certain constella­
tions a rich individual could also be the decisive voter). In the inegalitarian case 
there can be coalitions between poor and rich agents who favour higher inflation 
rates than middle-class individuals thus “squeezing the middle-classes” , with a poor 
agent (and under certain constellations with a rich agent) being the decisive voter.
Moreover, both in an egalitarian and an inegalitarian society, for c sufficiently 
small there are also "corner solution" equilibria. Those equilibria - where a rich 
individual is the decisive voter - are typically characterised by both the rich and the 
middle classes completely evading inflation tax, and using relatively high inflation 
rates to redistribute income away from the poor which cannot avoid inflation tax.
In any case, as there are multiple equilibria for low values of c, each of the groups 
containing the decisive voter can constitute an equilibrium if people expect this to 
happen21. For low values of c apart from the poor or middle-class squeezing there 
are still rich squeezing equilibria, and the middle-class or different poor squeezing 
cases only occur if people expect inflation to be sufficiently high. This is because 
only when the rich agents expect inflation to be high will they be willing to acquire 
sufficiently high levels of financial adaptation, making beneficial for them to join a
21A self-fullfilling expectations equlibrium of the JSaint Paul/Verdier (1997) type.
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coalition with the poor or the middle-classes. If people expect inflation to remain 
moderate, even in a situation where the poor and middle-class form a coalition 
against the rich, it is optimal for the latter to acquire less financial adaptation and 
accept to pay (relatively low) inflation tax on a larger part of their income.
One can see that for most cases inflation (tax) converges to zero when the cost of 
financial adaptation c goes to zero. Low values of c mean that financial adaptation is 
widely used, and thus the inflation tax base becomes very small. This ends inflation 
as the distributional struggle via inflation taxation has become meaningless as there 
is almost nothing left to redistribute. However, the corner solution equilibrium with 
complete tax evasion by the rich and middle classes and high inflation rates consists 
even when c goes to zero. This indicates that even when financial adaptation is 
rather cheap, high inflation remains a possibility as long as some parts of society 
have only limited capacity to evade the inflation tax. Whether in such a situation 
low inflation or the high inflation equilibria prevail depends solely on agents’ inflation 
expectations.
Finally, given that for a large range of values of c one finds multiple equilib­
ria, the question might seem relevant whether all these cases are equally likely or 
whether some of these equilibria are more or less robust than others. As is shown in 
the Appendix, the equilibria where either a poor or a middle-class agent are decisive 
voters axe robust to small errors in anticipations, whereas those equilibria with a 
rich individual are not. The intuition behind this finding is that equilibria become 
unstable if the capacity of the decisive voter to evade inflation is sufficiently above 
average levels, as in such circumstances errors in inflation expectations are no longer 
automatically corrected but become amplified (see appendix). Corner solution equi­
libria are "semi-stable". When inflation expectations are slightly too low, errors 
become amplified, eacxtly as with the other equilibria where a rich is the decisive 
voter. However, if inflation expectations axe too high this does not have any impact: 
as maximal evasion is constraint, neither financial adaptation decisions nor optimal
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tax rates are affected.
Though the main aim of this paper is not to discuss the impact of income distri­
bution on inflation, we would nevertheless like to comment briefly on this subject. 
A standard assumption, though not very well founded theoretically, is that more un­
equal income distribution leads to higher inflation. Beemtsma/van der Ploeg (1995) 
find some empirical support for this thesis. Though our results might be seen as 
roughly consistent with that idea, insofar as more inequality could sharpen the re­
distributive struggle, we think that the question whether inequality leads to more 
inflation is ambiguous22. If one thinks of inflation as a means by which the group in 
power may redistribute income in their own favour, than more inequality between 
in- and out of power agents will only give rise to higher inflation if redistribution can 
be raised. This will mainly be the case when inflation is used to redistribute from 
the rich to the less well off, because only then will higher inequalities always enable 
a higher redistribution level. If, on the other hand, inflation is used to redistribute 
from the less well off to richer strata of society (who, through financial adaptation, 
evade inflation tax), then more inequality might actually reduce inflation, as in such 
a case less well off agents have less income that is worth taxing away.
3 Introducing shocks or slow  adjustm ent
So far it has been assumed that the only reason for inflation is the conscious attempt 
of individuals to redistribute income in their favour via inflation tax financed trans­
fers. This simplification has made it possible to concentrate on the redistributive 
effects of inflation, and to show how the incentives to create inflation for redis­
tributive purposes vary with different levels of financial adaptation. But, in addi­
tion to these longer term determinants of inflation, there must equally be short-term 
effects. Otherwise we would usually see declining - or at least stable - inflation with
22 Which, by the way, might be a reason for the rather thin empirical proof for this hypothesis.
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rising levels of financial adaptation, especially ruling out episodes of hyperinflation. 
One explanation why this phenomenon might not be observed is that with rising 
levels of financial adaptation the real cost of inflation a might fall. This would im­
ply that inflation-financed redistribution would become less costly to society, which 
could further deepen the redistributive struggle and lead to rising inflation rates. 
This may be a promising feature to explore in further research, however it is not the 
focus of this work.
The main reason our model predicts constantly declining inflation with rising 
levels of financial adaptation is the assumption that in each period any level of re­
distribution desired by the decisive agent can be implemented. This is, of course, 
an unrealistic assumption in the short run. It usually takes time to change transfers 
and the size of a budget deficit, especially when those are to be cut. Furthermore, 
inflation is often used to create the necessary resources to “balance” the budget (or 
at least keep the deficit within the limits that international financial donors/markets 
are willing to finance) if the economy has been hit by shocks. This is easily under­
standable from a political economy viewpoint. Raising “ordinary” taxes or cutting 
expenditures, in addition to being unpopular, usually requires parliamentary ma­
jorities that are often politically difficult to obtain. Inflation financing often has the 
advantage of having no immediate political cost, and being easy to implement. In 
the following section short-term elements are incorporated into the general model, 
namely shocks and budget adjustment traps.
First, it is assumed that the economy is hit by shocks that, if negative, demand 
additional taxraising or cuts in government spending (and, if positive, make it pos­
sible to lower taxes or spend more). In order to avoid results that are mainly driven 
by informational asymmetries it is supposed that agents can observe the shocks. 
Thus they take them into account when making their optimizing decisions. Denot­
ing shocks by e this changes the formalisation in the following way:
Financial adaptation decisions are now taken by maximizing
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under T d(J](l — (j>j)hj) >= e . This condition simply states that the income 
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from inflation tax has to be at least as important as the amount of spending required 
by the shock.
Alternatively, suppose that the budget deficit is not freely adjustable. More 
precisely there is a minimal size of the budget deficit D in a given period that 
has to be financed from inflation tax. Replacing e with D, the conditions of this 
maximisation problem are identical to the one stated above, with the only difference 
being that the term that captures the transfer due to the shock disappears. The 
constraint in this case simply states that the income from inflation tax has to be at 
least as important as the minimal size of the budget deficit D .
It immediately follows that as long as the constraint is non-binding, the model 
basically does not change from the long-run inflation model presented in section 1. 
The most interesting case is thus naturally when the condition is binding. Then 
inflation is entirely determined by the need to finance the deficit or the shock. 
Thus it becomes irrelevant who is going to be the decisive voter as far as determ­
ining inflation levels is concerned. Under these circumstances, the inflation tax - 
referring notationwise to the budget deficit case23 - will be such that for a given 
inflation tax base the money raised is equal to D . So for r  =  —— substituting
3 =  1
23In the case of shocks simply replace D  by e.
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— hiSdie.(2 =  1...7V), and assuming rational expectations, the resulting quadratic 
equation is24
r
Simple derivation of the solution with respect to c shows that r  is decreasing in c 
{i.e.. is negative). Thus a shock or a not immediately compressible budget deficit 
of a given size will have a higher inflationary impact when financial adaptation is 
more widely used (that is for a lower c). In addition, for a smaller c, the term under 
the root in equation 2.17 becomes negative for lower values of D. When this term 
becomes negative the government can no longer finance its needed amount of tax 
income by inflation tax, however hard it tries. This situation arises as expectations 
of higher inflation lead to a more extensive use of financial adaptation such that 
the inflation tax base decreases at a faster rate than inflation increases, which we 
interpret as an hyperinflationary outburst. The fact that for a smaller c, a lower 
budget deficit D or shock e is sufficient to trigger hyperinflation illustrates how, for 
higher levels of financial adaptation, economies become more likely to end up in a 
hyperinflationary situation in the case of negative events.
4 T he dynam ics o f adaptation  tech n ology
This section illustrates how the static setting might be expanded to a dynamic one. 
The main assumption is that the cost function of financial adaptation technology 
is not fixed, but changes over time. More precisely, a kind of trickle-down effect is 
supposed, implying that the financial adaptation technology becomes cheaper when 
it becomes more widely used as in Uribe (1995). This can be justified by stating 
that agents simply learn from the experiences of their friends and neighbours or that
he _  / h  D
ah2 V 4~ah?2 Nah2c
24 There is a single economically reasonable solution of the quadratic equation as only for the 
negative square root a zero budget deficit coincides with zero inflation.
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when enterprises start to sell financial adaptation technologies on a larger scale, the 
cost of these technologies goes down. Supposing economies of scale for the organ­
isation of capital flight or the provision of foreign currency denominated accounts, 
for example, seems to be a reasonable assumption. Moreover, for higher levels of 
currency substitution the use of non-domestic currency will become more widely 
accepted in transactions thus the costs of using it will decrease. More precisely the 
cost parameter c is assumed to follow the following equation:
Ct = Ct-i +  /  — XA(ct-i) (2.18)
where /  is the rate at which people forget about financial adaptation (which makes 
it more costly) and A(ct-i)  is the total level of financial adaptation of the previous 
period.
An interesting question to investigate now is how the cost of the financial adapt­
ation technology (and thus the inflation tax base and the inflation rate) evolve over 
time. Unfortunately in doing so one encounters one of the main problems of polit­
ical economy modeling, namely that the complex structure of models with possible 
changes of the decisive voter usually does not allow for completely forward looking 
agents. To overcome that problem it is traditionally assumed that either the decisive 
voter does not change over time, which is often a somewhat unrealistic assumption 
that clearly does not hold in this model, or that agents are to some point myopic. We 
do the latter, insofar as in our dynamic setting the decisive agents do not take into 
account how the price level of financial adaptation will change in the future based on 
their actions today. Though it would undoubtedly be preferable to use a complete 
forward looking framework, we believe that this assumption does not pose a great 
problem in this case for two reasons: Firstly, financial adaptation, though sometimes 
occurring over a long period, is a process that rarely happens more than once in a 
country. Assuming that agents are not completely rational in foreseeing how it will
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evolve does not seem to be too far from reality. Secondly, using a time inconsistency 
argument, one sees that the inflation rate chosen by the decisive voter, (given the 
future evolution of the cost of financial adaptation) could never be lower than his 
optimal rate without bearing in mind this information. This occurs because if the 
other agents believe the decisive voter to implement an inflation rate that would be 
below his one period optimal inflation rate and would acquire financial adaptation 
accordingly, this would already deliver the optimal evolution path of the price of 
financial adaptation for the decisive voter, who would thus optimally fall back to 
his (higher) one period optimal rate. Thus in a complete forward looking model 
inflation could only be higher, which would only speed up the process of financial 
adaptation, but qualitatively would not change the results otherwise.
Let us return to the total level of financial adaptation, which is now A(Ct~i) =
N
Y^hj(f)y Using equation 2.6 to substitute for (f)j and then using equations 2.8 and 
j=i
2.7 to substitute for r e under the assumption that d is going to be the decisive voter, 
this becomes
N ^ ( h _ - h d)
' 1 ahdCt-i + ah2 -  adh\
Though the exact description of the evolution of the cost parameter c
heavily on the exact structure of the parameter values, supposing that / ,
at which people forget about financial adaptation is small, one typically
following picture25:
25 In the graph we have only drawn the line for total financial adaptation in the cases where M 
is the decisive voter. Typically for the cases where P or R are the decisive voter one obtains lines 
that are above the /  line without crossing it. This results from the fact that for those political 
equilibria financial adaptation is usually high, and there is thus a tendency for the cost of financial 
adaptation to decline further. These cases do not add anything to the dynamic structure.
Moreover, for certain parameter constellations one can obtain stable equilibria at high inflation 
rates; though this result is interesting we do not want to overstress it as it depends crucially on 
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If the economy is on the right-hand side of point c=p (which means that the cost 
of the financial adaptation strategy is very high), then the dynamics will drive the 
cost further up. This will allow the poorer agents to use more inflation to redistribute 
even more in their own favour as the financial adaptation possibility for the richer 
agents is practically excluded by its massive cost. This describes a situation where 
inflation rises, while at the same time the inflation tax base remains constant. This 
can be seen as a good approximation of a case of successful capital controls and 
prohibition to hold foreign currencies. To the left of point p, the dynamics will start 
to drive c down.
It can thus be seen that in a long-run perspective, everything that increases the 
cost parameter c (for example capital controls or the prohibition of possessing foreign 
currencies) will lead to higher levels of inflation, whereas - assuming that no group of 
society is constrained in it’s ability to use financial adaptation - everything that helps 
to keep c down (full convertibility, legal dollar denominated bank accounts, foreign 
currencies as a legal means of payment, etc.) helps to stop inflation. In the short- 
run all these measures might nevertheless have the opposite effect: in artificially 
expanding the inflation tax base, the government only needs a lower inflation tax 
rate to raise a given level of revenue, which might, in the case of external shocks or 
problems in the budget adjustment process, help to avoid a hyperinflation. Thus
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our model clearly shows the trade-off between inflation fighting policies that -more 
or less artificially- try to broaden the inflation tax base: they might have a beneficial 
short-term impact, but usually only at the cost of making things worse in the long- 
run. It might still be useful to apply those measures in situations of temporary 
crisis, especially if there is a realistic chance that the distributive conflict will end 
in the foreseeable future and a country will return to stability and social consensus. 
However, our model suggests that in chronically unstable countries with a long track 
record of distributive struggle, these measures should be avoided as - though giving 
temporary relief - they will, most likely, only make things worse in the future.
C onclusion
In this paper a theoretical framework has been developed to investigate the in­
teraction between distributional struggle, inflation and financial adaptation. We 
have discussed how different levels of financial adaptation lead to different coalitions 
and distributional outcomes. By endogenising the cost of financial adaptation we 
have shown how dynamically an economy can be driven from high to low levels of 
monetisation, where it then becomes particularly vulnerable to shocks or budget 
adjustment traps, and thus might suffer from hyperinflationary outbursts. We have 
argued that, as inflation is caused by budget deficits resulting from distributive 
struggle, final stabilisation occurs when the widespread use of financial adaptation 
has led to an erosion in the inflation tax base, so that inflation becomes useless for 
generating tax income. However, we also have shown that as long as inflation tax 
evasion possibilities remain limited for some parts of society, high inflation can occur 
even with low levels of the tax base. The model presented explains why stabilisation 
attempts in polarised societies might be doomed to failure in the early stages of an 
inflationary process with low levels of financial adaptation, unless demonetisation 
takes away the incentives to use inflation for redistributive ends. Financial liberal­
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isation, by facilitating financial adaptation, can be a helpful tool for overcoming such 
situations of distributive struggle, especially when available to all parts of society It 
should be noted, however, that low inflation by itself does not necessarily signify the 
end of distributive struggle which could simply have shifted to other spheres (e.g. 
wage bargaining in the private sector). Finally, a higher level of financial adaptation 
also increases the risk of hyperinflationary outbursts if the budget deficit cannot be 
kept under very strict control. In addition, as often mainly improving the posi­
tion of wealthier agents, financial liberalisation can have regressive distributional 
consequences.
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S tab ility  o f  equilibria
Given that for a large range of values of c we get multiple equilibria the question 
seems important whether all these cases are equally likely or whether some of these 
equilibria are unstable. Using equation 2.8 under the three different possibilities 
that people expect respectively a poor, a middle-class or a rich agent to be the
decisive voter, we obtain the following equations: Tp =  hajf£ +  re-^
+ and r R =  Given r  a function of r .  we
—ah? TM =
a h M othfrjc a h  i ahRC
see that the intercept falls from the first to the third equation (and is negative for 
the third equation). Given our earlier assumptions, the slope is positive for the first 
equation, mostly positive for the second equation (though negative under certain 
parameter constellations) and negative for the third26. Bearing in mind that at 
each equilibrium point (that is r  = r e) the resulting inflation tax rate r  must fall 
between the optimal inflation tax rates of the other two groups for a given r e, a 




26The graphs shown below are depict the case where the slope of the second equation is negative, 
but their message would be qualitatively unchanged if the slope was negative.
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Consequently we find two robust equilibria where either M or P are the decisive 
voter, the equilibrium of R being the decisive voter is not robust and converges 
towards either of the other ones if there are the slightest changes or errors in anti­
cipations.
This can also be deduced more formally. Looking at equation 2.8 Td(re) = 
7^7  ~~ka h ^ H~ Te second term reflects the impact of expected inflation r e 
on the inflation tax preferred by the decisive voter. Typically if the decisive voter 
has more ability to evade inflation than the average, the coefficient in front of re is 
positive, if the decisive voter has less ability than average the coefficient of the second 
term is negative. Importantly, equilibria will be stable to errors in anticipations if 
a^hahdchd^ ls smaller than one, as in this case errors in anticipations will be rectified 
through an error-correction process. If however this term is larger than one any 
errors in anticipations will be amplified, and hence equilibria will be unstable. Prom 
the above it results that equilibria are unstable if the capacity of the decisive voter to 
evade inflation tax is sufficiently above average levels. In this case a small overshoot 
of inflation expectations above the equilibrium value will lead to an even larger 
increase in the optimal inflation rate of the decisive voter, which in turn will further 
increase expectations etc.
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Straightforward calculations show that under the standard assumptions made in 
section 2 the coefficient in front of r e is always smaller than one for equilibria where 
P or M are decisive voters, and is always larger than one for equilibria where R is 
decisive voter. This confirms the intuition obtained by the two above graphs.
C hapter 3 
The Political Economy of Reform: 
Privatisation Beyond 
Machiavellism
There is hardly a subject that, over the two last decades, has raised as much in­
terest and passion in the economic profession as privatisation. While the economic 
mainstream in the seventies and early eighties rationalised the advantages of state 
ownership in a large number of sectors, in the late eighties the general consensus 
started slowly but surely to shift towards widespread support of privatisation of 
most state assets. The debate in the early nineties focused on the boundaries of ef­
ficient private ownership1, and the changes in the former communist countries were 
accompanied by a passionate economic debate about how to privatise their large 
and inefficient state sectors2.
Given the huge interest in normative features of privatisation, it is somewhat 
surprising that relatively little attention was devoted to positive issues. Neither the
^ e e  Hart/Shleifer/Vishny(1996) for the most fundamental contribution on this issue.
2See e.g. Roland(1994), Roland/Verdier(1994) and Boycko/Shleifer/Vishny(1995) for funda­
mental contributions.
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real motivations of governments that privatised, nor their methods in doing so at­
tracted much interest, with the exceptions of Perotti and Guney (1993) and Perotti 
(1995)3. Following these pioneering studies, in recent years the interest in positive is­
sues of privatisation has increased, and some interesting contributions have emerged. 
Though not exclusively focused on positive issues, the survey by Megginson and Net- 
ter (2000) provides an excellent starting point to familiarise with the recent history 
of and the empirical literature on privatisation. Megginson et al (2004) investig­
ate what determines whether state assets are sold in the financial markets through 
share-issue privatisation, or sold directly to investors. Jones et al. (1999) examine 
the effect of political and economic factors on the terms governments set in privatisa­
tions. Bortolotti/Pinotti (2003) investigate the relation between electoral systems 
and privatisation outcomes. On the theoretical side, Bennet et al.(2000) present a 
framework of how to conceptually understand insider privatisation. Perotti/Biais 
(2001), in what has become the canonical political economy explanation for privat­
isation, focus on how privatisation can be strategically exploited to change political 
preferences.
More precisely they argue that right-wing parties use privatisation in a Ma­
chiavellian fashion to increase the wealth of the middle-classes in order to ensure 
their future political support for right-wing policies. Underpricing in initial public 
offerings would be the vehicle through which this wealth transfer would be effected. 
As it would be more expensive to “buy” the middle-classes, that is to lift their in­
come above the mean income, when income differences between the rich and the
3Perotti/Guney observe that share-issue privatisation (opposed to direct asset sales by auc­
tion) are dominant at the beginning of privatisation programs, and explain this by the desire of 
the policymaker to create a broad ownership structure in order to render renationalisation more 
difficult. Perotti explains the observation that the British government usually kept equity stakes 
in the early stages of the privatisation programme by showing that it is in the interest of mar­
ket oriented governments, provided that control is effectively transferred to the private sector, to 
perform gradual privatisation. This way they can credibly commit to keeping their hands off the 
privatised companies, as political intervention would reduce the future sales value of the equity 
stake retained.
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middle-class are larger, one would expect more underpricing in more unequal soci­
eties. Finally, as only right-wing governments would have incentives to sell assets 
below their true value, this would equally explain differences in privatisation dis­
counts between right and left-wing policymakers.
Perotti/Biais quote several stylised facts that would corroborate their view. 
First, there seems to be a general tendency for excessive underpricing of assets, with 
underpricing being calculated as the % gain of a privatised company the first day it 
is traded (Biais/Perotti 2001, Jones et al 1999). One would expect some underpri­
cing in privatisations as, mainly due to problems of asymmetric information, initial 
share offerings of private companies are on average also underpriced. It is however 
hard to come up with economic reasons why state assets in share-issue privatisa­
tions (henceforth SIPs), that a priori are better-known and less risky, should sell at 
equal or even larger discount than private companies sold in initial public offerings. 
Second, according to Jones et al. (1999) there seems to be a tendency for greater 
underpricing in countries that -following some proxies as the share of government 
in GDP- are in some way more right-wing. Third, discounts seem to be higher in 
more inegalitarian countries (measured by the Gini coefficient). There is however a 
problem as the Machiavellian privatisation approach would equally predict that the 
larger a SIP, the smaller the degree of underpricing. This results from the fact that 
if the value of the privatised companies is bigger, a smaller discount (as measured 
in percentage terms) will already do the trick of lifting the middle-class above the 
mean. However, Jones et al. report the discount to be independent of the size of a 
SIP.
While we clearly agree that not only economic, but equally political consider­
ations have played a role in the set-up of privatisation programs, and that there 
have been cases where strategic “Machiavellian” considerations seem to have played 
a prominent role4 (and Perotti/Biais make an important contribution in highlight­
4 Britain seems a good case in point
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ing and explaining these cases), we find “Machiavellism” implausible as a general 
political economy explanation5. We thus establish a minimal, but relatively general 
framework of how to think about privatisation from a broader political economy 
perspective, which in addition allows to address broader questions related to privat­
isation. Our model allows for strategic privatisation initiatives. However, it also 
considers other political economy, and standard economic motives for privatisation, 
and establishes under which conditions the different motivations are likely to be rel­
evant6. Our framework explains not only the stylised facts that a “Machiavellian” 
privatisation approach can convincingly answer, but also those where this approach 
remains unconvincing.
We show that, indeed, in many constellations privatisation occurs for “standard” 
efficiency and political economy reasons, i.e. the potential for welfare increases due 
to efficiency gains from private ownership, and in some cases the possibility for the 
policymaker to use privatisation to redistribute part of these efficiency gains to its 
own constituency via underpriced assets. We also, in addition to "Machiavellian 
privatisation", find another possibility of strategic privatisation which we refer to as
5To give two concrete examples where we see the focus on the Machiavellian approach as mis­
guided: Perotti/Biais stress the ’Machiavellian’ aspect of Malaysian privatisation, in which sizeable 
wealth was transferred to the majoritarian ethnic Malayan and other bumiputra groups. As the 
ethnic Chinese control a large part of the economy, the ethnic Malayan and other bumiputra 
groups have traditionally been economically weak. It is however these ethnic groups that have had 
a political majority for the last twenty years (even though the Prime Minister relied on a broad 
coalition with Chinese business interests to secure his overwhelming majority in parliament). It 
seems therefore quite difficult to argue the case of a rich political group primarily handing out 
bounties to another one to buy its political support. An interpretation that sees those in power 
mainly transferring wealth to their -arguably less wealthy- constituency seems much more convin­
cing. Privatisation in Nazi Germany between 1933-37 is also commonly regarded as having been 
driven by the strategive motive of the Nazis to win over the support from German industrialists. 
While widening their political base was certainly among the motives of the Nazis, this simplistic 
view fails to acknowledge that a large part of the privatised assets actually went to party members 
and party organisations, and hence simply was a wealth transfer to the core Nazi constituency (see 
Bel 2006).
6Loosely speaking the conditions for strategic "Machiavellian privatisation" are that the po­
tential for efficiency gains from the assets that are up for privatisation must be quite substantial, 
without exceeding a certain threshold. Such a situation is more likely when either pre-privatisation 
incomes of the middle class are not far below the mean (while, at the same time, the income of the 
rich is far above it), or when pre-privatisation tax rates are very high.
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” Machiavellian support ”.
Our privatisation model draws on the political economy model of taxation by 
Meltzer/Richard (1981), as well as the “citizen-candidate” model developed by Bes- 
ley/Coate (1997). In our model, citizens from three distinctive classes (poor, middle- 
class and rich) compete for power. The winner of a general election where voters 
vote strategically becomes the head of the executive (the “president”) and has to 
decide on whether or not and how to privatise, and set tax rates. However, and 
here we depart from the citizen-candidate model, we model government not as a 
single agency, but (based on Alesina/Rosenthal 1995) as divided. Divided govern­
ment, either coalition governments or “presidents” lacking an absolute majority in 
the legislative, axe not an exception but almost the rule7.
Thus the elected president has to deal with a parliament reflecting the distribu­
tion of preferences in the population, that is the share of the seats in parliament 
of each social group corresponds to its population share. Given the divided struc­
ture of government, the president cannot simply implement his/her most preferred 
policies, but depends on a majority in parliament. In the spirit of the seminal paper 
by Romer/Rosenthal (1978) we see the president as an agenda setter, making policy 
proposals on certain issues to parliament, which may accept them or not. In case of 
refusal, the status quo prevails.
In our model all the stylised facts mentioned earlier appear naturally even for 
non-strategic privatisation. The intuitive explanation for non-strategic underpri­
cing is policymakers7 use of privatisation to redistribute to their clientele via dis­
counts. The lower discount at which left-wing policymakers privatise also has a 
very straightforward explanation that only necessitates the uncontroversial assump­
tion that poorer agents participate less actively in privatisations then more well-off 
individuals. The idea is the following: when right-wing or centrist governments
7Strohm (1984), based on a sample of 323 governments in 15 western democracies, reports 
divided government in more than 85% of cases.
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privatise at a discount, their clientele (respectively rich or middle-classes) largely 
benefits from the bargain price. On the other hand, when left-wing policymakers 
privatise at large discounts, not only do their clientele draw little profit from the 
discount (as they usually are not acquiring a large part of the assets), but they may 
even be negatively affected as a discounted privatisation may decrease the govern­
ment’s transfer potential. Hence the low enthusiasm of left-wing policymakers for 
discounted privatisations. It is equally not surprising that privatisations in more in­
egalitarian countries are more heavily discounted, given that right-wing governments 
privatise at a larger discount than their left-wing counterparts. It just requires the 
relatively uncontroversial assumption that countries that frequently have right-wing 
governments (mainly representing the interests of the better-off) will have a tend­
ency to be more inegalitarian. Finally, our model also succeeds in explaining the 
stylised facts where a pure Machiavellian approach fails, namely that underpricing 
is independent of the size of the privatised company (as measured by the market 
value of the shares on offer). When privatisation occurs for the above-mentioned 
"standard" motives the underpricing is independent of the size of the offer.
Finally, as mentioned, our model allows us to address broader questions related to 
privatisation, for example concerning the circumstances necessary for privatisation 
to proceed, and the main beneficiaries of a privatisation initiative. Here, we discuss 
the connection between privatisation and the efficiency of a country’s tax system. 
We show that inefficient taxation decreases the likelihood of privatisation being 
politically feasible. This is because the possibilities of compensating the losers from 
the discounted asset sale may be insufficient, a feature that may explain the general 
lack of enthusiasm for privatisation especially among the poor in less developed 
countries.
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Our model uses simplified elements both from Meltzer/Richard (1981) and Bes- 
ley/Coate (1997). More precisely we consider an economy (of total size 1) with 3 
groups of individuals, rich (R), middle-class (M) and poor (P) of size 0 < < 1/2
(i=r, m, p). Each group has a capital stock Ki that is equally split among the mem­
bers of the group, that is each individual has a capital ^  that he uses to generate 
income. For simplicity’s sake, we suppose individuals’ utility functions to be linear, 
so that an individual’s net income (after taxes and transfers) exactly represents his 
utility level. To simplify further, we assume that one unit of capital creates one unit 
of revenue. Thus, the revenue of social group i is Ri = K iy and the revenue of an 
individual belonging to group i is —. Moreover, we assume that poor individuals 
do not have any capital (and are unable efficiently to use physical capital). Thus 
they cannot generate income.
The main function of Government is to tax income and to redistribute it as a 
lump sum monetary transfer (one could equally think of this transfer as the provision 
of a public good). We assume everybody in the economy profits equally from this 
transfer. This avoids the results being dependent on a particularly biased way of 
redistribution. Though it is referred to as income tax, we consider taxation in a 
larger sense. Individuals are seen both as wage earners and enterprise owners. Thus 
all types of taxes that the enterprise is paying would be included in an individual’s 
income tax.
In a general vote, each individual i votes such as to maximise his personal well­
being as represented by his net income (after tax and transfer), that is
— ( l - r )  +  T. (3.1)
h 'i
In the preceding equation the first term describes an individual’s net revenue 
(apart from transfers), and the second term the share in the transfers an individual
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obtains. This transfer is financed by the government’s tax revenue, and the profit 
of the state owned enterprises II, that is T  =
j
The political equilibria is based on a slightly altered version of the “Citizen- 
Candidate” model8. More precisely citizens from three distinctive classes (poor, 
middle-class and rich) compete for power. The winner of a general election where 
voters vote strategically becomes the head of the executive. For simplicity we will 
refer to him as the “president”. More precisely he has to decide on whether to and 
how to privatise, and set tax rates. Here, we depart from the citizen-candidate model 
by assuming government to be divided between the president and a parliament. We 
model parliament as reflecting the distribution of preferences in the population, 
that is the share of the seats in parliament of each social group corresponds to its 
population share. While such an outcome is obviously obtained when parliament 
is elected under proportional representation, purists could argue that this is not 
the case in majoritarian parliament elections. Hence the applicability of our model 
would be limited. However, under most circumstances even a parliament elected by 
a majority system will, by and large, represent the population’s preferences, which 
for our results would be sufficient (we only need that none of the three social groups 
-that by definition comprise less than 50% of the population- obtains an absolute 
majority in parliament.).
Given the divided structure of government, the president cannot simply imple­
ment his most preferred policies. He depends on a majority in parliament. In the 
spirit of the seminal paper by Romer/Rosenthal (1978) we see the president as the 
agenda setter, making policy proposals on different issues to parliament, which can 
accept or reject each of them. If a policy proposal is refused, the status quo prevails 
with respect to this issue.
The exact timing of the political game is now as follows:
1. Both a president and a parliament are elected, the former directly by absolute
8 See Besley/Coate(1997).
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majority rule (following the citizen-candidate model), the latter by proportional 
representation.
2. The president decides whether he wants to pursue a privatisation initiative, 
and asks parliament for approval.
3. If parliament agrees, the terms of the privatisation are negotiated with the 
potential buyers. Thus the exact price of the assets in the privatisation (implying 
the discount) will depend to some degree on the respective bargaining powers of the 
president and the potential buyers. As everybody is rational, fully informed and 
forward looking, the president will only propose privatisation if it will succeed, and 
on terms that will allow it to succeed.
4. Once privatisation completed (or the decision not to privatise taken) the 
president can propose to change the tax rate, and if he obtains majority support for 
his proposition the tax rate is changed.
While it might seem unusual to think of privatisation as being targeted towards 
a special social group, privatisations are usually structured to have a large impact 
on a particular group. For example, closed insider privatisation, or tenders for large 
entities are mainly oriented towards the rich. In such a set up it would be very 
difficult for middle-class individuals to win control over privatised assets, as they 
would lack the necessary connections and/or financial power9. By contrast, public 
share offerings (possibly with a limit to the amount of shares an individual can buy, 
or special financial incentives for retail investors), or the sale of large enterprises 
in small entities, would favour privatisation towards members of the middle-class. 
While we do not claim that in reality privatisation is entirely restricted to one class, 
in a large number of cases is will be biased in favour of some type of individuals10. 
Assuming that privatisation is targeted towards one social class is a simple way of
9 Supposing that they are credit constrained.
10Following Keloharju et al. (2007) retail incentives have been widely used in SIPs, and the 
value of these incentives has been substantial. Retail incentives have also had a large impact on 
participation of retail investors (read: the middle classes) in privatisations.
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capturing this stylised fact, while keeping the model simple.
All individuals have perfect information, are rational and forward-looking in any 
of their decisions, and pursue their own best interests given the constraints they 
face. We solve the model backwards. We first determine all policy choices that a 
given policy-maker would take if in office (and get approved by parliament), and 
only then look at who will be the winner at the election stage.
The determination of the tax rate in our set-up is standard for political economy 
models. The rich obviously want minimal taxation, and the poor maximal taxation 
(we assume the maximal tax rate r max to be constrained to be strictly inferior to 
one11). The preferred tax rate of the middle-class (including the median individual) 
depends on their relative income position. If middle-class individuals are richer 
than the mean, they want minimal taxation. If they are poorer than the mean they 
want maximal taxation. We take the simplifying assumption that if, historically, the 
middle-class has been below the mean, the tax rate at the beginning of the period 
is maximal, and in the opposite case, the tax rate at the beginning of the period 
is minimal. Thus, if post-privatisation the middle-class is poorer than the mean, 
the post privatisation tax rate will be maximal (i. e. r max), if they are richer than 
the mean, it will be minimal (i. e. r mm). The post-privatisation tax rate depends 
therefore on the privatisation outcome. To underline this feature we will therefore 
- if the post-privatisation tax rate is different from the pre-privatisation rate - note 
those rates respectively t b p  (before privatisation) and t a p  (after privatisation); in 
cases where the tax rate remains unchanged we will simply note is as r.
11 Full taxation is empirically unrealistic. In addition, this constraint has the technical advant­
age of eliminating ’’division by zero” problems. It can also be justified by the assumption of a 
deadweight cost of taxation which is low (here zero) up to a certain level of taxation, and becomes 
higher (here infinite) thereafter. Such a switch could for example occur if beyond a certain tax rate 
agents migrate to the informal ("home production") sector, as e.g. in Acemoglu/Robinson 2000.
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Let us denote UBP the utility of an individual i before privatisation, and U^p its 
utility after privatisation.
Based on equation 3.1, an agent’s utility before privatisation is UBP =  (1 — 
t s p ) — +  T BP where the total transfer is T BP — II +  J~jrBPR j . During privat-
3
isation, assets are sold at a price P to the individuals of one social group12, and 
for simplicity we assume that each member of the social group acquires the same 
amount of privatised assets. Thus the “old” capital stock of the new owners of the 
former state assets decreases by P. Following our simplifying assumption that one 
unit of capital creates one unit of income, their income decreases by P. However, by 
owning the former state assets, they now have an additional income stream. While 
there is still some controversy whether and, if so, under which conditions private 
ownership is more efficient than state ownership13, it seems at least relatively uncon- 
troversial that under efficient private ownership outcomes are usually better than 
under state ownership. While the emergence of efficient private ownership struc­
tures depends in part of how privatisation is conducted and is nothing that should 
be taken for granted, this is another complex subject which is beyond the reach of 
this chapter. We therefore simply abstract from these issues here and make the - 
we think generally reasonable - assumption that private ownership is more efficient 
than state ownership. Due to increased efficiency private owners are able to obtain 
n  +  A n from their new assets (bearing in mind that under state ownership the
12 Obviously in reality individuals from different social groups may end up buying assets during 
the privatisation process. We use the assumption of one social group acquiring ownership of all the 
assets as a simple stylised way of stating that one of the social groups obtains a larger ownership 
share in the privatisation process, a feature that for a majority of privatisations does not seem 
overly controversial.
13Sabirianova et al. 2005 e.g. show that in Russia and the Czech Republic in the 1990s privat­
isation to domestic owners did not markedly improve efficiency. Djankov and Murell 2002 also 
find that in transition countries commercialised state ownership was superior to some forms of 
private ownership, though generally remained inferior to relatively concentrated private ownership 
by outsiders.
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profit of the state owned companies was II). Thus the utility of an individual i who 
acquired state assets during privatisation is UAP =  (1 — r AP) [J^ +n+An~p] _j_ t ap m 
Individuals —i who did not buy state assets are only affected via the transfer (and 
an eventual change in the tax rate), thus their post-privatisation utility is simply 
UAf  =  (1 -  TAP)*=i- +  Tap.~l v J p-i
Total government revenue, that consisted of individual’s tax payments and profits 
from the public companies before privatisation, is now diminished by the latter. 
However, in return the government obtains privatisation receipts, which in our simple 
static model are used to finance the transfer14. Moreover, as long as taxation is 
possible, the government profits equally from the increased income of individuals 
who are now more efficient owners of the former state assets. Total government 
income, that is the total transfer after privatisation, is equal to T AP = r A P ( R i  +
n + An -  p )  +  p  +
—i
2.1 Left-wing government
Assume first that a left-wing president has been elected. For a left-wing government 
to propose a privatisation initiative, poor individuals post-privatisation must be 
better off than before15. As, by assumption, poor individuals do not have an income 
of their own, this boils down to an increase in the amount of redistribution in the 
economy post-privatisation, that is A T  = T AP — T BP > 0. Substituting for T AP 
and T BP and solving for P this gives us the minimum price P mm below which a
14In a dynamic model (dynamic in the sense that cash flows repeat themselves every period), 
the government -assuming a stock market with a return to capital as in the private sector- could 
convert the privatisation revenue into a constant cash flow P.
15We assume that the decision to privatise or not does not affect the relative income position 
of the middle class (i.e. whether they are above or below the mean). This - together with the 
assumption that initial tax rates reflect the relative position of the middle class - implies that tax 
rates will not be changed, i.e. t a p  — r BP — r. For simplicity, we hence use the notation r  when 
discussing privatisation under left wing government.
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left-wing government does not privatise:
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pmin =  j j  1_A II. (3.2)
1 — T
While the left-wing government as the agenda setter has the power to decide 
whether or not to propose privatisation, it obviously cannot force privatisation on 
potential buyers. Thus when acquiring state assets, the utility of a prospective buyer 
must also increase, that is A£/< =  U^p — Upp > 0. Substituting for U^p and U fp 
and solving for P gives us the maximal price P max at which privatised assets will 
actually be bought
pmax =  n  + An + —^ — — An. (3.3)
1  -  f t  1  -  T
For privatisation to proceed, obviously the maximal price must be equal or 
above the minimal one, a feature that we will refer to as the “feasibility” condition. 
Straightforward calculations show us that this is always the case. Thus privatisation 
is “technically” feasible- there is an equilibrium price at which the government is 
willing to sell and there are individuals willing to buy.
In addition, we see that if privatisation is “technically” feasible, it is also polit­
ically feasible, i.e. there is a majority of people in the population -and thus in 
parliament- who prefers it to the status quo (state ownership of the assets). This 
results simply from the fact that for both the poor and the class of buyers privat­
isation increases their utility16.
Apart from structural economic features, the exact privatisation price P depends 
on the bargaining power of the government and the prospective buyers. We assume 
Nash bargaining, where a  is the bargaining power of the left-wing policy maker, 
which leads to the optimisation problem
16 As in this case the general transfer would increase, privatisation would even have full public 
support from the whole political spectrum.
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M a x  (A T p ) a ( A U i ) 1~ a , with the solution
p
p* =  n  — —  An +  t %------ r An. (3.4)l - r  ( l - / 0 ( l - r )   ^ '
By construction, P mm ^  P* ^  P max, this obviously implies that at price P* 
the utility of the parties involved in the privatisation increases. More precisely the 
increase in utility for each individual belonging to the social group represented by 
government -the poor- is A Up = y^-A II, and the change in utility for an individual 
from the social group acquiring the assets is
A Ui =  (3.5)
ALi
For completeness it should be noted that the utility for a (rich or middle class) 
individual i from the social group that is not acquiring the assets is y^j-AII.
Having found the privatisation price, we can now establish the discount -the 
difference between the “market” value of the assets and the price P at which they 
will be privatised. According to capital market theory, the price of an asset should be 
the net present value of all future cash flows that it earns, which in our static setting 
without any temporal discounting simply is the profit from assets after privatisation, 
i.e. n  +  A n. Consequently, in absolute terms the discount D is n  +  A n — P, which 
substituting and rearranging comes to
(3-6)
Partial derivatives are ^  < 0, this simply means that the discount decreases 
with the left-wing government’s degree of bargaining power. Moreover ^§j[ , §7 > 0 
if a < 1 — Pi and < 0. This means that as long as the policy maker’s bargaining 
power is not overwhelmingly strong, the discount increases both with the potential 
efficiency gains from privatisation and a higher degree of redistributive taxation. The
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former results from the fact that if there is a larger potential gain from privatisation, 
the buyers will get their share of this gain (unless their bargaining power is extremely 
weak). The latter highlights the feature that, in the presence of a higher degree of 
redistributive taxation, the poor are willing to allow for a larger wealth transfer 
to private owners (middle-class or rich), as they will profit via redistribution from 
increased profits of privatised enterprises.
Lastly, the discount is higher if the number of buyers fa is small. This results 
from the fact that if the social group that buys the assets is less numerous, it will 
capture a smaller share of the government transfer, and hence insist on a lower 
price for the assets. A more interesting interpretation of this feature, however, is 
to assume that population is equally split between classes, and interpret fa as the 
share of the total transfer a social class obtains. In this interpretation, the discount 
increases when the buyers’ share of the transfer is below average. An example is 
when transfers are targeted at the poor. In such a case, where transfers are skewed 
against the buyers and towards the poor, the former will capture a smaller and 
the latter a larger part of the efficiency gains from privatisation, with respect to 
the situation of a uniform redistribution. Hence the buyers will demand a larger 
discount, which a left-wing government would be willing to grant.
We have so far mainly considered the question whether and at what price privat­
isation will take place, but have not considered who will actually gain ownership of 
the state assets during the privatisation process. We will come back to this point in 
more detail when we start to discuss the connection between the efficiency of the tax 
system and privatisation outcomes, and will for the time being, just give the general 
answer that the left-wing policy-maker will choose to privatise assets in favour of a 
social group in such a way, as to maximise the increase in the utility of the poor.
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2.2 Centrist government
Suppose now that a centrist president, representing the interests of the middle-class, 
has been elected. Such a government would obviously want to privatise state assets 
at the largest possible discount to its clientele, the middle-class. However, due to the 
need for support in parliament, it has to take into account the fact that privatisation 
must be preferred to the status quo by a majority in parliament, representing a 
majority of the population17. This means that privatisation must increase (or at 
least not decrease) the utility for the members of another social class as well. We 
first explore what we refer to as the "standard" case, namely a situation where 
the privatisation at the lowest feasible price does not lead to shifts in ownership 
patterns in the economy that would lead to changes in the tax regime18. We then 
discuss the case where privatisation implies a change in tax rates, referring to it as a 
privatisation with "Machiavellian support", and explore the conditions under which 
"standard" or "Machiavellian supported" privatisation occurs.
In the standard case, for potential buyers to be willing to acquire the assets, the 
price must be below P max as specified in equation 3.3. In addition, for privatisation 
to be supported by a social class that does not acquire privatised assets, the price 
of the assets must be above the threshold P mm as determined in equation 3.2. The 
constraints are thus the same for a centrist government as for a left-wing policy 
maker. However there is a major difference between this case and that of a left- 
wing government. There is no need for a bargaining process over the price of the 
asset sale, as the interests of the buyers and the government (both middle-class) 
are identical. Consequently the assets will be privatised at the lowest possible price 
P min, that is
p* = n — —  An (3.7)
1 — T
17 We assume that members of parliament vote in favour of a law if it does not decrease the 
utility of their clientele.
18This implies that tax rates will not be changed, i.e. t a p  — r B P  =  r. For simplicity, we hence 
use the notation r  for the "standard case" under centrist government.
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and the discount will consequently be
D = - — An. (3.8)
1 — r
Under these circumstances the gain from privatisation for a middle-class indi­
vidual will be A Um = that is the middle-class captures the whole surplus fromPm
privatisation. Comparing a centrist president with a left-wing one with some bar­
gaining power19, we see immediately that a centrist government privatises at a larger
discount. This occurs naturally without any strategic or Machiavellian intentions 
by those in power.
As mentioned above, in addition to the standard case there also is possibility 
for “Machiavellian support” from the rich for discounted privatisation by a cent­
rist policy-maker that would actually redistribute away from the poor. This is 
the situation if the privatisation discount is sufficiently large to lift middle-class 
individuals that were poorer than the mean before privatisation above the mean 
post-privatisation. Under these circumstances, privatisation shifts the political equi­
librium of taxation (from maximal to minimal). Hence the rich can gain from sup­
porting a privatisation in favour of the middle-classes even at an extreme discount. 
As "Machiavellian supported" privatisation requires that the relative income po­
sition of the middle-class changes from being below the mean to being above it 
post-privatisation, the middle-class before privatisation must obviously be poorer 
than the mean, which implies that the pre-privatisation political equilibrium tax 
rate is maximal, i. e. r BP = r max. Moreover, in order to achieve the lifting 
of the middle-class above the mean post privatisation, the discount must be suf­
ficiently large. More precisely we need (1 — r max)^M. +  T < R r +  R m + n  and
Pm
—  {Rm +  n  + An — P) +  T  > Rr +  Rm +  n  +  An, where the left-hand side in both
19In the extreme case where a left wing president has no bargaining power at all, he would 
privatise at the same price and with the same discount as a centrist president.
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equations is the expected income of a middle-class individual respectively pre- or 
post-privatisation, and the right-hand side is the mean income in society respectively 
pre- or post-privatisation (given that there axe pM middle-class individuals and that 
the size of the total population has been normalised to 1, and assuming for simpli­
city that the tax rate after the privatisation r AP =  r mm =  0 ). Substituting for T, 
which is T  = (Rr +  R m ) rmax +  II pre, and T  = P  post privatisation, and arranging 
the above equations leads to ^  < R  (which simply restates that a middle-class 
individual pre-privatisation must be poorer than the mean), and another condition 
that we will refer to in what follows as the “lifting condition”:
n +  An -  p  >  ( r  -  — ) (3.9)
1 pM flM
where R = Rr+rw is mean private income before privatisation, excluding the 
part of income that comes from state enterprises and is redistributed via transfers.
As the policymaker’s clientele will profit directly from privatisation, he will want 
to privatise at the lowest possible price. However, in order to ensure political support 
from the rich in parliament, the privatisation price must be set so as not to decrease 
the utility of the rich, that is so that A Ur ^  0. This change in the utility of a 
rich individual is A Ur = (rmax — r min) ^  +  AT, where the first term describes 
the increasing utility due to a reduction in the tax rate and the second term the 
change due to the change in the general transfer. This change in the transfer is more 
precisely AT =  - ( r max -  r min)RR +  [rmin(PM +  n  +  A n -  P) -  r maxRM] +  [P -  II]. 
The first and second term describes the change in the transfer due to the change 
in tax income from the rich and middle-classes respectively, and the third term the 
change in the transfer that results from a changing amount of state owned assets. 
Substituting for AT in the above equation for A Ur , assuming again for simplicity 
that the minimal tax rate (which will be implemented post-privatisation) is zero, 
we obtain A Ur = r max(^J — R) +  (P — II). Resolving for P we obtain the minimal
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price at which the rich are willing to privatise P mm =  II — r max(^ -  — P). Obviously 
the price must also be such that privatisation increases the utility of middle class 
individuals AC/m — r max( ^  — P) +A^-(AII — (1 — fiM)(P — U)) (again assuming the 
post-privatisation tax rate to be zero). Consequently the maximum price at which 
the middle-class is willing to buy is P max =  11-1- —All — IJ‘M r max(P  —
& J  1 - M m  1 ~ M m  v M m  '
Straightforward calculations show that P max > p mm always holds, thus privatisation 
is always feasible from this point of view.
Given that there is no bargaining (the middle-class has all the bargaining power) 
the effective price will be the minimal price P* =  II — Tmax(^J — R) and thus 
the discount D = All +  r max(— — P), and the gain in utility for a middle-classMb
agent AUm = ^ -A Il +  The gain for a poor agent will be A Up =
R r -T..max“ "’Mb
Substituting P* =  P mm for P in the lifting condition (equation 3.9) we obtain 
that All > . - M (P — — ) — r max(— — P ),20 which basically states that for “Ma-
! - M m v M m ’  v M b n  J
chiavellian supported” privatisation to go ahead, the value of the potential efficiency 
gain from privatisation A n has to be sufficiently large, where this value must be the 
greater, the larger the initial distance of the middle-class from the mean income, 
and the more numerous the middle-class (or in an alternative interpretation: the 
larger their share of the transfer provided by government). A higher tax rate and a 
higher income for the rich with respect to the mean decrease the needed efficiency 
gain for Machiavellian supported privatisation to go ahead. This arises from the 
fact that under a higher level of redistribution the rich axe more eager to support a 
privatisation that would lead to a fall in the political equilibrium tax rate, and are
20Note that, for different reasonable parameter values, this condition can be restrictive or not. 
E.g. if one assumes the middle class to account for just below half, and the rich for 1/3 of the 
population, and the revenue of a rich individual to be three times as large as for a middle class 
individual, the condition becomes restrictive (i.e. requiring efficiency gains) as soon as maximal 
tax rates are below 40 percent. On the other hand, when the rich and the middle class account each 
for 30 % of the population, and with the revenue of a rich individual double the size of a middle 
class one, the lifting condition will never be restrictive, i.e. in such a constellation Machiavellian 
supported privatisation would go ahead even in the absence of efficiency gains.
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thus willing to support privatisation at larger discounts.
Assuming a centrist government, what kind of privatisation should be expected. 
As the utility for a middle class individual is always higher under Machiavellian 
supported privatisation compared to the "standard case"21, whenever possible the 
middle class would prefer a Machiavellian supported privatisation. Whether such a 
possibility exists comes down to the question of whether ATI > —
Tmax(^£ — R). Under certain parameter constellations this is always the case, so 
privatisation by a centrist will always be of the Machiavellian supported type, under 
other constellations Machiavellian supported privatisation will only be feasible if the 
value of potential productivity gains from privatisation is sufficiently large. Con­
sequently, a larger initial distance of the middle-class from the mean income, and a 
more numerous middle-class (or in an alternative interpretation: a larger share of 
the transfer provided by government to them) will increase the likelihood of centrist 
privatisation to be of the standard type. In contrast, a higher tax rate and a higher 
income for the rich with respect to the mean increase the chances for Machiavellian 
supported privatisation.
2.3 Right-wing government
Suppose now that a right-wing government representing the interests of the rich 
is in power. There are also two possible cases of privatisation, a standard and a 
Machiavellian one, which we explore in turns in the following. In the standard 
case a right-wing government - similar to the centrist-government standard case - 
would want to privatise state assets at the largest possible discount to its clientele. 
However it is constrained by the need for political support. The constraints for 
a right-wing government in the standard case are exactly the same as those for a 
centrist government. So, the assets will be privatised at the same price and with
21 The middle class obtains not only the total efficiency gain from privatisation as in the standard 
case, but manages also to capture a share of the tax savings of the rich.
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the same discount as in the case of a centrist policy-maker. The only difference is 
that assets are now sold to the rich22. Comparing the discount at which different 
policymakers privatise, we see that right-wing and centrist governments privatise 
at discounts superior to those of left-wing policy-maker23. Moreover, a general 
feature under any policy-maker is that higher tax rates increase the discount at 
which companies are privatised (see equations 3.6 and 3.8). This results from the 
fact that with higher levels, of taxation, a larger part of the efficiency gains from 
private management will be redistributed, thus compensating those who did not 
profit directly from the discounted sale of state assets. This, in turn, increases the 
willingness of the losers of the discounted sale to suffer wealth transfers to the new 
owners during the privatisation process.
In addition there can be the possibility of “Machiavellian privatisation”, that is 
the case where a right-wing policy-maker privatises assets strategically at a heavily 
discounted price in favour of the middle-classes in order to change their political 
preferences, and thus to obtain lower tax rates in political equilibrium. The differ­
ence with “Machiavellian support” is that here, rather than simply tolerating the 
distribution of state assets at bargain prices by a centrist president to his clientele, 
the right actually accepts that a right-wing president gives away state assets at a 
heavy discount to a social class different from his own clientele.
Obviously for this situation to be possible, as in the case of "Machiavellian 
support", the relative income position of the middle-class must be below the mean 
pre-privatisation - implying a maximal tax rate - and the relative income position of 
the middle class must change with the privatisation from being below the mean to 
being above it, which implies that the “lifting condition” (equation 3.9) must hold.
However there is one major difference: In the case of “Machiavellian support” a
22 As argued before, selling the assets to the rich is a metaphor for a privatisation set-up that 
favours asset acquisition by the rich. We use this simplification to keep our model focussed on the 
most important features and thus tractable.
23In the extreme case where a left-wing president has no bargaining power, i.e. a  — 0 , he 
privatises at the same price and discount as a centrist or right-wing president.
Chapter 3 : The Political Economy of Reform: Privatisation 88
centrist president was privatising to his own constituency, having thus all the bar­
gaining power with respect to pricing the assets, and only being required to assure 
that the utility of the rich increased to assure their support for his policy in par­
liament. Now, however, the rich have a bargaining position, as it is a right-wing 
government that negotiates the details of the privatisation with the potential middle- 
class buyers. Moreover, the rich have a new outside option, namely a discounted 
privatisation of the assets to themselves.
We model the bargaining process as before, that is the relevant parties bargain 
over the joint potential surplus. The increase in utility from a “Machiavellian” 
privatisation for the middle-class and the rich (assuming after privatisation r AP = 
r min =  0) are the same as in the case of Machiavellian support, and consequently 
so are the minimum price at which a right-wing policy-maker is willing to sell, and 
the maximum price at which the middle-class is willing to buy. The same condition 
must hold for privatisation to be feasible. Supposing Nash bargaining (a being the 
bargaining power of the rich) leads to a privatisation price of P* = II — r max(^ -  — 
R) +  i 4 ~[An +  TmaxR R ] • Substituting P * in the utility equations we get
the increase in utility from “Machiavellian” privatisation for middle-class and rich 
individuals to be respectively, A Um = ^ J [ ^ n + T maxi?^^-] and A Ur =  i _ af l M  [An+  
r maxRRj^]. However, as we mentioned before, for Machiavellian privatisation to 
proceed it must not only fulfill the lifting condition, but also increase the rich’s utility 
by more than if the rich simply privatised the assets to themselves at the largest 
possible discount. As we have seen before (2.3), under such a scenario the utility of a 
rich individual would increase by Consequently the fact that AUR must be larger 
than —  leads to the additional condition that An < a TmaxRR, whichPR 1 ~PM~aPR ’
basically states that for Machiavellian privatisation to be feasible the bargaining 
power of the rich a  must be sufficiently strong, and also their revenue R r must 
be sufficiently large in comparison to All in order to ensure that the rich prefer 
the gain from lower taxation to grabbing the (underpriced) assets themselves while
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continuing to pay taxes. Especially, when the pre-privatisation tax rate is already 
relatively low (for example because a country has limited administrative capacity 
to enforce higher tax rates) the incentives for the rich to undertake Machiavellian 
privatisation are very limited24.
3 E lection  ou tcom es
So far, we have discussed the privatisation outcomes for different parties in power, 
without taking into account whether the assumed political outcome could actually 
realise. We now explore the conditions under which a given party is able to win power 
(i.e. the presidency) in the electoral process. As mentioned earlier we place ourselves 
in a citizen-candidate framework. Our choice is motivated by the fact that the 
“Citizen-Candidate” model is far more general than the “median voter” approach, 
and delivers political (voting) equilibria even when the latter is inapplicable. More 
precisely the “citizen-candidate” model splits the political selection process into 
two-stages. First there is an entry stage, in which each citizen chooses strategically 
whether to run as a candidate for president or not. A small entry cost in this stage 
prevents more than one candidate with the same preferred policy running for office. 
In a second stage, all citizens vote and elect one of the running candidates, who 
then implements his most preferred policy. At this point we innovate with respect 
to the standard citizen-candidate model, insofar as the elected policy-maker will 
be constrained in implementing his most preferred policy by the need for political 
support. More precisely we assume that he needs an absolute majority in parliament 
(and thus among the population) to support his policy, which requires that they 
prefer his proposal to the status quo25.
24 This could help to explain why in Russia in the mid-nineties of the last century - in a situation 
of widespread tax evasion - the most valuable assets were largely privatised at very substantial 
discounts to the ruling elite.
25 For simplicity we assume that parlamentarians who have no preference between a new law and 
the status quo, vote in favour of the new law.
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Our framework implies that either one citizen stands unopposed and wins26 or 
various citizens from different groups run and tie. In this case the winner is chosen 
in a lottery, which signifies that the preference of each of the n running candidates is 
implemented with a certain probability. We assume that, if there is a tie, the prob­
ability of a citizen becoming president equals the share of votes cast for him. Thus 
a situation with multiple candidates necessitates that each class that is represented 
by a candidate prefers the expected payoff from choosing a policy-maker among the 
candidates by lottery after a tie, to supporting any candidate from another class.
In the following table we present a fist of the payoffs for individuals. More 
precisely, the cases of the table below present the payoff, that is their change in 
utility, for poor, middle-class and rich individuals under left, centrist and right-wing 
presidents.
Poor Middle Class Rich
Left — wing ■ president An “ An ‘"“ ah
i-hi
a .„ 1 -a----- An — An
i-n*
Centrist ■ president 0 An
V-M
0
Centrist ■ president 




Right -  wing ■ president 0 0 An
Right — wing ■ president 
Machiavellian ■ privatisation
“ (An+X™x^ ^ )  X ™ R* 
1 — M-aj M'i? M-jt (An+T™/^)
In the following we will first discuss the political equilibria in situations where 
Machiavellian support and Machiavellian privatisation are not "technically" feasible 
(see discussion above), before turning to those situations where they are. We see 
that the poor profit from privatisation only under a left-wing president, and have
26In those cases where the median-voter framework applies, the elected citizen will be the median 
voter.
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no preference between a centrist and right-wing policy-maker. Thus they stand 
to gain only by voting for a left-wing candidate. A middle-class individual would 
obviously prefer a centrist president, as this would give him the largest gain from 
privatisation. However, as in the absence of "Machiavellian" privatisation possib­
ilities the middle-class gains more from privatisation by a left than a right-wing 
president, they might have an incentive to vote for a left-wing presidential candid­
ate, thus ensuring the election of a left-wing government, instead of presenting their 
own candidate for the presidency whose accession to power is uncertain. This same 
logic holds equally for the rich, who would obviously prefer a right-wing presid­
ent, but might under certain conditions be willing to vote for a leftist president. 
Assume that social class i (either the rich or the middle-class) are the ones that 
would be chosen by a left-wing president to receive state assets. Remember that, in 
the case of a tie27, the probability for each candidate to become the policy-maker 
is given by the numerical weight of the social group that he represents. It fol­
lows that social class i (rich or middle-class) votes for a left-wing policy-maker if 
AU^eft > f ip A U ^ 1 -I- pMA u f entrlst +  pRAU ^ight, that is the change in class i’s 
utility under the left U^eft is larger than the expected change in utility under a tie 
between a candidate from each social class. By substituting these values into the 
above equation and rearranging it we find that class i will vote for a left-wing policy 
maker as long as a which, in the case of social groups of equal size, boils
down to a  < 1/ 2. This signifies that a left-wing policy-maker will be elected as long 
as he is sufficiently weak and willing to hand over a substantial part of the efficiency 
gains from privatisation to the buyers. However, for a  there will not be a
clear coalition (there will be a candidate from each social class), and thus any social 
group can rise to power. Thus while there will be a tendency for left-wing politicians 
who are willing to privatise to be elected, standard privatisation can occur under 
a politician of any colour - evidently supposing the constraints as laid out in the
27That is the case where no candidate obtains an absolute majority
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previous sections are fulfilled.
Assume now that Machiavellian support would be feasible, while Machiavellian 
privatisation was still no option.28 As both the rich and poor are not going to profit 
from such a situation (the situation of the poor deteriorates, but also - as the middle 
class having all the bargaining power would capture all the surplus - the utility of the 
rich would not improve significantly), they are not going to vote for a middle class 
candidate but instead prefer to vote for their own candidate. Machiavellian support 
could still occur, but only in a situation where candidates from all three classes tied, 
and provided the middle class candidate would be the winner of the ensuing lottery. 
The possibility of Machiavellian support also has another impact, as it reduces the 
constellations where the middle class would elect a left-wing President. This results 
from the fact that the possibility of Machiavellian support renders the Presidency of 
a middle class individual more lucrative for the middle classes, and hence increases 
their expected returns from a situation of a tie and ensuing lottery.
Finally, we look at constellations where both Machiavellian support and privat­
isation would be technically feasible options and where the rich - once in office - 
would actually prefer Machiavellian privatisation to privatising the assets to them­
selves. As any of the Machiavellian schemes deteriorates the expected payoff for the 
poor of not being in power themselves, they continue to vote for a leftist candidate. 
It is easily shown that the expected utility of the rich increases more if they field 
their own candidate (even if this implies a lottery) than with a poor or middle class 
president, so a rich individual will always stand in the elections. Straightforward cal­
culations also show that the middle class always prefer voting for themselves rather 
than for a poor candidate (the possibility of Machiavellian privatisation under a rich 
President increases their expected pay-off from a tie and ensuing lottery). Whether
28The inverse case is impossible, and hence not treated. If Machiavellian supported privatisation 
was unfeasible, this would signify that the lifting of the middle class income above the mean 
cannot be achieved in a situation where the middle class has all the bargaining power. There will 
consequently be no possibility to achieve this lifting above the mean in a situation of Machiavellian 
privatisation where the bargaining power of the middle class is diminished.
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the middle class prefer to vote for a rich candidate (assuring his election) or to vote 
for a middle class candidate (with the ensuing tie and lottery) depends on exact 
parameter values. More precisely, for the middle class to vote for "Machiavellian 
privatisation"29 it must hold that
(AI| +  t^ R rBp ) > a _ ^ An
Mm  M.r 1 — Mi?
While it is difficult to evaluate this equation fully as for reasonable values of the 
parameters relatively small changes in these values can change whether the equation 
holds or not, the equation shows nonetheless that the middle class vote for the rich 
only if the bargaining power a  of the rich is sufficiently weak, otherwise the middle 
class prefers to vote for their own candidate.
4 P rivatisa tion  o f  sta te  assets  th a t provide tar­
geted  transfers
So far we have been assuming that direct and indirect profits from state enterprises 
are equally spread across the population to keep the model as simple and general 
as possible30. This is not always a reasonable assumption. Often special social 
groups benefit disproportionately from the fact that enterprises are state owned, an 
advantage they generally risk losing during privatisation.
The most common case of targeted profits from state ownership probably arises
29This is assuming that a left wing policymaker would privatise to the rich. If he privatised to 
the middle class, the equation would change to —aAII -f rEe.\ > o. The
Mm  v Mh
reasoning for the evaluation of this equation is the same as in the former case.
30 On some occasions we have in previous sections reinterpreted fi as the share a certain social 
group would get from the total state transfer. This is however fundamentally different from the 
scenario we consider here. In both cases redistribution is, or can be, skewed towards the poor. 
However in the scenario under consideration now, targeted redistribution to the poor is only possible 
from state owned assets, which implies especially that privatisation of these assets takes away the 
possibility of any targeted redistribution.
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through over-employment, for example by keeping unprofitable branches of enter­
prises running, or by producing with inefficiently high labour inputs. Thus the 
indirect profits from state ownership seem in a large number of cases to be directed 
to the lower classes. We try to capture this feature by assuming that the share A of 
the profit from state assets II is targeted directly at the poor, with the remainder 
(1 — A)II being spread equally across the population.
How does such a targeting of the transfer from state owned assets impact on 
privatisation initiatives? The main impact is that poor individuals, who before 
were willing to support privatisation as long as the general transfer increased (i.e. 
AT > 0), will now demand that the transfer increases sufficiently to compensate 
them for the loss of the targeted transfer A n. The minimum price of privatised 
assets acceptable to the poor will be P min =  n  — y ^ A n  +  —j j ^ jAn. The maximal 
price potential buyers are willing to pay will be
pmaX = n  + An +  —^ — —  (An +  An). (3.10)
1 -  ^  1 -  T
Unsurprisingly, both the minimal and the maximal price increase with respect to 
the general case. This results from the fact that privatisation contains an additional 
implicit redistribution away from the poor to the other social groups, which increases 
both the price a left-wing government would demand, as well as the price the buyers 
are willing to pay. In consequence the sale price of the assets increases, and so the 
discount decreases. More importantly the feasibility condition for the sale to take 
place becomes
An > 1 ~ /J* ~ /fpAn.
Up
This means that, in contrast to the case of non-targeted transfers where privat­
isation was always feasible, a left-wing government will only privatise when the 
efficiency gains from privatisation are sufficiently large.
How does the fact that transfers from state assets are targeted to the poor
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change the privatisation process under a centrist or right-wing president31? The 
maximal price at which agents are willing to buy the assets is unchanged with respect 
to the above situation, that is equation 3.10 must hold. Moreover the minimum 
price at which the poor are willing to support privatisation is unchanged. However, 
the minimal privatisation price for a right-wing government to secure support from 
the middle-class representatives in parliament, or for a centrist politician to secure 
support from those of the rich, changes to P mm = n  — j ^ A n  — ^^yAH.
Compared with the standard case (section 2 of this chapter), the minimum price 
at which the poor would support privatisation increases, but decreases for the rich 
and the middle-class. As our support constraint only requires a majority to prefer 
privatisation over the status quo, the support of the poor is not needed for privat­
isation to go ahead as long as the middle-class support a right-wing government’s 
privatisation efforts and vice versa. Consequently the condition for privatisation to 
be feasible becomes A n  > —A n, which obviously always holds.
When government assets are used to provide targeted transfers to the poor, left- 
wing governments will not privatise in some situations where right-wing or centrist 
policy-makers would privatise. This is because efficiency gains from privatisation 
are not sufficiently large for a leftist politician’s taste. This seems to reflect well the 
observation that left-wing policymakers have often been more reluctant to privatise. 
However, they appear to have been willing to do so when the efficiency gap of the 
state sector got extremely large. Finally, election outcomes under targeted transfers 
differ insofar as the middle-class or rich will be more reluctant to support a left-wing 
presidential candidate (as they will profit less from his privatisations). Moreover they 
will never vote for a left-wing policy-maker in a situation where right and centrist 
policymakers would privatise, but a left-wing politician would not.
What are the main empirical predictions of our model with respect to elections
31 To avoid unneccesary complication we abstract here from the possibility of strategic 
privatisation.
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and underpricing? First, privatisation can happen under any type of policy-maker. 
Second, if state assets were used to provide targeted transfers to the poor, a left- 
wing policy-maker will require much higher potential efficiency gains than centrist 
or right-wing policymakers in order to be willing to privatise. This implies that left- 
wing governments are less likely to privatise than centrist or right-wing governments. 
Third, if a left-wing policy-maker privatises when elected, there will be a tendency for 
leftist governments to be elected, especially if they are going to be politically weak32. 
Fourth, there will be underpricing. Fifth, left-wing policy-makers who privatise will 
sell assets at a lower discount than their right-wing or centrist counterparts. Sixth, 
and finally, higher tax rates increase the discount at which companies axe privatised.
5 T he im pact o f  th e  ta x  sy stem  on privatisation  
ou tcom es
We have, in the previous sections, set up a framework for thinking about privat­
isation that takes into account both the electoral process, as well as bargaining 
between relevant groups. We now use this framework to investigate the connection 
between the tax system and privatisation outcomes. Specifically, we focus on how 
“inefficiencies” in the tax system can have an impact on privatisation outcomes.
So far we have assuihed that privatised assets are risk-free, and that investors 
are risk neutral. In reality, however, neither of these is the case. Consequently, 
privatisation can usually only take place at a discount on the value of the assets as 
measured by the net present value of future income streams. For simplicity, we use 
a very crude method of introducing risk in our model by assuming that the utility 
for a risk averse individual i of an uncertain cash flow with an expected value of 
II +  All is the certainty equivalent of this cash flow. We describe this certainty
32That is when a , the bargaining power of a left wing government, is low.
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equivalent by (1 — o) (II +  All), where o G [0,1] is a proxy for the riskiness of the 
assets. Alternatively, if one prefers to keep the assumption of risk neutrality, one 
can also interpret o as a transaction cost parameter, and hence (r(n + AII) as the 
transaction cost. Under both assumptions (either risk non-neutrality or transaction 
costs) the utility of an individual i who acquired state assets during privatisation 
is U fp = —  [i^ +  (1 — cr) (II +  All) — P] +  T ^ .  Taking into account this changeMi
in utility for the acquirer of state assets, the privatisation game obviously changes. 
Results are qualitatively robust, with the main difference being that the feasibil­
ity constraint for privatisation o ^  TZ7 n+§n becomes binding33 regardless of the 
government’s political orientation, that is assets must not be too risky (or in the 
alternative interpretation transaction costs must not be too high) for privatisation 
to be possible34.
So how can one think about the efficiency of the tax system? While the actual 
tax rate depends on the political equilibrium in a country, the maximal effective tax 
rate could be considered as a reasonable proxy for the efficiency of a tax system. The 
maximal effective tax rate could be low for example if corruption is a widespread 
phenomenon in a country, as a corrupt tax administration would allow taxpayers to 
get away with paying only a fraction of their taxes due. Another possibility would 
be if potential income tax intakes are low compared with the cost of running a large 
tax administration (e.g. in a very poor country). In this case it may simply be 
pointless to tax large parts of the population.
As we have seen, under risk averse agents (respectively transaction costs) the 
feasibility constraint o ^  for privatisation becomes dependent on the tax
rate. More precisely, a higher tax rate increases the feasibility of privatisation in two 
ways. First, it permits an increased transfer. Thus it allows a higher compensation
33 Even if there are no targeted transfers.
34It should be noted, however, that the tax system only influences privatisation outcomes as 
long as post-privatisation taxation is not zero, i.e. as long as the middle class continues to support 
taxation.
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for individuals who do not buy privatised assets, and hence lose out on the transfer 
that was previously financed by the state enterprises. This, in turn, increases their 
willingness to accept a more highly discounted sales price for the assets. Second, 
a higher tax rate decreases the "value” of capital, and hence makes agents more 
willing to risk capital (or to suffer a certain capital loss under the transaction cost 
interpretation), which results in potential buyers willing to pay more for privatised 
state assets35.
For countries with a high business and political risk - respectively high transac­
tion costs - (that is high cr ) the feasibility condition for privatisation might simply 
become unattainable if taxation levels are too low. Typically36 this would be the 
case if the political equilibrium allowed for maximal taxation, but maximal effective 
taxation levels are not sufficient to allow for the necessary redistribution to com­
pensate politically relevant losers from privatisation. Unfortunately countries where 
business and political risk or transaction costs are high are often the ones that lack 
adequate redistribution mechanisms (being poor with inefficient and corrupt ad­
ministrations). As a consequence even efficiency and aggregate welfare improving 
privatisation may simply be politically unfeasible in these countries. This results 
from the fact that risk aversion /  transaction costs make potential buyers of the 
assets unwilling to pay a price that would make it possible to compensate the losers 
of the privatisation process directly. Moreover the lack of efficient redistribution 
mechanism makes it impossible to compensate losers from privatisation through the 
redistribution of efficiency gains post-privatisation. Under these circumstances any
35 This somewhat counterintuitive feature arises from the fact that individuals pay for privatised 
assets with their capital stock. While a higher tax rate decreases the value of their capital stock 
for the owners, as it decreases their revenue from it, it increases their willingness to trade their 
capital stock for more risky, newly privatised assets or to incur transaction costs.
36 There would equally be the possibility that the country is in a political equilibrium that does 
not allow for sufficient taxation, as the middle class (with income above the mean) and the rich 
both prefer minimal taxation. In reality, however, one would expect the rich and middle-classes to 
somehow overcome the commitment problem they would have strictly following this model, and 
come to an agreement over how to split the assets between them.
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privatisation achieved during periods of (quasi) totalitarian rule or under interna­
tional pressure will be threatened by reversal.
Less extreme inefficiencies in a tax system are, for example, particular evasion 
mechanisms for certain social groups. By this we mean a mechanism that would 
allow either the middle-class or the rich to pay taxes at a rate well below the rate of 
the other social class. A case where the rich pay taxes at a lower effective rate as the 
middle-classes could be a situation where rich individuals or large corporations have 
an disproportionate advantage in tax evasion, due to their being politically better 
connected. A case where, on the contrary, the middle-class paid a lower effective 
tax rate than the rich could37 be a situation where sufficiently small companies 
(representing the middle-classes) were able to work in the unofficial sector of the 
economy, and thus escape the attention of the tax authorities38.
Calculating the price at which a left-wing government would, in the presence 
of risk and risk aversion (respectively transaction costs), privatise P* = (II — 
A l l ) +  4 = ^ ( n  +  All), we find that the change in utility for poor in­
dividuals from privatisation is AUp = [All — cr(II +  All) +  r(II +  All)]. We see 
that if a left-wing government privatises, the utility of the poor increases more, the 
higher the tax rate of the buyer of the privatised assets. Consequently, if there is 
a sizeable difference in tax rates between rich and middle-classes39 a left-wing gov­
ernment would prefer to privatise the assets in favour of the social group with the 
highest effective tax rate as this leads to a larger increase in the poor’s’ transfer. This 
implies that, in countries where administrative inefficiencies favour tax evasion of the 
rich and powerful, one would expect to find rather traditional electoral coalitions. 
These electoral coalitions of left and middle-classes would elect left-wing govern­
37 Obviously apart from a situation where there is a progressive income tax.
38For anecdotal evidence of such situations see FT, June 16, 1999 ’’Brazil’s regional drinks 
makers slake thirst for value - The tax regime and growing demand have penalised leading brands” 
or Moscow Times, August 31, 1999 ’’Residential Construction Remains Profitable”.
39 And assuming that risk aversion, bargaining power, and population size between rich and 
middle class is not too different.
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ments, that would predominantly privatise towards the middle-classes. In contrast, 
countries where administrative inefficiency favours tax evasion of the middle-class 
would show a tendency for “populist” coalitions. These coalitions between rich and 
poor would increase wealth inequality by handing over state assets to the rich, while 
at the same time decreasing income inequality through higher income redistribu­
tion4041 .
C onclusion
In this chapter we have developed a simple political economy framework to invest­
igate privatisation of state assets. In our model, privatisation occurs in order to 
achieve welfare increases when private ownership is more efficient. Underpricing is 
used as a way for the policy-maker to redistribute part of these efficiency gains to 
its own constituency, but can also be used for strategic purposes. This wider focus 
contrasts with the recent political economy literature on privatisation which sees 
privatisation mainly from a narrow strategic perspective as a Machiavellian tool of 
right-wing governments to manipulate the preferences of middle-class voters.
40Borlotti/Pinotti (2003) present empirical evidence that more left wing governments have ten­
ded to privatise less in domestic SIPs, but have rather done so via direct asset sales or in interna­
tional SIPs - i.e. have had a tendency to sell state assets to the rich or foreigners.
41 Argentina might be an interesting example of such a ’’populist” coalition. Under a Peronist 
government at the beginning of the nineties, assets were privatised mostly in discounted direct 
asset sales to the better off. Privatisation stayed largely popular, not least because in the following 
years transfers and social spending increased, both in relative and absolute GDP terms. Recent 
unpopularity of free market reforms in Argentina is largely unrelated to past privatisation, but 
mainly results from the increasing unemployment and poverty that have resulted from the 2001/02  
financial crisis. To underline the point that in the nineties the Argentine government presented 
a populist coalition a quote from El Pais (October 9, 1999) about Argentina under the rule of 
President Carlos Menem:
”In these ten years the ” Justicialismo” (=the party of Carlos Menem) transformed its con­
stituency and consequently the social alliance that it represented historically. It stayed with the 
extremes of the social spectrum. Those who have the least and those who have the most. The 
numerical weight of the former and the economic power of the latter. For the time of the election 
and for the time to govern. It had been said that such a combination was highly unstable, but 
for ten years Carlos Menem proved that for him it was not. The ’’justicialist” rhetoric oscillated 
between a strong social and populist stress, and a cold economic neo-liberalism.”
Chapter 3 : The Political Economy of Reform: Privatisation 101
We have shown that our simple political economy approach convincingly ex­
plains all stylised facts of privatisation, including those where a “Machiavellian” 
interpretation does not provide plausible answers. We have, moreover, explored the 
conditions under which each of the different motives that our model allows for will be 
the driving force for privatisation. We have, finally, used our framework to explore 
the connection between inefficiencies in a country’s tax system, and privatisation 
outcomes.
Chapter 4 
The Political Economy of Reform: 
Fighting Corruption
“The more I  observe the main effects of a free press, the more convinced I  am that, in 
the modem world, freedom of the press is the principal and, so to say, the constitutive 
element in freedom.” (Alexis de Tocqueville, 1805-1859)
“Society does not believe the President when he says he will fight against the 
Mafia because a large part of the public sees him almost as the boss. ...The President 
doesn’t even believe it himself when he says he is fighting the Mafia1. ”
Given the overwhelming empirical evidence on its negative consequences2, fight­
ing corruption has become an important issue. This fight, in principle, can be led 
in two ways. The direct way is for governments to tackle corruption in their coun­
tries “from above”, by trying to promote honesty and cleaning up bureaucracies. 
Pressure from international donors, for example making aid payments dependent 
on “good governance”, can provide additional incentives for reluctant governments
form er Argentine Interior Minister Gustavo Beliz speaking about Carlos Menem, Reuters 
article quoted from IASOC Criminal Organisations, Vol. 10, No. 4.
2See for example Mauro 1995/1998, Wei 1997/2000, Isham et al. 1997, Friedman et al. 2000, 
Le Van/Maurel 2007, and Del Monte/Papagni 2001. See also Aidt 2003, Jain 2001 and Dre- 
her/Herzfeld 2005 for surveys on the issue.
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to join the crusade. The indirect way is to encourage measures that, by inducing 
structural changes, would lead to permanently lower corruption levels.
While the direct approach has the advantage of simplicity, it is often problematic 
because government officials are not always sincerely interested in fighting corrup­
tion, as they are potentially its largest beneficiary. Moreover, corruption is usually 
a deeply entrenched problem, and even politicians sincerely interested in fighting 
it may simply not have enough time and strength to overcome it. Thus focus has 
recently started to shift to indirect ways of fighting corruption. Propositions of such 
structural improvements from the economic profession include3 : increased compet­
ition, a more independent judicial system, meritocratic hiring in bureaucracies, and 
an increased share and responsibility of women in governments and administrations. 
In addition it has been argued that economic growth reduces rent seeking, and can 
therefore be a substitute for good governance4.
The international donor community has also started stressing the need for strength­
ening civil society at large, and press freedom especially. James D. Wolfenson, former 
President of the World Bank, e.g. argued that “a free press is not a luxury” , but “at 
the absolute core of equitable development”5. This stress on the importance of press 
freedom has coincided with the simultaneous appearance of economic articles that 
show a strong correlation between a free press and low corruption levels across coun­
tries6. This work proposes the strengthening of press freedom as a way of fighting 
corruption. The empirical relevance of the findings of these articles can, however, be 
challenged as the cross-sectional correlation between corruption and press freedom 
might be spurious. More developed countries have higher levels of press freedom, 
as well as higher corruption scores, i.e. lower levels of corruption (see Table 1),
3 See respectively Ades/Di Telia 1999, Ades/Di Telia 1997b, Rauch/Evans 2000, et Swamy et 
al. 2001.
4 See Aidt/Dutta 2003.
5In a speech to the World Press Freedom Committee, Washington, D.C., November 8, 1999.
6Both Stapenhurst(2000) and Brunetti/Weder(2003) show this strong correlation in work un­
dertaken simultaneously with and independently from ours.
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and a correlation between the latter might therefore not provide much proof. One 
possibility to get around this problem is the focus on developments within countries. 
Reiniak and Svenson (2004), for example, show that in Uganda the dissemination 
of information on government grant programs for schools in newspapers strongly 
reduced local ’'diversion" of these funds.




P re s s  F reedom LogG D Ppc R ule o f Law P rim ary Edu. S eco n d a ry  Edu. T ertiary  Edu.
P re s s  F reedom 0.63* 1
LogG D Ppc 0.62* 0.58* 1
Rule o f Law 0.61* 0.35* 0.64* 1
Prim ary  E ducation 0.34* 0.35* 0.62* 0.33* 1
S eco n d a ry  E ducation 0.46* 0.43* 0.79* 0.53* 0.69* 1
H igher E duca tion 0.47* 0.51* 0.75* 0.53* 0.58* 0.77* 1
"Correlation highly significant (I'tbvel)
We construct a panel data set that allows us to follow the evolution of corruption 
and press freedom over roughly 20 years in approximately 140 countries. In exploit­
ing these data we concentrate on fixed-effect regressions techniques, which allows us 
to abstract from different corruption levels between countries, and to focus on de­
velopments with respect to corruption, press freedom and other variables of interest 
within countries over time.
The following graphs show average levels (as far as data are available) for the 
last decades of corruption and press freedom by country. Especially the charts for 
the more recent periods shows the aforementioned strong positive cross-section cor­
relation between press freedom and absence of corruption. The charts, however, 
also indicate that there has been a significant evolution over time. While in the 
eighties the correlation was less pronounced with a large number of "outlier coun­
tries" showing either "excess press freedom" or "excess corruption", there has been
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a general tendency for those countries, especially the ones where corruption levels 
were unexpectedly benign, to converge to the norm over time. Closer inspection 
of the charts reveals that "overly" high press freedom did not always result in cor­
responding improvements in corruption, but that countries where corruption was 
better than what would have seemed indicated by levels of press freedom were only 
rarely able to sustain their good score on corruption.
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In addition to controlling for a “direct” link of developments in corruption and 
press freedom, we use the data-set to investigate an additional indirect channel
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through which press freedom influences corruption, namely via the effect of educa­
tion on corruption. As mentioned earlier, there is a high correlation between low 
corruption levels and most variables that describe a country’s level of development, 
including human capital. This latter correlation between corruption and education, 
in turn, has been interpreted as proof that education decreases corruption7. We 
show that this negative correlation between education and corruption levels does 
not necessarily hold at the margin, that is that increases in education do not ne­
cessarily decrease corruption. We develop a simple model where bureaucrats abuse 
their position to seek bribes, but risk detection for unlawful behaviour. The probab­
ility of being detected and fined depends on the efficiency of monitoring technology, 
such as a free press or an independent judicial system. A general increase in human 
capital will now lead to an increase in the efficiency of these monitoring agencies, 
but will at the same time increase the capacity of bureaucrats to extract bribes 
unpunished.
Our main theoretical result is that the impact of changes in education on corrup­
tion depend on how well civil society monitors those who enjoy the power of public 
office. In a country with well developed monitoring agencies, more education de­
creases corruption, whereas it may lead to higher corruption elsewhere. Simplifying 
somewhat, this possible negative impact of education on corruption results from the 
fact that, in the absence of any efficient control mechanism, educated agents may 
simply use their newly acquired capacities to become more efficient corruption rent 
seekers. Using our panel data set, and considering press freedom as a proxy for the 
quality of a society’s monitoring agencies, we find empirical support for this conjec­
ture. We show that while primary and secondary education may improve corruption 
even in countries that lack press freedom, increases in higher education only have 
a positive impact on corruption in countries that profit from a sufficient amount of
rAdes/DiTella(1997a) in a cross-section sample of 32 countries find that education reduces 
corruption.
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press freedom.
There is little, but growing literature on the relation between corruption and 
civil liberties. Treismann (1999) argues that while current levels of democracy do 
not influence corruption levels, long periods of democratic exposure actually decrease 
corruption. Brunetti/Weder (2003) introduce a differentiation between extortive and 
collusive corruption. They define the former as the case where a public agent abuses 
his power to force citizens to pay a bribe for a service that he is supposed to provide 
anyway, and the latter as a situation where a public agent provides an illegal service 
to a citizen in exchange for a bribe. They show empirically that while press freedom 
is highly correlated with low overall corruption, it is not so with extortive corruption, 
and they conclude that press freedom has an impact mainly on collusive corruption. 
Isham/Kaufman/Pritchett (1997) show that in countries with more developed civil 
liberties the performance of government projects is greatly improved. Mauro (1998) 
finds empirical proof that corruption reduces government spending on education. 
Persson et al. (2003) investigate the link between electoral rules and corruption, 
and find that proportional elections are associated with more corruption. Finally 
Acemoglu/Verdier (1998/2000), though mainly occupied with property rights and 
market failure, investigate the theoretical relationship between corruption and the 
allocation of talent in a general equilibrium framework.
In section 1 we develop the theoretical model outlined above. Section 2 gives 
details on data and methodology, and section 3 presents the empirical results on 
corruption, press freedom and education.
1 A  sim ple m odel o f corruption  and education
We present a simple illustrative model here, delegating a more general version to 
Appendix A2. Suppose an economy consists of bureaucrats and regular citizens, 
where bureaucrats provide a service that citizens need monopolistically. Monopolists
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can use their power to extract a rent from citizens in the form of a bribe B. But 
this gain for bureaucrats does not come without risk. The higher the bribe rate b 
an official demands (the bribe rate being the percentage of the value of the service 
he provides that he demands for himself), the higher his risk of being caught and 
sentenced for corruption. This is because a citizen might prefer not to obtain the 
service and instead denounce the corrupt official. Distinguishing between the bribe 
B  and the bribe rate 6, and using the latter as our measure of corruption, has 
the advantage that the level of corruption does not increase automatically with the 
general level of economic activity.
We assume that better educated bureaucrats can provide higher quality goods or 
services. As the bureaucrat’s service is of higher value to his client, he can extract a 
higher bribe from him for a given bribe rate. The rent he extracts increases therefore 
with the bribe level b he chooses and with the quality of his services, described by 
his human capital He . Formally - and for simplicity- we assume that B  = b * hs- 
Bureaucrats, however, risk detection by a monitoring agency M. Such a monitoring 
agency could, for example, be a free press or an independent justice system. We 
set the level of monitoring to depend both on the level of human capital of the 
monitors Hm , as well as the freedom of the monitoring agency to pursue its task. 
In the following we will refer to this capacity of the monitoring agency to fulfill its 
monitoring role as the level of freedom of the press (F P ), but this could also be seen 
as shorthand for the level of power and independence any other monitoring agency 
may have. Formally we set M  = Km * FP.
If a corrupt official is detected he loses the bribe and his wage, and is sentenced 
to pay a fine F. His probability of being detected and sentenced Pd decreases with 
his own human capital /i#, but rises with the chosen bribe rate b. In addition it rises 
with the capacity of the monitoring agency, M, that is Pd = b — y 1 * He +  72 * M  
(where and 72 are simply two parameters such that Pd remains in the interval
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An official’s utility is therefore equal to his expected wage plus the expected 
bribe minus the expected fine
U = (w + B ) * ( 1 - P d) - P d * F. (4.1)
Using the above defined equations for B, M  and Pd to substitute for in 4.1 we 
obtain U = w+b*hB*(l — (6—7 1*/&b+72*^at*jF1-P)) — (b—7 1*/iB-t-7 2*^M*F\P)*.F. 
For simplicity we assume the human capital level of all agents in the economy to be 
equal, that is h = hs  =  Hm - A bureaucrat now chooses his bribe level b such as to 
maximise his utility, which - substituting the equations for B, M  and Pd defined 
above into 4.1 and taking the partial derivative - leads to the following first order 
condition8:
h — 2bh — 7 a/i2 — 7 ^  * F P  — F  +  w = 0. (4.2)
What is now the impact of a general rise in human capital on corruption measured 
by the bribe rate? Define G{b, h) := h — 2bh — 7 a/i2 — 7 xh2 * F P  — F  + w . Implicit 
differentiation of G yields
db 1 - 2 b -  27 l/i -  27j/i * F P
dh ~  ^2 h '
Education will decrease corruption if is negative, that is if
— Ti * (1 +  FP) <  0.
It immediately results from this that the likelihood of education to decrease 
corruption is higher if press freedom (or more generally the power and independ­
ence of monitoring agencies) is higher. In Appendix 2 we show that this feature is 
quite robust to the exact specification of the different equations in our model, only 
necessitating the assumption that the strength of the monitoring agency is some
8This is a maximum as the second order derivative is obviously negative.
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multiplicative function of the human capital of the monitoring agents and the inde­
pendence of the agency - which indeed seems a reasonable assumption. This implies 
that while education would generally be expected to decrease corruption, it may 
fail to do so if a country lacks sufficiently independent monitoring systems, as for 
example a free press, a hypothesis we test econometrically in the following.
2 D ata  and m ethodology
We focus on the dynamic dimension and hence do not use the widely known “Trans­
parency International” data for corruption, as these data have only been available 
on a regular basis since 1996. Instead we use a corruption perception index compiled 
by a private risk rating agency “Political Risk Services Group” which is regularly 
published in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This index is compiled 
using less information than the TI Index, but has the advantage of being consist­
ently available for a relatively long period (we use data from 1984-2006) and for a 
larger number of countries (about 140). To measure press freedom, we use yearly 
data obtained from “Freedom House” yearly reports (1980-2006) on press freedom 
in the world. We scale variables to fluctuate between 0-10, where higher numbers 
indicate a better state of affairs, namely higher levels of press freedom, or lower 
corruption levels. In addition, we use the general classification from Freedom House 
of countries as having a free press, a partly free press, and no free press, equally 
available for the 1980-2006 period.
As proxies for a society’s level of education we use enrollment data from various 
sets of World Bank’s “World Development Indicators”. More precisely we use net 
enrollment data for primary and secondary education, and as those data are unavail­
able for tertiary enrollment we use gross enrollment data for the latter. Moreover, 
as enrolment is unlikely to have an immediate effect on the level of education of 
potential corruption rent seekers, we lag it by 10 years. In addition we use per
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capita GDP (in PPP terms at 2000 prices), trade openness (the sum of exports & 
imports as % of GDP) and a proxy for natural resource exports (based on the share 
of manufactured goods exports) from the same World Bank tables. Lastly, we use 
rule-of-law ratings from the above-mentioned ICRG publication. These data are 
available annually for the 1984-2004 period (some of them up to 2006), albeit not 
for all countries in all years. Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of the data.
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1985 120 5.5 2.6 0.0 10.0 1985 121 5.3 2.7 1.7 10.0
1990 127 5.6 2.4 0.0 10.0 1990 128 5.1 2.7 0.0 10.0
1995 131 5.9 2.1 0.0 10.0 1995 131 7.1 2.3 1.7 10.0
2000 140 5.0 2.1 1.7 10.0 2000 140 6.6 2.3 1.7 10.0
2005 140 4.2 2.0 0.0 10.0 2005 140 6.2 2.5 0.8 10.0
Raw material exports Press Freedom
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1985 129 67.0 28.3 3.7 100.0 1985 127 4.3 3.3 1.0 9.0
1990 132 61.6 29.8 4.1 99.9 1990 127 5.5 3.3 1.0 9.5
1995 147 56.8 30.1 4.8 99.0 1995 187 5.3 2.4 0.0 10.0
2000 157 53.3 31.3 3.9 99.8 2000 187 5.4 2.6 0.0 10.0
2004 112 48.0 30.3 2.9 98.0 2004 193 5.4 2.5 0.3 9.1
Trade Openess Primary Education
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1985 140 72.3 42.4 8.2 224.8 1985 109 78.6 21.7 9.8 100.0
1990 164 75.1 42.8 7.5 252.6 1990 113 79.0 22.4 9.1 100.0
1995 170 82.1 43.4 3.1 290.9 1995 148 80.1 19.8 23.3 99.9
2000 166 88.0 46.3 20.2 282.9 2000 156 84.0 17.1 25.3 100.0
2004 148 92.5 47.6 30.9 371.5 2004 124 87.6 13.9 32.8 99.9
Secondary Education Higher Education






A word of caution is necessary before using this data-set. The ICRG corruption
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index that we are exploiting is based on the perception of country experts by one 
single agency only. It might thus be argued that it is less precise than, for example, 
the Transparency International (TI) index which is compiled from various surveys 
(there could, in particular, be problems with comparability of data across countries). 
However, apart from the fact that there is no choice if one wants to exploit a long 
time dimension of twenty years, correlation of the ICRG corruption index and the TI 
index is quite high9 (around 0.8). Moreover we are convinced that an index compiled 
by a single agency is more precise than an index compiled from a multitude of sources 
that vary from year to year to track what we are most interested in, namely the 
changes in a given country over time.
Given very different forms of corruption, empirical work on the subject has been 
criticised for not having a clear idea of what is actually being measured, or for meas­
uring the wrong type of corruption. The corruption perception of foreign country 
experts or businessmen, it is argued, is heavily biased to how exactly foreigners 
or foreign investors are treated in a country, and is not necessarily connected to 
the local population’s experience. Moreover, this critique also points out that top 
level corruption and petty corruption are completely different social phenomena, 
and therefore not necessarily correlated. It is obvious that these objections do raise 
points that merit further research, and especially increased efforts to collect more 
differentiated data. However, in most places different types of corruption seem to 
be correlated, and the problems that foreign investors face in a country seem to be 
similar to those local businesses are confronted with - apart from few exceptions. 
We do therefore strongly believe that the data for corruption that we and others 
have been using are an interesting and meaningful first proxy. Thanks to these data 
it has finally become possible to study issues connected with corruption in a serious 
econometric way, instead of dealing with them in the realm of pure speculation, as 
was the case until some years ago.
9 The exact numerical value depends on the year considered.
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Based on the theoretical model developed in section 1 we can expect education 
to have a more beneficial impact on corruption in countries with better monitoring 
institutions (as a free press or an independent judiciary) than in countries where 
civil monitoring is poorly developed. Although this is not explicitly specified in the 
model, there should be a difference between types of. education. In our model, a 
potential increase in corruption from more education depends on the possibility of 
better educated bureaucrats becoming more sophisticated corruption rent-seekers. 
Primary education by itself is, however, rarely sufficient to be employed in a coun­
try’s administration. Hence we would expect a possible negative effect from educa­
tion on corruption to be confined to more advanced education, particularly higher 
education.
As we want to test whether the impact of education on corruption differs with the 
regime of press freedom, we divide our sample into three groups, looking separately 
at countries that are classified as having no press freedom, a partly free press, or 
a free press10. Then, for all three samples, we run identical regressions in which 
we try to explain corruption levels through education, while controlling for other 
variables that have been identified as influencing corruption. We also use a second 
approach, looking at multiplicative cross-effects of press freedom and education, 
testing thereby whether the impact of education on corruption is stronger when 
press freedom is higher. For both approaches described above we use country fixed 
effects panel regressions, because unlike other studies, we are not mainly interested in 
the cross-section distribution (we know that, in general, more developed countries 
have higher levels of education and lower levels of corruption), but we want to
10We have unfortunately been unable to obtain sufficient time series data on the independence 
of the judicial system. We decided not to use data on the ’’rule of law” as a substitute for judiciary 
independence, because our focus is on the control mechanisms of society to check those in power. 
A country may be characterised by a high degree of rule of law in general (for example a military 
dictatorship), but this may still be insufficient when it comes to controlling those at the top. We 
therefore restrict our examination to the degree of press freedom as a proxy for civic society’s 
monitoring capacities.
Chapter 4 : The Political Economy of Reform: Fighting Corruption 115
know the impact of changes in a country’s education levels on corruption11. We 
include time fixed effects in all our regression, mainly to ensure that changes in 
the compilation of data over time do not influence our results. We also control for 
autocorrelation in our regressions. More precisely we estimate equations of the form 
yit =  a  +  XH&! +  ZitP2 +  Vi +  Q +  i=l,...,N; t= l,...,T ;, where eit = pet- i  + 1]it,
\p\ < 1 and r]it i.i.d. with mean 0 and variance cr2. The Vi axe country ftxed-effects, 
and the qt time ftxed-effects. Estimations are done following the methods derived 
in Baltagi/Wu (1999). When using the first approach described above, yu is the 
corruption score variable, Xu is the relevant education variable, and zu is a vector of 
control variables. When using the second approach Xu becomes a vector comprising 
press freedom, the relevant education variable and a multiplicative cross-term of 
education and press freedom.
While a number of variables have been identified in the literature as influencing 
corruption, and would therefore be potential control variables in our regressions, a 
large part of those variables concern structural features such as dominant religions 
or origin of legal systems. As such variables are time invariant (unless one regards 
extremely long time spans), they cannot be used in country-fixed-effects regressions. 
We therefore have to restrict our control variables to those with a sufficient amount 
of variation in the time domain. More precisely we use trade openness (measured 
as the sum of exports and imports over GDP), income levels (measured by the 
logarithm of GDP per capita), natural resource exports (measured as the share of 
non-manufactured goods), the rule of law (as measured by expert perceptions) and 
the level of press freedom itself12.
We also undertook a series of robustness checks: The rule of law variable was
11 Unsurprisingly -as some of our variables have different effects in the time and cross-section 
dimension- a random effects specification is clearly rejected by Hausman tests.
12We include press freedom even in the regressions where we have split the sample along the 
lines of the regime of press freedom, as even within a group of countries with similar levels of press 
freedom (i.e. free, partly free, or not free) differences in press freedom could still have some impact 
on corruption.
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compiled based on the perceptions of the same individuals as our corruption in­
dex, which could lead to an artificially high correlation between the two variables; 
moreover there may be problems with endogeneity. We therefore systematically run 
our regressions excluding the rule of law variable (the largest part of these results 
are reported, see tables 3-5). We also excluded the press freedom variable from a 
number of regressions (see tables 3-6). We moreover reran our regressions progress­
ively adding the control variables in different orders. We moreover excluded some 
outliers, as well as all transition countries from the regressions (results not reported). 
We found our results to be qualitatively robust to all these changes.
3 E conom etric resu lts
In this section we report the main regression results with regard to press freedom, 
human capital and corruption. Before doing so, we would briefly like to draw at­
tention to the fact that we find somewhat different results for the relation between 
corruption and trade openness then in the literature, but as not the focus of this 
paper we delegate discussion of this to Appendix A3. For the split sample, results 
for higher education are reported in Table 3, for secondary education in Table 4, 
and primary education in Table 5. Results for the regressions using multiplicat­
ive cross-effects are reported in Table 6. At this stage we would like to make two 
observations: first, we indeed find press freedom to be strongly connected to corrup­
tion. This relation holds in most regressions even controlling for country and time 
fixed effects plus numerous other control variables, pointing to it not being simply a 
spurious relation (see tables 3-6). Second, as regards the link between education and 
corruption, education generally seems to rather have a positive effect on corruption 
scores (i.e. to decrease corruption) when using the whole sample, though this effect 
is usually not significant at conventional levels (see also tables 3-6).
Chapter 4 : The Political Economy of Reform: Fighting Corruption 117
Table 3 Higher Education & Corruption
Split Sample Full Sam ple
Press Regime: Press Regime: Press Regime:
Not Free Partly Free Free
Higher Education -0.01 -0.006 0.05 0.054 0.039 0.043 0.014 0.015
(0.16) (0.09) (1.47) (1.59) (1.93)* (2.11)** (0.96) (0.97)
LogGDPpc -0.42 0.023 -0.27 -0.112 -0.466 -0.359 -0.453 0.042
(0.69) (0.03) (0.56) (0.23) (0.67) (0.50) (1.21) (0.11)
Trade Openness -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002
(0.75) (0.97) (1.27) (1.44) (1.00) (1.10) (0.84) (0.83)
Raw m aterial exports -0.001 0 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004
(0.09) (0.09) (0.28) (0.23) (0.64) (0.90) (0.96) (0.94)
Rule o f Law 0.249 0.119 0.11 0.194
(4.39)* (2.22)* (2.53)* (7.42)*
Press Freedom 0.079 -0.044 0.055 0.057
(1.04) (0.65) (0.55) (2.40)*
Nb. o f Observ. 425 425 543 543 763 763 1820 1832
Nb. o f countries 56 56 69 69 62 62 118 118
Rho 0.77 0.81 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.71 0.72
R2 (w ithin) 0.24 0.19 0.30 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.13
T-statisties in parentheses * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
Note:lfe above table reports the results from panel regressions with both country and time fixed effects, also controling for autocorrelation (following 
Baltagi-Vfjf. W regress corruption on the variables in the column to the left S ee the ppendix for a  detailed description of variables and sources. Each 
column of the table presents the estimated coefficient values and t-statistics from one regression, where the sam ple used for the regression varies a s  
indicated in the first row of the table. Not free, partly free, and free refer to a  restriction of the full sample to a  subsam ple of countries and periods where 
the press has been, respectively, not free, partly free, or free. He last four rows give, respectively, the number of observations used in a regression, the 
number of countries from which these observations are tafen, the estimated autocorrelation coefficient, and the within R2. Note that the sum of the 
countries used in different subsam ples can exceed the total number of countries of the full sample, a s  countries can be classified differently with respect 
to press freedom for different periods.
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Table 4 Secondary Education & Corruption
Split Sample Full Sample
Press Regime; Press Regime: Press Regime:
Not Free Partly Free Free
Secondary Education 0.062 0.065 -0.004 -0.001 0.022 0.025 0.007 0.006
(1.99)** (1.8)* (0.14) (0.02) (0.96) (1.05) (0.41) (0.35)
LogGDPpc -0.23 0.08 -0.191 0.015 -0.038 0.096 -0.255 0.206
(0.26) (0.09) (0.30) (0.02) (0.04) (0.11) (0.50) (0.39)
Trade Openness -0.009 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006
(1.35) (1.68)* (2.19)* (2.37)* (1.46) (1.43) (1.87)* (1.81)*
Raw m aterial exports 0.004 0 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003
(0.57) (0.50) (1.13) (1.07) (0.43) (0.60) (0.63) (0.57)
Rule o f Law 0.246 0.137 0.159 0.201
(2.90)* (2.07)* (3.06)* (6.04)*
Press Freedom 0.107 -0.054 0.085 0.057
(1.17) (0.64) (0.69) (1.79)*
Nb. o f Observ. 247 247 310 310 574 574 1193 1205
Nb. o f countries 31 31 47 47 50 50 85 85
Rho 0.79 0.82 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.67 0.70 0.73
R2 (within) 0.31 0.25 0.38 0.37 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.13
T -sta tis tics in paren th eses  * significant a t 10% level; ** significant a t 5% level; *”  significant a t 1% level
For methodological explanations see  ib le  3.
Table 5 Primary Education & Corruption
Split Sample Full Sample
Press Regime: Press Regime: Press Regime:
Not Free Partly Free Free
Primary Education 0.042 0.046 0.021 0.021 -0.03 -0.028 0.005 0.006
(1.8)* (1.6)* (0.96) (0.99) (0.73) (0.66) (0.33) (0.38
LogGDPpc 0.044 0.21 -0.283 -0.091 -0.404 -0.272 -0.301 0.07
(0.07) (0.32) (0.48) (0.16) (0.51) (0.33) (0.66) (0.15)
Trade Openness -0.005 -0.006 -0.011 -0.012 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004
(0.93) (1.05) (2.31)* (2.47)* (1.02) (0.99) (1.52) (1.43)
Raw material exports 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.008 -0.011 -0.001 -0.001
(0.75) (0.67) (0.20) (0.25) (0.87) (1.14) (0.35) (0.34)
Rule o f Law 0.141 0.1 0.171 0.175
(2.10)* (1.65)* (3.43)* (5.88)*
Press Freedom 0.113 -0.046 0.074 0.081
(1.31) (0.62) (0.65) (2.96)*
Nb. of Observ. 324 324 419 419 623 623 1444 1456
Nb. of countries 48 48 62 62 58 58 115 115
Rho 0.74 0.77 0.70 0.70 0.64 0.67 0.70 0.72
R2 (within) 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.14
T -sta tistics in paren th eses  * significant at 10% level; ”  significant a t 5% level; *** significant a t 1% level
For methodological explanations see  ib le  3.
Turning to the results for the split sample, we find that for tertiary education 
there is generally a substantial difference between countries with and without press 
freedom (Table 3). Coefficients for education are generally negative in the “no free
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press” sub-sample (though insignificant at conventional levels), but are positive in 
the “partly free” or “free press” sub-samples, and for the "free press" sub-sample 
significantly so. This effect does not hold for primary or secondary education, which 
even in countries that lack press freedom (Tables 4-5) has a strong positive effect on 
corruption.
In the regressions with multiplicative cross-effects (i.e. using the product of an 
education variable with the press freedom score) results are inconclusive (Table 6).
Table 6 Mtiplicative Cross-Effects: Education & Press Freedom Score
Press Freedom 0.081 0.033 0.055 0.057 0.056 0.078
(2.98)* (0.37) (1.75)* (0.99) (2.38)* (2.41)*
Primary Education 0.006 0.004
(0.45) (0.26)
Primary Educ. * Press Freedom 0.001
(0.54)
Secondary Education 0.004 0.005
(0.26) (0.26)
Secondary Educ. * Press Freedo TI 0
(0.03)
Higher Education 0.01 0.03
(0.72) (1.22)
Higher Educ. * Press Freedom -0.002
(0.98)
LogGDPpc -0.289 -0.296 -0.105 -0.108 0.041 0.047
(0.74) (0.75) (0.23) (0.24) (0.11) (0.13)
Trade Openness -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003
(1.62) (1.60) (2.03)* (2.03)* (0.93) (0.93)
Raw material exports -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.19) (0.18) (0.48) (0.48) (0.89) (0.87)
Rule of Law 0.173 0.174 0.199 0.199 0.19 0.189
(5.92)* (5.94)* (6.07)* (6.09)* (7.37)* (7.37)*
Nb. of Observ. 1439 1439 1189 1189 1812 1812
Nb. of countries 115 115 85 85 118 118
Rho 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72
R2 (within) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17
T-statistics in parentheses
Note:Ife above tab le  reports the resu lts  from panel reg ressions with both country and  time fixed effects, a lso  controling for 
autocorrelation (following Baltagi-Uy. W regress corruption on the variables in the column to the left. S e e  th e  £pendix for a  detailed 
description of variables and sources. Each column of the tab le  p resen ts  the estim ated  coefficient values and  t-statistics from one 
regression , w here the  sam ple used  for the regression varies a s  indicated in the first row of the table, He last four rows give, 
respectively, th e  num ber of observations used  in a  regression, the num ber of countries from which th e se  observations a re  tafcn, the 
estim ated  autocorrelation coefficient, and  the within R2.
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Taken together, our empirical findings provide some evidence for the predictions 
of our model, as at least with one of our two approaches we find the impact of 
increases in higher education on corruption to depend positively on the level of 
press freedom, with the possibility of higher education not having any beneficial 
impact on corruption in countries that lack press freedom. We however find that 
primary and secondary education may have a positive impact on corruption even in 
countries that lack press freedom. As mentioned earlier, finding results consistent 
with our model rather for higher levels of education seems intuitively reasonable13 
in the kind of framework we use, as it is mainly more advanced levels of education 
that would be expected to reinforce a civil servant’s rent-seeking capacity.
Finally, our econometric results do not simply fulfil standard statistical signific­
ance criteria, but - maybe even more importantly - coefficients are also of a relevant 
order of magnitude. Using the results from the split sample, differences in coeffi­
cients for the impact of (10 year lagged) tertiary education enrolment on corruption 
between countries that lack press freedom, and those that have a free or at least 
partially free press are in the order of 0.04-0.07 (depending on the exact specific­
ation). This means that if a country increases tertiary enrolment for example by 
10 percentage points, if it lacks press freedom it will - in average - forgo an im­
provement in its corruption index by around half a point. To this comes the direct 
effect of press freedom on corruption, where coefficients are mostly in the order of
13 Differences in the relationship between primary and higher education with corruption also has 
the advantage of clearly indicating that results are not driven mainly by reverse causation. It has 
been shown that corruption increases “corruption prone” public spending (e.g. for infrastructure 
projects), and decreases spending on more “corruption proof’ items as salaries or education (Mauro 
1998). It would be unsurprising if such an effect was stronger in countries that lack mechanisms 
to monitor those in power, that is e.g. where press freedom is low. Hence corruption may lead to 
less education, and such an effect could be stronger, the less developed press freedom. However, 
in such a case, corruption should, for a given level of press freedom, have an impact on all forms 
of education in the same way. Our empirical finding that, for a given level of press freedom, 
the relation between corruption and education seems to be somewhat different between basic and 
higher education is incompatible with the “reverse causation” explanation.
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0.06-0.08. An increase in press freedom by 3 1/2 points - which is roughly what is 
needed to move from the middle of the no press freedom range to the middle of the 
partial press freedom range - will hence add a further improvement in corruption 
of roughly 1/4 point, indicating that a move from no press freedom to partial press 
freedom - accompanied by an increase in tertiary education of 10 percentage points 
(5 percentage points)- would decrease corruption by roughly 3/4 of a point (1/2 a 
point). Given that corruption is measured on a scale from 0-10, changes of that 
order are not spectacular, but are not trivial either. This indicates that while press 
freedom alone is unlikely to win the fight against corruption, it has nonetheless an 
important contribution to make.
C onclusion
With this chapter, we hope to have drawn attention to an area that, by and large, 
has been absent from political economy literature in general, and the literature on 
corruption in particular, namely press freedom. We have presented two channels 
through which low levels of press freedom can lead to increased corruption. In 
addition to direct evidence that increased press freedom is related with lower cor­
ruption levels- both in the cross-section and time dimension-, we have argued that 
in countries with low levels of civil monitoring of those in public office, increases 
in education (especially higher education) might not have the expected positive im­
pact on corruption, as they might principally increase agents’ rent seeking capacity. 
We provided empirical evidence that while primary and secondary education may 
improve corruption even in countries that lack press freedom, increases in higher 
education only have a positive impact on corruption in countries that profit from a 
sufficient amount of press freedom.
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A p p en d ix
A l D ata sources /  Description o f variables 
Corruption
This indicator reflects the degree of corruption (a higher score means less corrup­
tion). Corruption is expected to be encountered “in the form of demand for special 
payments and bribes connected with import and export licences, exchange controls, 
tax assessments, police protection, or loans”. Forms of “excessive patronage, nepot­
ism, job reservations, and ’favour-for-favours’ are also considered risky for foreign 
business. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), various April issues, 
(the ICRG is a publication from a private risk rating agency called Political Risk 
Services Group, based in East Syracuse, New York. The publication offers indexes 
of different kinds of risk, covering about 140 countries).
Rule of Law
This variable reflects “the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing 
to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate 
disputes”. A grade corresponding to low risk is assigned to countries “with an 
established law and order tradition, ... sound political institutions, a strong court 
system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power” Source: ICGR, various 
April issues, Political Risk Services Group.
Press Freedom
The indexes for press freedom are based on a yearly Freedom House survey on 
press freedom in the world. In each country surveyed the “system of mass com­
munication is assessed. The degree to which each system permits the free flow of 
information to and from the public determines the classification of each country’s 
news and information media as being ’free’, ’partly free’, or ’not free’.” In compiling 
the survey Freedom House measures the degree to which “law and administrative 
decisions of the government influence the content of the news media”, the degree of
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“political influence or control over the content of the news system”, “the economic 
influences on the media exerted either by government or private entrepreneurs” , and 
the degree “of oppression of the news media exhibited in many forms (from killing 
... to interfering with news production or distribution)”. Source: Freedom House, 
yearly press freedom report.
Higher Education
Gross school enrollment, tertiary. Gross enrolment ratio is the ratio of total 
enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially cor­
responds to the level of education shown. Estimates are based on the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ICSED). Tertiary education, whether or not 
to an advanced research qualification, normally requires, as a minimum condition 
of admission, the successful completion of education at the secondary level. Source: 
World Bank Development Indicators, 1999, 2006.
Secondary Education
Net school enrollment, secondary. Net enrollment ratio is the ratio of the num­
ber of children of official school age (as defined by the national education system) 
who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school 
age. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at 
the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and hu­
man development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more 
specialised teachers. Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 1999, 2006.
Primary Education
Net school enrollment, primary. Net enrollment ratio is the ratio of the number 
of children of official school age (as defined by the national education system) who 
are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age. 
Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, and mathematics 
skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography, 
natural science, social science, art, and music. Source: World Bank Development
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Indicators, 1999, 2006.
GDPpc
- GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2000 prices. GDP 
PPP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing 
power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over 
GDP as the U.S. dollar in the United States. GDP measures the total output of 
goods and services for final use occurring within the domestic territory of a given 
country, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. Gross domestic 
product at purchaser values (market prices) is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident and nonresident producers in the economy plus any taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. Data are in current international dollars. Source: World Bank 
Development Indicators, 2006.
Natural Resource Exports
Proxy for export share of natural resources, based on export share of manufac­
tured goods data. Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2006.
Trade Openness
Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured 
as a share of gross domestic product. Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 
2006.
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A2 Generalised M odel
This annex provides a generalisation of the model presented in the main chapter. 
Suppose an economy consists of bureaucrats and regular citizens, where bureaucrats 
provide a service that citizens need monopolistically. Monopolists can use their 
power to extract a rent from citizens in the form of a bribe B. But this gain for 
bureaucrats does not come without risk. The higher the bribe rate b an official 
demands (the bribe rate being the percentage of the value of the service he provides 
that he demands for himself), the higher his risk of being caught and sentenced for 
corruption. This is because a citizen might prefer not to obtain the service and 
instead denounce the corrupt official. Distinguishing between the bribe B  and the 
bribe rate 6, and using the latter as our measure of corruption, has the advantage 
that the level of corruption does not increase automatically with the general level 
of economic activity.
We assume that better educated bureaucrats can provide higher quality goods or 
services. As the bureaucrat’s service is of higher value to his client, he can extract 
a higher bribe from him for a given bribe rate.
The probability PB of a corrupt official being detected and sentenced to pay a 
fine F  is not independent from the society he lives in. If there is a monitoring agency 
M, as for example a free press or an independent justice system, the risk for corrupt 
agents of being discovered and punished rises with the power and capacity of these 
monitoring agencies.
An official’s utility is equal to his expected wage, w , plus the expected bribe 
minus the expected fine
U{b, hBl hM, FP, F, w) = w{ 1 -  PD(..))) + B(b, hB)( 1 -  PD(..))) -  PD(..)) * F. (4.3)
where Pd (-)  stands for PD(hB,b, M(h,M, FP)).
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B(b, hs), the rent an official extracts, increases with the bribe level b he chooses 
and with the quality of his services, described by his human capital hs- His prob­
ability of being detected and sentenced Pb(hs, b, M(/im)) decreases with his own 
human capital /ig, but rises with the chosen bribe rate b. In addition it rises with 
the monitoring of his activity, that itself depends positively on the level of
human capital of the monitors Hm -
For simplicity we assume the human capital level of all agents in the economy 
to be equal, that is h = hs  =  h,M, and normalise the wage to 0. To gain notational 
clarity we drop the parameters in the B and P functions. A bureaucrat now chooses 
his bribe level b such as to maximise his utility, which leads to the following first 
order condition14:
Bb{ 1 -  P) -  BPb — (F + w)Pb = 0. (4.4)
What is now the impact of a general rise in human capital on corruption measured 
by the bribe rate? Define G(b,h) := Bb (1 — P) — BPb — Pb(F +  w) . Implicit 
differentiation of G yields
db _  Bbh( 1 — P) — Bb [PitfMh +  Ph] — BhPb — (B +  F  -I- w)Pbh
f
Straightforward calculations (using the fact that the second order condition of equa­
tion 4.3 must be negative to insure that the bribe rate is maximised) shows that ^  
is always negative. Education will decrease corruption if | |  is negative, that is if
( + ) ( + ) ( + )  ( - ) (+ )  (+)(+)  ( + ) ( + )
Bbh [1 — P]—PM[MhBb—PhBb—PbBh~(B  +  F  +  w)Pbb — (B  +  F  +  w)pMbMh < 0.
1 ( + )  2 (—) 3 ( + )  4 (—) 5(?) 6 (—)
The first term accounts for the possibility of a more educated bureaucrat to 
extract higher rents. Making the reasonable and natural assumption of Bbh being
14 We drop the index D in the probability function to avoid confusion with partial derivatives.
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positive (that is an increase in a bureaucrat’s human capital, and thus the value of 
his service, increases his bribe the more, the higher is his bribe rate) we thus find 
that an increase in overall education leads to a rise in corruption due to a higher 
productivity of bureaucrats. The second term, which describes the increase of the 
probability of being caught due to an increase in the capacities of the monitoring 
agencies is negative. Consequently an increase in overall education leads to a fall 
in corruption via this monitoring term. The third term which turns out to be 
positive captures the increase in corruption due to the fall in the probability of 
being caught that is caused by a (more educated) bureaucrat’s increasing level of 
sophistication. The fourth term describes the fall in corruption linked to the increase 
in the probability of being caught due to the fact that better educated bureaucrats 
go for higher bribe rates. The sign of the fifth term depends on the sign of Pbh• 
This cross derivative shows us how changes in the overall education level impact on 
a bureaucrat’s incentives to change his bribe rate. When Pbh is positive this implies 
that increases in human capital, for a given increase in a bureaucrat’s corruptness, 
increase his risk of detection. If on the contrary Pbh is negative, increases in human 
capital, again for a given increase in a bureaucrat’s corruptness, will decrease his 
risk of detection. The cross derivative Pbh is thus a kind of measurement for whether 
the positive or negative aspects of education dominate bureaucrats’ incentives to go 
for corruption. Term 6 finally depicts how changes in monitoring impact on the 
detection probability of bureaucrats via their effect on the level of the optimal bribe 
rates of a bureaucrat.
The essential information provided by this equation is that an increase in edu­
cation can increase corruption through the impact of terms 1 and 3, unless it is 
counterbalanced by a sufficient increase in the terms 2, 4, 6 and eventually 5. As 
term 4 is of a more technical nature, our interpretation focuses on terms 2, 6 and 
5. Education is more likely to decrease corruption when terms 2, 6 and 5 are large 
and negative. For term 5 to be negative, the cross derivative Pbh has to be positive,
Chapter 4 : The Political Economy of Reform: Fighting Corruption 128
which means that those aspects of education that lead to decreased incentives for 
bureaucrats to go for corruption must dominate. This is the case when education 
increases mainly the capacity of the monitoring institutions to detect corruption. 
Such an effect should be more pronounced if monitoring institutions are efficient,
including in particular their independence. The size of both term 2 and 6 depends
(+)
on Mh. Making the reasonable and undemanding assumption that the capacity of 
the monitoring agency depends (positively) in some multiplicative way on both the 
human capital of the monitors and their degree of independence, which we will refer 
to as "press freedom", it follows that Mh depends positively on the level of press 
freedom. It results that under fairly minimal assumptions both the size of term 2 
and 6 depend directly on the level of press freedom in a country, which implies that 
education is more likely to decrease corruption in a country where the level of press 
freedom is high. Finally, note also that for Pbh positive (or at least Pbh +  PMbMh 
positive) both higher wages for bureaucrats and fines for detected corruption will 
increase the likelihood of education to decrease corruption.
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A3 Corruption and Trade Openness
While this is obviously not the focus of our paper we would like to comment briefly 
on our results on the relationship between corruption and trade openness. So far 
most empirical studies have found a positive cross-section correlation between trade 
openness and low corruption levels, and so these studies have been advising opening 
up the economy as a means of decreasing corruption. For example Ades/DiTella 
(1997b,1999) argue that the existence of rents in a country leads to corruption, and 
therefore that competition from foreign firms, by reducing rents in a local market, 
decreases corruption. Using different corruption indexes, they use cross-sections of 
approximately 30 and 50 countries, as well as a panel with observations for two years 
in roughly 50 countries to show that a larger share of imports in a country’s GDP 
decreases corruption. To avoid problems of endogeneity (namely that corruption 
acts as a barrier to imports and thus decreases trade openness) they use population 
and size of a country as instruments, and find results to be robust in these vary­
ing specifications. Larrain/Tavares (2004), in a more careful econometric study on 
openness and corruption, significantly improve the instrumenting by constructing 
a measure of how much a country should trade given a large number of charac­
teristics uncorrelated with its degree of corruption. They find that cross-country, 
both an increase in a country’s import or export share decreases corruption. Tre- 
isman (1999) using different corruption indexes in cross-sections of varying size15 
finds that higher import shares decrease corruption, though this effect would be 
extremely small and its significance of low robustness. Brunetti and Weder (2003), 
in a cross-section regression of roughly 80-100 countries, find that the positive effect 
of trade openness on corruption defined in the standard way (namely imports plus 
exports as share of GDP) becomes insignificant when controlling for other variables
15Between 36-64 countries.
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of economic development16.
Our study seems to indicate that even if there was a cross-section correlation 
with more open countries being on average less corrupt, within the time dimension 
this is not the case. While econometric estimates are significant only in part of the 
specifications, estimators are consistently negative which points to the conclusion 
that opening up an economy - at least in the short and medium-term - does not 
contribute to decreasing corruption, and might actually increase it. We hypothesize 
that more trade could, in the short-run, simply mean more scope for bribe extrac­
tion (at customs, to obtain permits or lower tariffs, etc.) and so lead to increases 
in corruption. Only in the very long-term might the beneficial impact of “good 
practice” or increased competition become relevant and lead to lower corruption 
levels. Increasing corruption levels in a given country could also result from increas­
ing trade with relatively more corrupt countries, which would be consistent with 
Gokcekus and Knoerich (2006) who find that the "quality of openness" as measured 
by a weighted index of the corruptness of trading partners matters, in the sense 
that "low quality openness" increases corruption. However, a closer inspection of 
this interesting but preliminary empirical finding is beyond the scope of this paper 
and has to be left open for further research. This said, while we think that in general 
opening up an economy to international trade has merits in itself, for the time being 
we would ask for extreme caution in advocating opening up for the sake of fighting 
corruption.
16 The two latter papers do, however, not control for possible endogeneity, Treisman because he 
finds existing instruments unconvincing, Brunetti/Weder as trade openness is not the main focus 
of their paper.
C hapter 5
Russian Regions’ Economic 
Performance: How Much Can 
Differences in the 
Politico-Institutional Setting or 
Reform Efforts Explain?
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the main causes behind the widely differing 
growth rates of Russian regions during transition, and to find out to what degree 
political economy explanations can account for the observed differences. Using data 
for 77 Russian regions for 1993-2004, we study the impact of three groups of vari­
ables1 on regional economic performance. First, we consider politico-institutional 
features, among them governors’ political orientations, and proxies for the risk of 
violent conflict. Second, we look at indicators of economic reform, such as the de­
gree of privatisation and price liberalisation. Third, we consider initial conditions2,
1 This classification is to a certain degree arbitrary, but we find it helpful for expositional clarity.
2 We use this term in a somewhat unconventionally large sense.
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including economic, geographic and structural features. Our main findings are the 
following: up to the 1998 crisis - which was mainly a period of economic decline - 
differences in regional growth were almost entirely driven by initial conditions, with 
resource and human capital endowments, industrial structure, and geographical loc­
ation playing the dominant roles. However, since the crisis the importance of initial 
conditions has declined significantly, and is now basically reduced to hydrocarbon 
wealth and advantageous geographical location. More reform-oriented policies, as 
well as better regional leadership are also found to have come to make a significant 
difference.
This work is related to the large empirical literature on the determinants of 
growth (early and influential examples are Barro 1991 and Mankiw/Romer/Weil 
1992) that developed following the availability of the Summer-Heston data and the 
renewed interest of economists in growth following the seminal paper by Romer 
(1986). This empirical growth literature can roughly be divided into two strands. 
The first is mainly focused on estimating a form of theoretical growth model (of­
ten Mankiw/Romer/Weil, or the Solow/Swan model), and thus usually ultimately 
estimates an equation that is based on some form of augmented and dynamised pro­
duction function. Apart from the advantage of being economically better founded, 
this approach generally has the advantage of making it possible to study how dif­
ferent economic variables have an impact on growth, either via factor accumulation 
or by improving total factor productivity of the economy.
The second strand of econometric work is somewhat more lax, in the sense that 
it is little interested in how variables have an impact on growth, but rather on 
which variables are important for growth performance (as e.g. Barro 1991). While 
we think that the first approach is in principle preferable, in this study we use an 
approach that is closer to the second. The justification for this is twofold. First, 
we think Russian regional capital stock (and investment) data to be of particularly 
low quality. Economists have been sceptical about the relevance of capital stock
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measurements for the early years of transition in all transition countries, and the 
quality of regional capital stock data is even worse than national data. Moreover, for 
a large part of the period under consideration output has been falling at tremendous 
speed, and under such circumstances capital stock data (derived from accounting) 
do not seem to reflect properly the size of the capital stock that is actually in use in 
the economy Hence, as a more theoretically based approach relies crucially on some 
form of data regarding capital stock or changes to it, it seems very problematic 
to adopt such an approach in our case. Second, even if these problems could be 
overcome, it would not help us much in answering the question that we are really 
interested in. If we were able to obtain reasonable yearly estimates of capital stock 
used in regional production, and if, for example, we found that a large part of the 
differences in economic growth were due to changes in effectively used capital stock, 
this would only change our question. Instead of explaining to what degree different 
variables might account for differences in growth performance, we would be left 
with the question as to what degree these variables can explain whether capital 
stock (or the labour force in a region) continued to be productive. While this is 
not an uninteresting question in itself, it would be even harder to answer given the 
available data, and we thus take a short-cut by looking at the determinants of growth 
performance directly, while neglecting the role factor accumulation (or destruction) 
may have played.
This work is to some degree related to the research about whether initial condi­
tions or the amplitude of economic reform explain more convincingly the different 
economic performances of transition countries3. The main difference with respect to 
this debate is, however, that our focus on Russian regions only captures the part of 
reform that has (or has not) been initiated in regions, and thus does not take into 
account the large - and arguably more important part - of the changes that have
3See for example World Bank (1996), Popov (1999a), and EBRD (1999) for differing early 
views on this issue, as well as Falcetti et al. (2002) and Radulescu/Barlow (2002) for more recent 
contributions.
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been undertaken at the national level. It is, however, interesting that the results we 
obtain from Russian regions are fairly similar to what is obtained when looking at 
transition countries as a whole. Falcetti et al. (2002) show that initial conditions 
have a strong initial effect on growth in transition economies, but that the import­
ance of this effect wanes over time. Falcetti et al. also show that while reforms 
have exerted a positive overall impact on growth, this effect comes with a lag and 
is smaller and less robust than previously thought4. These findings correspond well 
with our results for Russia, where we find little initial effect from reform during the 
pre-crisis , but a significant positive effect for the post-crisis period, and generally a 
declining importance of initial conditions over time.
There have been several attempts at studying Russian regional growth perform­
ance. Berkowitz/DeJong (2003) claim that for the 1994-96 period the Russian re­
gions that advanced faster on reforms had a larger share of private small enterprises, 
which in turn led to higher income growth or, at least, lower declines. Their finding, 
however, is not particularly robust and probably mainly driven by a peculiarity in 
the way the Russian statistical agency calculates income5. Ahrend (2000), based 
on data from 1990 to 1998, finds that neither differences in the depth of economic 
reform, nor politico-institutional variables explain much of the variation in regional 
performance, but that the principal determinants have been the initial structure 
and competitiveness of a region’s industry, or a region’s human capital and nat­
ural resource endowments. He also reports that more urban places experienced 
higher growth rates. Popov (1999b) also argues that initial conditions, measured 
by resource advantages, played a significant positive role in determining changes in
4Looking specifically at the robustness of the link from reform to growth, Radulescu/Barlow 
(2002) obtain roughly similar findings.
5More precisely the Russian national statistical agency GosKomStat, in an attempt to account 
for undeclared income, corrects reported regional income using regional retail trade data. A large 
share of private small enterprises are actually entreprises active in trade. One would expect retail 
trade to be correlated with the numerical importance of enterprises that have their main business 
in trade. Hence it is unsurprising to find a correlation between income data and the share of private 
small enterprises.
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output and income, whereas Mikheeva (1999) finds initial export shares to be highly 
important in explaining differing regional performance. Yudaeva et al. (2004) also 
find little impact of economic reform on pre-crisis regional growth performance, but 
looking at 1999 data provide some tentative evidence that this may have changed 
post-crisis.
Almost all of these studies, however, suffer from a well-known problem of growth 
regressions.6 There usually are a large number of right hand side variables (often 
highly correlated with one another) which have been found to be significantly related 
to growth performance in some studies, but not in others with different specifica­
tions. In short, the robustness of any link between those variables and growth is an 
issue here, and the fact that a variable comes out significant in a specific growth 
regression is no longer considered by many economists as sufficient proof for the rel­
evance of this link. This problem can be overcome by using some sort of "extreme 
bound" analysis, the approach we take in this chapter.
In section one we describe the methodology used and present tables with eco­
nometric results, whereas section two sets up hypotheses concerning the influences 
on economic growth in Russian regions, explains our choices of variables of interest, 
and discusses in detail the empirical results.
1 M eth od ology  and E conom etric R esu lt Tables
Russia’s federal structure provides an interesting opportunity for econometric re­
search, as it allows us to investigate the consequences of different politico-institutional 
settings, as well as those of varying economic policies, in entities with an almost 
identical judicial and cultural framework. Studies on Russian regions can thus avoid 
the main criticism of cross-country studies, namely their failure to account properly
6 With the exception of Yudaeva et al., which aggregates potentially correlated right hand vari­
ables into common factors. While this solves the problem of collinearity, it comes at the price of 
making the interpretation of results more difficult.
Chapter 5 : The Political Economy of Russian Regional Growth 136
for large differences in attitudes and cultures.
In this study we use data of 77 Russian regions from 1993 through 2004. Our 
data-set includes all Oblasts, Krais, Republics and the two independent Cities (Mo­
scow, Petersburg), with the exception of Chechnya and Ingushetia for which data 
are only sporadically available7. Reliable data on GRP (Gross Regional Product) 
growth is available from 1995 to 2004. Descriptive statistics of the data are shown 
in Table 1.
7The data of the ten Autonomous Okrugs are included in their surrounding region, as sufficient 
separate data is unavailable.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
O bs M ean Std. Dev. Min Max
R eal G R P  growth 1995-98 (cum ulated) 76 0.89 0.17 0.53 1.51
Real G R P  growth 1999-2004 (cum ulated) 77 1.46 0.21 0.91 2.08
Initial G R P per capita  1994 77 3393 1572 955 10573
Initial G R P per capita 1997 77 13821 8466 4397 65460
S h are  of regional population with secondary  education  (1994) 77 64.4 6 .0 53.3 84.8
S h are  of 1994-98 period region under G overnor supported  by T a rty  of Power” 77 0.55 0.46 0 1
S h are  of 1994-98 period region under G overnor supported  by com m unist party 77 0.18 0.32 0 1
Quality of regional leadership  (1998) 77 2.9 1.3 1 5
Duma elections sco re  (1995) 77 2.3 0.4 1.7 3.5
Presidential elections sc o re  (1996) 77 2.9 0.5 2.1 4.0
Control of criminal g roups over the  econom y (1996) 77 2.4 1.2 1.0 5.0
Potential for violent conflict 77 95.1 13.4 40 100
Potential for e thnic conflict 77 9.3 18.9 0 80.2
Dummy for reg ions tha t have the s ta tu s  of a  republic 77 0.23 0.43 0 1
D egree of food price regulation (1995) 76 18.9 17.8 1.0 85.0
Proportion of goods an d  serv ices with regulated prices (1996) 76 15.4 8.8 3.2 69.1
S h are  of priv. enterpr. in trade, ca tering  and  HH serv ices (1996,GKS) 77 82.8 4.9 67.0 95.0
Proxy for sm all-scale  privatisation (1996, a s  u sed  in th e  literature) 77 82.4 31.9 20.3 305.6
N um ber of sm all b u s in esse s  per capita (1995) 77 5.3 2.5 1.2 19.6
N um ber of sm all b u s in esse s  per capita (1998) 77 4.6 3.2 1.7 21.6
O utput sh a re  of regional m onopolies (1996) 70 14.5 13.9 0 60.8
Foreign Direct Investm ent per capita (1995) 74 8.1 17.5 0 117.5
Foreign Direct Investm ent per capita (1998) 77 17.5 37.1 0 212.8
Initial Oil production (per capita, 1995) 77 1.4 7.3 0 63.5
Initial G a s  production (per capita, 1995) 77 2.5 18.9 0 165.7
Initial C oal production (per capita, 1995) 77 1.7 4.6 0 30.5
Natural R eso u rce  Endow m ent 77 1.0 0.5 0 2.7
Proxy for th e  initial sh a re  of agriculture in total output (1993) 76 0.19 0.08 0 0.50
Proxy for th e  initial sh a re  of industry in total output (1993) 76 0.69 0.10 0.31 0.90
Initial sh a re  of exports  to foreign countries (1994) 76 0.08 0.08 0 0.39
Initial sh a re  of pow er sec to r (1993) 77 10.3 5.0 0.3 24.2
Initial sh a re  of fuel sec to r (1993) 77 9.3 14.9 0 80.9
Initial s h a re  of ferrous- and  non-ferrous m etal secto r (1993) 77 13.3 18.9 0 70.6
Initial sh a re  of m achine building sec to r (1993) 77 20.3 13.5 0.2 56.5
Initial sh a re  of chem ical sec to r (1993) 77 6.0 6.8 0 25.6
Initial sh a re  of food sec to r (1993) 77 18.1 13.0 2.2 72.4
Dummy for border with CIS 77 0.30 0.46 0 1
Dummy for border with EU 77 0.06 0.25 0 1
Dummy for border with China 77 0.08 0.27 0 1
Dummy for th e  p re sen ce  of a  m ajor port in th e  region 77 0.23 0.43 0 1
Region located  in "Red Belt" 77 0.26 0.44 0 1
Dummy for all "European" R ussian  regions 77 0.64 0.48 0 1
D egree of latitude on  which the regional capital is situated 77 54.6 5.5 43 68
D egree of longitude on  which regional capital is situated 77 61.8 36.9 21 174
Dummy for regions with an  unfavourable clim ate 77 0.10 0.31 0 1
Population density 77 30.4 31.1 0.2 191.6
Index proxying a  region 's d eg ree  of u rbanisation 77 2.7 0.6 1.2 5
Railway D ensity 70 168.3 116.3 0.5 583
In order to avoid the above-mentioned problem of collinearity of right hand side 
variables, which risks making the link between right hand side variables and growth 
specification dependent, we are using Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) based on Lev­
ine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-I-Martin (1997). EBA analysis, however, is not the 
only potential way around the problem of collinearity. Another possibility would be 
the aggregation of groups of right hand side variables into common factors, but this
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approach comes at the price of making the interpretation of results more difficult, 
and does not allow determining which variables exactly are driving growth perform­
ance. A predefined selection rule to narrow down the right hand side variables, as 
e.g. Hendry’s general to specific procedure8, is another way to tackle the problem. 
However, in cases with a fairly large number of potential right hand side variables, 
the ultimate outcome risks being strongly path dependent even under a quite soph­
isticated selection procedure. All in all, EBA seems therefore the most appropriate 
approach for our purpose.
Simplifying somewhat, the general idea of EBA is to run a large number of 
regressions where one looks at one specific RHS "variable of interest", while using 
permutations of variables from a rather large pool of variables that are also thought 
to be related to the LHS variable as control variables. One then looks at all the 
coefficient estimates for the "variable of interest", and if a sufficiently large part 
of these values are "robustly" in positive territory (or alternatively if a sufficiently 
large part is "robustly" in negative territory) it is concluded that there is a robust 
relationship between the RHS "variable of interest" and the LHS variable. The same 
exercise is then repeated for another variable of interest, progressively treating all 
variables in the aforementioned pool of variables in this fashion.
More precisely, EBA basically means running cross-sectional regressions of the 
form
Y  = a  + f i gy  * SV  +  fix  * A" +  8ay * A V  + s
where Y  is the LHS variable, SV, the Standard Variables, is a vector of standard 
explanatory variables that are included in each regression, X is the "variable of 
interest", AV a vector of additional variables thought to be related to the left-hand- 
side variable, and e is the error term. (In our case Y  is the cumulative growth rate 
of Russian GRP for a given period.)
8See e.g. Hendry(1980). See also Radulescu/Barlow (2002) for an application of both general 
to specific testing and extreme bound analysis to growth in transition countries.
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The lower (respectively higher) bound for each regression is defined as (3X minus 
(respectively plus) two standard deviations. The extreme bounds for a variable of 
interest are the lowest value for the lower bound, and the highest value for the higher 
bound which is obtained in the numerous regressions done for a given variable of 
interest X. A variable X passes the Learner (see Learner 1985) extreme bounds test 
and following Learner is said to be robustly related to Y if the extreme bounds 
(i.e. the lowest value for the lower bound, and the highest value for the higher 
bound) do not have opposing signs. Following Sala-i- Martin (1997), this test is, 
however, too restrictive. If the distribution of the parameter of interest has both 
negative and positive support, one will eventually have coefficients with opposing 
signs if one runs a sufficiently large numbers of regressions. Sala-i-Martin therefore 
proposes looking rather at the whole distribution of the estimate of the parameter 
in question, and declaring X to be robustly related to Y if more than 95 % of the 
distribution is respectively above or below zero (which is equivalent to the 90% 
confidence interval around the parameter in question being entirely on one side of 
zero). Sala-i Martin considers both cases where the distribution of the estimates of 
the variable of interest over models is normal, and where it is not, and finds that 
results are virtually identical9.
We will base this chapter and our discussion of results on the method suggested 
by Sala-i-Martin, as we basically think that his critique of the overrestrictiveness of 
the original Learner extreme bounds test is well founded. However, for completeness 
we also report Learner’s extreme bounds.
As "standard variables" we use a proxy for human capital, namely the share 
of individuals with secondary education, as well as the initial level of GRP. Both 
variables are used in the same fashion in Levine/Renelt, and are generally considered 
important and relatively robust determinants of economic growth10. We do not
9We therefore simply assume the distribution of the estimates of the variable of interest over 
models to be normal, which greatly simplifies the evaluation of the CDFs at zero.
10 At least for groups of countries that are similar, or for provinces within one country.
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include data on capital stocks or changes in them for the reasons we outlined in 
the introduction11. In each regression we are using three additional variables (as 
is common practice), in addition to the two standard variables and the variable of 
interest.
As, in addition to investigating what have been the drivers of Russian regional 
growth, we are also strongly interested in the question of whether and to what degree 
growth drivers in the early and later stages of transition have been different, it is 
useful to split our sample into different periods. Given that the economic situation 
in Russia pre- and post-crisis has been fundamentally different, with a declining 
economy for most of the nineties, and strong economic growth starting in 1999, it is 
natural to use the crisis for splitting our sample. We therefore look at the pre- and 
post-crisis periods separately, using first the average annual growth performance for 
the 1995-1998 and then for the 1999-2004 period as LHS variables in our regressions.
The econometric results are explained and discussed extensively in section 2, but 
we beforehand present the detailed results of the EBA analysis in Tables 1 and 2. 
In each table, variables are ordered by the value of the cumulative density function 
(CDF) evaluated at 012. In addition to the CDF evaluated at 0 we report the fraction 
of regressions where the variable of interest has been significant at respectively 5 
and 10% significance levels, the extreme bounds, and the unweighted parameter
11 Furthermore we do not include investment data for a number of reasons : first, according 
to standard economic theory, the relevant variable influencing growth should be changes in the 
capital stock, and not investment. This said, one might argue that investment, or rather the 
share of investment in the economy, could be used as a proxy for capital accumulation. In a 
situation like Russia’s during the nineties, however, where the dominant factor was obviously a 
large drop in the use of the existing capital stock, taking investment as a proxy for changes in 
the capital stock is clearly inappropriate. Second, empirically, according to Easterly (1999), in the 
short-term investment does not cause growth. Third, we believe Russian data on regional private 
investment to be of particularly poor quality. Finally, in spite of all the arguments against its use, 
we tentatively tried investment data in some regressions, and -unsurprisingly- found it generally 
to be insignificant.
12 More precisely, as the area under the density is divided in two by zero, following standard 
notation we will define as CDF(O) the larger of the two areas, irrespective of this being the one 
above or below zero.
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estimates of j3x , as well as the unweighted standard deviation13. Unsurprisingly, 
the extreme bounds of all variables under consideration have opposing signs, which 
- in spite of the fact that some variables of interest are highly significant in more than 
95 percent of the regressions - means that they would not pass the Learner extreme 
bounds test as used e.g. in Levine and Renelt (1992), which confirms our choice of 
using a test based on the cumulative density function as suggested by Sala-i-Martin. 
However, the test proposed by Sala-i -Martin is basically a one-sided test. Therefore 
Sturm/de Haan (2005) suggest that, to confirm to traditional significance levels, 
the 95% confidence interval around the parameter in question should be entirely 
on one side of zero (and not only the 90% confidence interval), which means that 
the CDF(O) should be larger than 0.975. However, as even those variables with a 
CDF(O) between 0.95 and 0.975 turn out significant in a very large fraction of our 
regressions, we call a variable X robustly related to Y if the 90% confidence interval 
condition is fulfilled, i.e. when the CDF(0) is above 0.95. Those "robustly related" 
variables are bolded in the following tables. We find close to ten variables to be 
robustly related to Russian regional growth in either sub-period. It may be worth 
noting that the results of the following two tables are based on close to 1 million 
regressions.
13 Following Sturm/de Haan (2005) the use of such unweighted measures is preferable.
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Table 2 - Determinants of Pre-Crisis Growth
Fraction Fraction S tandard Lower Upper
Variable under Review CDF(O) R egress. R egress. Beta
sign. 5% sign. 10% Deviation Bound Bound
D egree of long itude on  w hich regional capital is s itu a ted  
Initial Oil p roduction  (per capita)
Initial sh a re  o f chem ica l s e c to r
Dummy for th e  p re sen ce  of a m ajo r po rt in th e  region
P opu la tion  d ensity
Initial sh a re  of ex p o rts  to  foreign  co un tries
Initial s h a re  of fuel s e c to r
Initial G as  p roduction  (per capita)
Initial sh are  of power sector
Share of priv. enterpr. in trade, catering and HH services [GKS]
Proxy for the initial share of industry in total output
Index proxying a  region's degree of urbanisation
Dummy for border with CIS
Dummy for regions with an  unfavourable climate
Control of criminal groups over the economy
Proportion of goods and services with regulated prices
Output share of regional monopolies
Governor supported by "Party of Power"
Dummy for regions that have the status of a  republic 
Governor supported by communist party 
Dummy for all "European" Russian regions 
Initial Coal production (per capita)
Initial share  of food sector
Dummy for border with China
Railway Density
Natural R esource Endowment
Foreign Direct Investment per capita (1995)
Initial share  of machine building sector
Initial share  of ferrous- and non-ferrous metal sector
Potential for ethnic conflict
Proxy for the initial share of agriculture in total output 
Duma elections score (1995)
Region located in "Red Belt"
Presidential elections score (1996)
Degree of food price regulation 
Potential for violent conflict 
Dummy for border with EU
Proxy for sm all-scale privatisation (as used in the literature) 
Number of small businesses per capita (1995)
Degree of latitude on which the regional capital is situated
1.00 0.96 0.98 -0.00053 0.00016 -0.0015 0.0003
1.00 0.97 0.98 0.00312 0.00110 -0.0043 0.0183
0.99 1.00 1.00 0.00179 0.00064 -0.0002 0.0035
0.98 0.85 0.89 0.02780 0.01149 -0.0137 0.0640
0.98 0.76 0.82 0.00050 0.00022 -0.0004 0.0013
0.97 0.61 0.76 0.14400 0.06565 -0.0976 0.3820
0.96 0.66 0.76 0.00075 0.00036 -0.0007 0.0021
0.95 0.92 0.92 0.00082 0.00042 -0.0055 0.0027
0.91 0.26 0.42 -0.00160 0.00095 -0.0043 0.0016
0.91 0.33 0.43 0.00158 0.00094 -0.0018 0.0050
0.91 0.48 0.56 0.10400 0.06237 -0.3490 0.5240
0.90 0.30 0.41 0.01730 0.01044 -0.0279 0.0560
0.90 0.30 0.43 0.01680 0.01025 -0.0243 0.0529
0.89 0.28 0.41 -0.02920 0.01849 -0.1020 0.0536
0.86 0.08 0.17 -0.00625 0.00425 -0.0196 0.0077
0.84 0.04 0.09 0.00075 0.00053 -0.0009 0.0027
0.79 0.11 0.15 0.00042 0.00033 -0.0009 0.0015
0.78 0.08 0.13 0.01290 0.01054 -0.0292 0.0508
0.77 0.06 0.11 -0.01500 0.01261 -0.0931 0.0473
0.74 0.00 0.02 -0.01730 0.01546 -0.0661 0.0450
0.73 0.14 0.23 0.01190 0.01086 -0.0635 0.0542
0.72 0.01 0.04 -0.00112 0.00105 -0.0048 0.0027
0.71 0.05 0.10 -0.00044 0.00042 -0.0020 0.0016
0.69 0.02 0.06 -0.01790 0.01780 -0.0857 0.0738
0.68 0.01 0.03 0.00004 0.00004 -0.0002 0.0002
0.66 0.06 0.08 0.01050 0.01095 -0.0300 0.0564
0.60 0.00 0.01 0.00037 0.00044 -0.0010 0.0020
0.59 0.01 0.03 0.00031 0.00038 -0.0011 0.0019
0.55 0.04 0.05 -0.00022 0.00029 -0.0015 0.0013
0.54 0.05 0.07 -0.00023 0.00031 -0.0016 0.0019
0.51 0.10 0.14 -0.06000 0.08637 -0.4950 0.6450
0.51 0.03 0.05 0.01180 0.01715 -0.0799 0.1180
0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00777 0.01131 -0.0383 0.0490
0.31 0.03 0.04 0.00579 0.01449 -0.0910 0.0727
0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00010 0.00027 -0.0010 0.0010
0.28 0.01 0.03 0.00015 0.00041 -0.0016 0.0017
0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00562 0.01841 -0.0605 0.0720
0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00003 0.00014 -0.0005 0.0005
0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.00022 0.00319 -0.0114 0.0118
0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.00005 0.00120 -0.0057 0.0061
Total number of regressions: 9139 for each variable under review 
Note: D ependent Variable is average 1995-98 GRP growth
Chapter 5 : The Political Economy of Russian Regional Growth 143
Table 3 - Determinants of Post-Crisis Growth
Fraction Fraction Standard Lower Upper
Variable under Review CDF(O) Regress. Regress. Beta
sign. 5% sign. 10% Deviation Bound Bound
Initial sh a re  of fuel sec to r 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.000722 0.00024 -0.00022 0.00151
Dummy for th e  p re sen ce  of a m ajor port in the region 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.02262 0.00655 -0.0028 0.0433
Dummy for border with CIS 0.99 0.94 0.98 0.01540 0.00595 -0.0078 0.0343
Quality o f regional leadersh ip 0.98 0.85 0.94 0.00503 0.00217 -0.0013 0.0111
N um ber of sm all b u s in e sse s  per cap ita  (1995) 0.98 0.79 0.88 0.00306 0.00134 -0.0015 0.0106
S hare  o f priv. en terpr. in trade , ca tering  & HH serv ices  [GKS] 0.97 0.72 0.82 0.00126 0.00056 -0.0009 0.0029
P otential for v io len t conflict 0.96 0.63 0.72 -0.00048 0.00023 -0.0014 0.0005
D egree of longitude on which the regional capital is situated 0.93 0.44 0.53 -0.00018 0.00010 -0.0010 0.0004
Initial Oil production (per capita) 0.93 0.66 0.74 0.00161 0.00090 -0.0043 0.0086
D egree of latitude on which the regional capital is situated 0.93 0.43 0.55 -0.00117 0.00065 -0.0043 0.0019
Initial share  of power sector 0.91 0.25 0.45 -0.00097 0.00057 -0.0027 0.0007
Initial G as production (per capita) 0.85 0.53 0.63 0.00047 0.00032 -0.0023 0.0022
Proxy for the initial share of agriculture in total output 0.81 0.13 0.21 0.06513 0.05002 -0.1533 0.4551
Initial Coal production (per capita) 0.80 0.09 0.14 -0.00080 0.00062 -0.0031 0.0013
Dummy for all "European" Russian regions 0.79 0.15 0.19 -0.00818 0.00651 -0.0503 0.0188
Population density 0.75 0.06 0.12 0.00014 0.00013 -0.0005 0.0006
Dummy for regions with an unfavourable climate 0.71 0.01 0.03 -0.01131 0.01077 -0.0470 0.0386
Proxy for small-scale privatisation (as used in the literature) 0.70 0.01 0.03 0.00009 0.00009 -0.0002 0.0004
Output share  of regional monopolies 0.66 0.01 0.01 0.00018 0.00019 -0.0004 0.0009
Initial share  of ferrous- and non-ferrous metal sector 0.65 0.01 0.03 -0.00016 0.00017 -0.0009 0.0006
Duma elections score (1995) 0.60 0.03 0.07 0.00865 0.01017 -0.0458 0.0709
Initial share of m achine building sector 0.60 0.01 0.02 -0.00019 0.00023 -0.0011 0.0006
Potential for ethnic conflict 0.59 0.07 0.08 0.00015 0.00018 -0.0007 0.0015
Dummy for regions that have the status of a republic 0.59 0.09 0.12 -0.00615 0.00749 -0.0677 0.0200
Foreign Direct Investment per capita (1995) 0.59 0.04 0.06 0.00007 0.00009 -0.0002 0.0004
Initial share of food sector 0.58 0.05 0.09 -0.00020 0.00025 -0.0013 0.0012
Railway Density 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.00002 0.00003 -0.0001 0.0001
Dummy for border with EU 0.42 0.00 0.00 -0.00618 0.01107 -0.0454 0.0362
D egree of food price regulation 0.35 0.00 0.00 -0.00007 0.00016 -0.0006 0.0005
Proportion of goods and services with regulated prices 0.27 0.00 0.00 -0.00011 0.00032 -0.0011 0.0010
Proxy for the initial share of industry in total output 0.26 0.01 0.03 -0.01247 0.03725 -0.1867 0.2766
Control of criminal groups over the economy 0.22 0.00 0.00 -0.00047 0.00260 -0.0078 0.0081
Dummy for border with China 0.22 0.01 0.02 0.00195 0.01079 -0.0435 0.0574
Region located in "Red Belt" 0.21 0.00 0.00 -0.00173 0.00676 -0.0277 0.0267
Presidential elections score (1996) 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.00220 0.00845 -0.0551 0.0439
Index proxying a region’s  degree of urbanisation 0.15 0.01 0.01 -0.00119 0.00641 -0.0315 0.0304
Natural R esource Endowment 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00102 0.00679 -0.0246 0.0319
Initial share of exports to foreign countries 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.00200 0.03973 -0.1744 0.1369
Initial share  of chemical sector 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00001 0.00041 -0.0013 0.0012
Total number of regressions: 8436 for each variable under review 
Note: Dependent Variable is average 1999-2004 GRP growth
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2 H y p oth eses and results
144
In the following we shortly discuss the "standard variables". We then set up hypo­
theses concerning the influences on economic growth in Russian regions, explain our 
choice of variables of interest, and discuss in detail the empirical results we obtain. 
We do so by structuring our variables in three groups: politico-institutional features, 
measurements of economic reform, and initial conditions.
2.1 The "Standard Variables"
This decade’s developments in endogenous growth theory and the related econo­
metric work have highlighted the importance of human capital for economic devel­
opment14. During the process of transition, enterprises and economic agents were 
(and are) forced to change their economic behaviour substantially, and to acquire 
a large amount of new skills. It seems reasonable to expect agents with a higher 
level of education to find these changes easier to accomplish, and so regions with a 
higher human capital level to do relatively better during transition. However, for the 
variable that usually delivers the best results in cross-country regressions, secondary 
education, there is less variation within Russia than in cross-country studies, due to 
the high standard of the Soviet education system.
We include initial levels of GRP mainly to conform to comparable econometric 
studies. Proponents of this approach have interpreted it as testing for ^-convergence15, 
or in a case like ours where we include other variables that control for the general 
efficiency of an economy or region, as testing for conditional /^-convergence (see 
e.g. Barro/Sala-I-Martin 1995). Opponents have criticised the whole approach as 
flawed (Quah 1993, 1997). Where both have finally come to agree is that simple
14For a somewhat relativising discussion see Benhabib/Spiegel 1994.
15Where a negative sign of the (3 coefficient would indicate convergence or conditional con­
vergence, depending on the framework. Solanko (2003) reports both relatively strong beta and 
conditional beta convergence for Russian regions.
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/^-convergence has clearly not been observed on a global level, however certain eco­
nomies that were similar in some aspects, part of a “club” (e.g. the EU), or regions 
within a country have often seen GDP respectively GRP converge over the last 
decades
As our software routine does not report statistics for the standard variables, we 
also undertook an EBA analysis where we used our standard variables (Initial GRP 
per capita levels and Secondary Education) as variables of interest, not using any 
standard variables (results not reported in the result tables, as not directly com­
parable). We found that Secondary Education was strongly positively and robustly 
related to regional growth performance in the pre-crisis period, but that this effect 
basically disappeared post-crisis. We did not find any robust relationship between 
initial GRP levels and GRP growth, though coefficients were significant in roughly 
one regression out of four (slightly less pre-, and slightly more post-crisis), and the 
average coefficient was marginally negative, which could be interpreted as - albeit 
very weak - evidence for some convergence.
2.2 Politico-institutional features
HI: Regions with less reform-oriented political leaders will experience 
less economic growth.
One recurring theme of the early transition literature (see e.g. World Bank
1996) has been that faster and more profound economic reform should be rewarded 
by higher economic growth. Assuming that the political attitude of the regional 
political leadership has an impact on the speed and intensity with which regional 
reforms are implemented, or more generally on the quality of economic policy in a 
region, one would expect regions with a more pro-reform leadership to attain higher 
economic growth. For 1998 we have a variable, being based on two independent 
ratings of governors, that directly measures the "quality" of local governors, qual­
ity being defined as their perceived capacities to deliver reform and improve the
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economic situation of their regions. This variable is strongly correlated with the 
political orientation of governors (that is, higher when supported by more reform 
oriented parties, lower if supported by anti-reform parties), but is superior to those 
as it takes not only into account the ideological orientation of a governor but also 
his actual capacity to deliver. It is hence very well suited to assess to what degree 
better economic policy at the regional level has resulted in better regional growth 
performance in subsequent years, i.e. the 1999-2004 period. For the earlier period 
such a variable is unfortunately unavailable, and we therefore have to rely on vari­
ables of political orientation of governors. As in the mid-nineties not even half of the 
governors in our sample were actually official members of a political party, we rather 
consider by which party a governor was supported during his election campaign as 
a proxy for his political orientation. Governors close to the Communist Party are 
generally considered to be more hostile to economic reform, hence common wisdom 
would expect their regions to underperform substantially.
H2: Regions with a less reform-oriented population will experience 
less economic growth.
The political preferences of a region’s population might have an impact on the 
political feasibility of reform. If this is the case, regions that have an “anti-reform” 
voting track record, for example by voting “more communist” in the past, should 
underperform. We use a "Duma election score" - a variable that increases with the 
electoral success of reform minded parties in the 1995 parliament elections, as well 
as a "presidential election score" (increasing with the first round performance of 
reform oriented candidates in the 1996 presidential election) to proxy the reform 
orientation of a region’s population16.
H3: Regions with stronger institutions will experience higher eco­
nomic growth
16However, if those variables were found to be significantly related to growth this could be driven 
by a potential problem of endogeneity, as it might be that in regions with bad growth performance, 
voters show their protest by voting anti-reform.
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Currently, one of the main lessons the economic profession has drawn from the 
experience of transition is that institutions matter for economic development (see 
e.g. World Bank 2002, as well as Eicher/Schreiber 2005). We thus want to test to 
what degree regional economic performance has been influenced by the quality of 
regional institutions. Finding a good indicator for institutional quality in Russian 
regions is, however, extremely difficult. We think that (high) control of criminal 
groups over the local economy is a good proxy for (low) quality and strength of 
regional institutions, but must caution that there is a risk that our choice might not 
capture the feature we are interested in very well.17 We also look whether regions 
with the status of Republic attained a higher growth performance. This is motivated 
by the fact that regions that have the status of Republic generally enjoy a larger 
degree of freedom from Moscow. Based on the main idea that the more a region 
is responsible for its own fate, the better its incentive to work on improving its 
situation (including its institutions), it is interesting to see whether Republics have 
been able to use their freedom to improve their economic performance.
H4: Regions that suffer from -even potential- violent conflict will ex­
perience lower economic growth.
Violent conflict, whether economically, ethnically or otherwise motivated, is gen­
erally perceived as detrimental to growth (Alesina/Perotti 1994). Even if violence 
never actually breaks out, potential violent conflict creates high levels of uncertainty 
that might be detrimental to investment (Pyndick/Solimano 1993).
We first use an index of a region’s potential for violent conflict compiled by 
an investment bank. As violent conflict unfortunately often arises from ethnic or 
religious tensions, we proxy violent conflict potential also by a measure of ethnic 
diversity. More precisely we take the population share of the “original” (non-Slavic) 
ethnic group of the region as a proxy for ethnic diversity18.
17 The variable is supposed to measure control of criminal groups over the economy in a given 
region, and was compiled by the weekly newspaper "Argumenti i Fakti" in 1996
18 Given that most of the time non-Slavic ethnic groups have a religion that differs from the
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Results H1-H4
The reform willingness of regional leaders does not seem to have mattered in 
the pre-crisis period, when the economy was in decline, as our variable measuring 
political orientation of governors - which we see as a proxy for their willingness 
to reform - comes out largely insignificant. However, we find strong evidence that 
reform willingness of regional leaders began to matter once the economy started to 
grow robustly post-crisis (HI). Our variable that proxies the quality of governors 
is robustly related to regional post-crisis growth, indicating that with a normalising 
economic situation, reform efforts (probably both undertaken pre- and post-crisis) 
finally paid off. We find, however, no evidence that the general attitude of a region’s 
population towards reform (H2) made any difference to economic growth. Neither 
a proxy for the degree of pro-reform votes in the 1995 parliamentary elections, nor 
in the 1996 presidential elections shows a robust relation with economic growth.
Potential violent conflict (H4) seems not to have significantly influenced regional 
growth performance pre-crisis, but becomes a robust determinant of economic per­
formance post-crisis. It should be noted that, as both Chechnia and Ingushetia are 
excluded from our sample due to lack of reliable data, this finding does not directly 
reflect on events in Chechnia. It also does not seem to be driven by ethnic ques­
tions, as our proxy for ethnic conflict potential has no robust impact on regional 
growth whatsoever. Our proxy for (lack of) institutional quality, namely the con­
trol of criminal groups over the economy, is also far from any robust relation with 
economic growth (H3). This, however, does not necessarily imply that institutions 
did not matter, but could simply reflect either measurement problems, or that the 
variable used is a poor proxy.
Summarising, while we do not find any evidence that regional differences along 
political and party fines had any impact on pre-crisis growth performance, the reform
dominant Russian-Orthodox, this is equally an - albeit less precise - measurement of religious 
diversity.
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orientation of governors seems to have born fruit in the post-crisis context. In 
addition, large uncertainty, as reflected in the potential for violent conflict, became 
an obstacle to growth post-crisis.
2.3 M easurements o f economic reform
H5: Regions with a higher share of regulated prices will experience lower 
growth.
We use two variables, one that reflects the degree of food price regulation, another 
that reflects the degree of price regulation in goods and services. A higher degree 
of food price regulation should be a disincentive for agricultural production, and a 
higher proportion of regulated prices of goods and services should lead to distortions 
in the allocation of resources to production. Thus both types of price regulation 
should be detrimental to a region’s growth performance.
H6: Regions with a higher share of privatised and/or private economic 
activity will experience higher growth.
While according to standard economics, under most circumstances privately 
owned enterprises will be more efficient than those owned by the state (see e.g. 
Megginson/Netter 2000), it is still somewhat controversial whether this holds under 
any circumstances19. It seems however relatively uncontroversial that under effi­
cient private ownership outcomes are better than under state ownership. While the 
emergence of efficient private ownership structures depends in part on how privat­
isation is conducted and is nothing that should be taken for granted, it has generally 
been argued (e.g. Berkovitz/DeJong 1998) that regions that privatised more act­
19Sabirianova et al. (2005) e.g. show that in Russia and the Czech Republic in the 1990s 
privatisation to domestic owners did not markedly improve efficiency. Djankov and Murell (2002) 
also find that in transition countries commercialised state ownership was superior to some forms of 
private ownership, though generally remained inferior to relatively concentrated private ownership 
by outsiders. Bennet et al. (2004), based on a sample of transition countries during the 1990s, 
report that mass privatisation was the only privatisation method to have had a significant positive 
effect on growth.
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ively should have become more economically efficient, and hence enjoyed a superior 
economic growth performance to those dragging their feet on this issue. Or, from a 
somewhat more general perspective, regions that profit from a larger share of private 
economic activity, should experience faster economic growth. We use two proxies for 
the private sector share. First, we look at the share of small enterprises (in trade, 
catering and household services) that are privately owned, expecting that more 
private ownership should have a positive impact on a region’s economic perform­
ance. Second, we look at the number of small enterprises (per capita)20, assuming 
that a relatively elevated number of small companies should reflect dynamic private 
business creation, and hence a relatively sound business climate. Small companies 
have been the driving force behind growth in other transition countries (e.g. for 
Poland see Konings et al 1996), so one would expect regions with a larger number 
of small enterprises per capita to show a better growth performance.
HT: Regions with a higher degree of monopolisation will experience 
lower growth.
Economic theory is ambiguous about the impact of increased competition on 
growth. In simple Schumpeterian models, more competition leads to lower monopoly 
rents, which by decreasing incentives to innovate diminishes economic growth. In 
more sophisticated Schumpeterian models where workers are sufficiently “adaptable” 
(which basically means that they can switch sufficiently fast from old to new sectors), 
competition increases growth (see Aghion/Howitt 1998). The empirical evidence 
seems to indicate that, in general, competition is beneficial both for innovation and 
for growth (see Carlin et al. 2004 and Dutz/Hayri 2000). Hence regions with a higher 
share of regional monopolies should experience lower growth. We use the output of 
market controlling enterprises in a region as share of total industrial production as 
a proxy for regional monopolisation.
20 As Goskomstat has repeatedly changed the definition of small, we compare the level of small 
businesses in a region with the national average.
Chapter 5 : The Political Economy of Russian Regional Growth 151
H8: Regions with higher FDI inflows will experience higher growth.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is generally regarded as an important factor in 
economic development (see e.g. Bergsman et al 2000), and is growth enhancing 
(Borenzstein et al. 1995). We would thus expect FDI inflows into a region to have a 
beneficial impact on growth performance. We therefore use FDI inflows per capita 
for a given region as variable in our regressions.
Results H5-H8
Looking at variables of economic reform (H5-H8) we find no robust relations 
with growth in the 95-98 period. However, more small scale privatisation as well 
as a better developed small business sector (both highly likely to depend on no 
small measure on regional economic policy) are very strongly and robustly related 
to regional growth performance in the post-crisis period (H6).21
There is no evidence that a region’s larger reliance on price regulation (H5) had 
the expected negative effect on economic growth22. A higher degree of monopol­
isation in a region (H7) had also no robust effect on regional performance (and if 
anything may have had a positive relation with growth - though this relation fails the 
robustness test by a wide margin). The reason for this, arguing based on Schumpe­
terian economic theory, could be the low level of “adaptability” of Russian workers. 
Guriev/Friebel (2000), for example, emphasise that the mobility of Russian workers 
is particularly low. Surprisingly, there is also no econometric proof whatsoever of a 
positive impact of foreign direct investment (H8). We hypothesise that the absence
21 It is noteworthy in this respect that we have been using two different compilations of the 
variable measuring the share of private small business. Interestingly, for the first variation of the 
variable, which has been fairly widely used in the literature, we actually find no robust relation 
with regional growth. The second variation, taken from GosKomStat, covers a larger number of 
regions and presumably is more precise. Using this variation, we do find a robust relation between 
the share of the private sector and economic growth in the post-crisis period.
22 Though this is not the focus of this paper, it seems interesting to note that agricultural 
subsidies and food price regulation were -contrary to common economic wisdom- not a pet policy 
of governors close to the communist party. Correlation coefficients show that they were used at 
least as extensively by governors who were supported by President Yeltsin’s official “reform” camp 
as by communist supported governors.
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of a robust and strong positive effect of FDI on regional growth is probably due to 
the extremely low level of those investments. In spite of the fact that FDI had a 
strong positive effect on enterprises’ productivity (Yudaeva et al. 2003), the amount 
of FDI that Russia received during the nineties probably was simply not substantial 
enough to make a significant contribution to economic activity on more than the 
local level.
Summarizing briefly, our econometric analysis seems to indicate that the degree 
to which a region implemented economic reform had little impact on its growth 
performance in a situation of widespread economic decline before the crisis, but 
started to make a significant difference after 1998 when the economy started to 
grow strongly. In this respect it is worth noting that our results do not mean that 
reform undertaken before the crisis would have been wasted -but rather that its 
main fruits were only reaped once growth reappeared after 1998 (as also indicated 
by the fact that the size of the private small business sector as measured in 1996 
impacted on post-crisis growth).
2.4 Initial conditions
We consider a total of six hypotheses, the first half of them dealing with initial 
economic conditions, the second half with more general initial features.
H9: Regions with a larger natural resource endowment have experi­
enced higher economic growth.
Natural resource endowments are often considered a mixed blessing. While 
natural resources are valuable export items, they can easily lead to “Dutch dis­
ease” problems, and hence can have an overall negative impact on an economy 
(Sachs/Warner 2001, 1997). However, with regard to Russian regions, natural re­
source endowments should have played a positive role. In a situation where both 
Russian demand and industrial production were collapsing, the production of com­
modities that could easily be diverted for export should have been an advantage.
Chapter 5 : The Political Economy of Russian Regional Growth 153
Second, world market prices for most commodities are much higher than internal 
prices in Soviet times. Hence resource rich regions should have experienced a pos­
itive “terms of trade” shock allowing them to cushion themselves at least partially 
from the general collapse in GRP. To measure resource endowments we use variables 
on oil production, gas production and coal production (all measured per capita). We 
also use an aggregate index for natural resource endowment.
H10: Regions with a larger agricultural sector have experienced lower 
economic growth.
A region’s initial structure of output (agriculture, industry, etc.) should have 
played a role. At least, as Soviet agriculture was particularly heavily subsidised, 
regions with large agricultural sectors should have been more affected by the end 
(or at least strong reduction) of the soviet subsidisation regime. We use proxies for 
the initial (1993) share of agriculture, as well as of industry in total output23.
H ll:  Regions with a larger share of more competitive industries at 
the start of transition experienced higher economic growth.
As growth has varied widely between different industrial sectors, we include 
initial industrial structure variables to control to what degree a region’s performance 
has been influenced by “nation-wide” developments in its main industries. More 
precisely we use variables that indicate the initial share (as of 1993) of various key 
industries in total industrial production in a region24. Given that during Soviet 
times different industries worked at different levels of competitiveness compared to 
international standards (Senik-Leygonie/Hughes 1992), this indirectly tests to what 
extent regional economic performance has been driven by the initial competitiveness 
of its industrial sector.
Furthermore, we regard a region’s initial share of exports abroad (as % of GRP).
23 As regional sectoral value added data are not available, these proxies are calculated by adding 
up Services, Agriculture, Construction and Industrial Production in a region, and by taking the 
share of the relevant sector (e.g. agriculture) with respect to this sum.
24We use the initial shares of the power sector, the fuel sector, the ferrous- and non-ferrous 
metals sector, the chemical sector, and the food sector.
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If a region was, already in the early stages of transition, able to export a larger share 
of its industrial production abroad, this indicates that a larger part of its production 
was at least not too far away from international competitiveness. Hence a higher 
export share roughly equates with a region having “better” enterprises, and we can 
expect such a region to show signs of superior growth performance.
H I 2: Regions that have an advantageous geographical position will 
experience higher economic growth
H12-a: Regions with neighbours that are either high income countries or grow 
strongly experienced higher growth
H12-b: Regions with easy access to major routes for international transport 
experienced higher growth
H12-c: Regions that are geographically closer to Western Europe experienced 
higher growth.
H12-d: Regions with a particularly unfavourable climate experienced lower growth 
H12-e: Regions in the “Red Belt” experienced lower growth 
Initial geographic conditions are mainly supposed to catch effects from location in 
more or less favourable areas. It is generally assumed that countries profit from the 
good economic performance of neighbouring countries, and that countries with easy 
access to major routes for international transport perform better (Sachs/Warner
1997). We can expect regions with permanent sea access or major ports to outper­
form. We can equally expect regions that have a border with a rich or well per­
forming neighbour state to profit from its location, and this effect should increase 
with more developed trade links. Thus, regions bordering EU countries, as well as 
China, should have done relatively well, as these countries are either wealthy and/or 
experienced high growth. Location on the border of CIS countries would seem more 
of a double edged sword. The far from inspiring economic performance of most CIS 
countries during the nineties should have had a negative effect on bordering regions, 
but the strong growth in the CIS since 1999 may have been advantageous for those
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border regions. The influences should have been amplified by the historically well- 
developed trade links with CIS countries. We therefore use dummy variables for 
bordering with China, for bordering a CIS country, for bordering an EU country, 
for the presence of a major port (sea or river).
We equally consider “pure” geographical location, that is the line of longitude 
(and latitude) that a region’s capital is placed on. The longitude variable is very close 
to the ’distance from some Western European Capital’ variable, that has been popu­
lar in regressions on growth performance of transition economies (e.g. EBRD 1999). 
Using dummy variables, we also test whether regions situated in the European part 
of Russia had a better growth performance, as well as whether a particularly unfa­
vourable climate has been an obstacle to growth (on the latter see e.g. Hill/Gaddy 
2003). Finally we test whether being a region located in what political scientists 
call the “red belt” has led to a particularly poor growth performance. The “red 
belt” is a part of south-western Russia, often ruled by communist governors, that 
western economists generally consider to have been dragging behind on reform, and 
to have experienced a particularly uninspired growth performance since the start of 
transition (see e.g. Berkovitz/De Jong 1999).
H13: More urban regions will experience stronger growth.
Though economic theory tells little about the relationship between population 
structure and growth, casual empirical evidence from various countries seems to 
suggest that large cities generally have been growing faster during recent years than 
rural areas, and we would expect the same effect to hold for Russia. We use an 
urbanisation index and population density as proxies for how urban a region is.
H14: Regions with better infrastructure will experience higher growth.
In development and growth literature it has long been argued that good infra­
structure is a prerequisite for high growth (see Easterly/Levine (1997) for economet­
ric evidence). We would thus expect regions with a better-developed infrastructure
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to experience higher growth. We proxy infrastructure by railway density25.
Results H9-H14
Production of oil and gas explain better economic performance robustly pre­
crisis, and borderline robustly post-crisis (H9). Interestingly, natural resource en­
dowment more generally has no expalnatory power for economic growth at all, which 
probably reflects that there has so far been relatively little new production of nat­
ural resources from areas which had not already been producing them initially. It 
is somewhat surprising to see that coal mining regions did not robustly underper- 
form the general average, at least pre-crisis, taking into account all the negative 
media coverage of these places at the time. The share of agriculture did not have 
any robust relation with economic growth (H10), though pre-crisis the initial share 
of industrial production was related positively with economic growth (though this 
relation is only borderline robust).
The initial share of exports in GRP (H ll), comes out robustly and positively 
related with growth in the pre-crisis period, but this effect vanished post-crisis. 
We thus deduce that the initial competitiveness of a region’s industry has been an 
important factor behind a region’s pre-crisis economic performance. This finding 
is corroborated by the results concerning industrial structure. We see that regions 
with larger shares in fuel, metal or chemical production did robustly better pre­
crisis, though - excepting the fuel industry - this effect wanes post-crisis. In short, 
pre-crisis, a large part of differing regional performance in Russia can simply be 
explained by the “initial quality” , that is the initial competitiveness of its industrial 
sector. Some regions were simply more fortunate, insofar as their heritage from 
Soviet times included larger shares of “better” industries.
With respect to geographic location (HI2), we find it to have an important im­
pact both pre- and post crisis, nevertheless not exactly always the way we would 
have expected. Regions with a port (H12-b) fared robustly better in both periods.
25 Railway density as measured by the km of rail per 10.000 sqkm as of 1990.
Chapter 5 : The Political Economy of Russian Regional Growth 157
With regard to borders (H12-a), we find that they have had less significance than 
could have been expected. Moreover, where they have had some effect, it has of­
ten taken an unexpected form. Both regions neighbouring China or the EU do not 
seem to have profited from their location, but, surprisingly, regions that have a bor­
der with CIS countries seem to have had better GRP growth, especially post-crisis 
(though pre-crisis this relation is also borderline robust). However, while neither 
having borders with the EU nor being in the European part of Russia seems to have 
mattered, being more to the west clearly did help (H12-c). The degree of longitude of 
a region’s capital is robustly and negatively related to growth performance (though 
only borderline so post-crisis). It is, however, unclear whether this effect is due to 
the closeness of Western Europe, as it may simply reflect a post-soviet normalisa­
tion. It could have been driven by a progressive decline in non-resource extraction 
activity in Far Eastern regions with often unfavourable climate, where under Soviet 
planning industrialisation had been pushed for mainly political reasons26. Unfavour­
able climate, as such, seems however not have been terribly important for growth. 
Pre-crisis it may have played some (negative) role, as the variable is significant in a 
fair share of regressions, but it fails the standards for being called robustly related 
by quite some margin. Post-crisis, a more southern location is negatively, and bor­
derline robustly related with economic growth, though this could be a reflection of 
stronger growth in the informal sector in Russia’s south during this period. Finally, 
there is not the slightest evidence that location in the infamous “red belt” (H12-d) 
impacted on growth performance.
Population structure (H13) seems to have played some role in the expected sense.
26As natural ressources are abundant in many far east regions, even though meteorological 
conditions there are often extreme, their economic development was always a priority for Soviet 
planning. Stalin, during his rule of terror simply deported billions of innocent people to camps in 
these areas where most of them were effectively worked to death. Fortunately, later Soviet planners 
decided to replace terror with more human incentives, and started to offer highly attractive wages 
for those who where willing to go and work in the far east. Amid the general chaos of transition 
Russia’s interest to further develop these far east regions came to a halt, and so a substantial 
decrease in the far east wage premium followed.
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Pre-crisis, both more densely populated and more urbanised regions have done ro­
bustly better (though more urbanised regions only borderline so), but this effect 
vanished post-crisis. Finally, it is somewhat more surprising that infrastructure 
measurements (H 14) are not robustly significant. As various infrastructure meas­
urements (which are not reported here) are highly correlated among themselves and 
equally so with population density, this should, perhaps, be interpreted as some kind 
of post-mortal praise of Soviet planners, in the sense that they at least achieved an 
equally adequate (or inadequate) level of infrastructure for all parts of Russia.
C onclusion
In this work we have thoroughly investigated the impact of a large number of poten­
tial factors on Russian regions’ economic performance using extreme bound analysis, 
which should make our results particularly robust. We find that there has been a 
clear break in the determinants of Russian regional growth. Pre-crisis, the initial 
competitiveness of a region’s industry, as measured by the share of exports in re­
gional production or industrial structure mattered strongly, as did initial conditions 
such as abundance of natural resources and human capital, or geographic location. 
Neither political variables, as for example governor’s political orientation, nor eco­
nomic reform seems to have played a prominent role in explaining pre-crisis regional 
economic performance. This, however, changed drastically post-crisis. While a lim­
ited set of initial conditions (as e.g. hydrocarbon wealth, or benign geographical 
location) remained growth drivers, political and economic reform variables now also 
came into play. Regions with more reform oriented governors clearly outperformed, 
as did those which had pursued reform policies leading to a larger private share in 
economic activity. In this respect it is seems worth stressing that pre-crisis reforms 
should not be seen as a waste - they were probably crucial in many respects. Their 
positive impact, however, took some time to materialise, and only started to bear
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measurable fruit once the economy had ended its prolonged phase of decline and 
started growing again.
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Description o f variables
Data sources are indicated in brackets [ ]
Left Hand Side
• Cumulated growth of real Gross Regional Product (GRP) (1995-1998)27 -[la]
• Cumulated growth of real Gross Regional Product (GRP) (1999-2004) -[la]
Standard Variables
• Initial GRP per capita (1994/1997)-[la]
• Share of Population with completed Secondary Education28, as of 1994-[Id]
Politico-Institutional Variables : H1-H2
• Dummy for governor supported by the communist party-[V]
• Dummy for governor supported by “party of power”, that is by the inner circle 
of power in Moscow (i. e. mainly “Our Home is Russia” )-[V]
• Duma elections score (1995), as compiled by MFK Renaissance. This score 
increases with the electoral performance of reform-minded political parties or 
candidates.
27For 1995-96 data are constructed from nominal annual GRP data in the following way: we 
first constructed value added of the main economy sectors (industry, agriculture, construction, and 
services) by region. Value added of a sector in the region was calculated from regional sectoral 
output using the Russian average share of value added in total output of this sector. We then 
transformed the value added of each sector in the region into 1994 constant prices by using the 
national sectoral deflators. Finally we added up the results obtained for each region, thus obtaining 
a measure for GRP in 1994 constant prices.
28Including both secondary and special secondary education.
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• Presidential elections score (1996), as compiled by MFK Renaissance. This 
score increases with the 1st round electoral performance of reform minded 
candidates
• Quality of regional leadership, scoring each regional Governor with regard to 
his overall economic reformism - compiled by MFK Renaissance as of 1998 on 
the basis of various expert ratings.
Politico-Institutional Variables : H3-H4
• Control of criminal groups over the economy - as compiled from weekly news­
paper ” Argumenti i Fakti" in 1996
• Dummy for regions that have the status of a republic
• Potential for violent conflict, as compiled by MFK Renaissance 1998
• Potential for ethnic conflict proxied by the population share of the original 
(non-Slavic) ethnic of the region (e.g. percentage of Tatar nationals in Tar- 
tarstan), as of 1989-[lb]
Measurements of Economic Reform : H5-H8
• Degree of food price regulation (higher score means more regulated), as of 
1996-[IV]
• Proportion of goods and services with regulated prices, as of 1996- [IV]
• Share of private enterprises in trade, catering and household services (% of 
total enterprises in these sectors) as of 1996. This variable has been used in 
the literature as a proxy for small scale privatisation-[IV]
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• Share of private enterprises in trade, catering and household services (% of 
total enterprises in these sectors) as of 1996. As compiled by GosKomStat 
-pa]
• Number of small businesses per capita (compared to the average of the Russian 
Federation, RF=1), 1995/98-[la]
• Output of Market Controlling Enterprises (Regional Monopolies) as share of 
total industrial production (as of 1996)-[la]
• Foreign Direct Investment per capita, 1995/98-[la]
Initial Conditions : H9-H11
• Oil production (per capita), as of 1995-[la]
• Gas production (per capita), as of 1995-[la]
• Coal production (per capita), as of 1995-[la]
• Natural Resource Potential Index, compiled by [V], 1997
• Proxy for the initial (1993) share of agriculture in total output29
• Proxy for the initial (1993) share of industry in total output
• Initial (1994) share of exports to foreign countries, % of GRP-[Ib, la]
• Initial (1993) share of power sector (as % of total industrial output)-[lb]
• Initial (1993) share of fuel sector (as % of total industrial output)-[lb]
29 As regional sectoral value added data are not available, these proxies are calculated by adding 
up Services, Agriculture, Construction and Industrial Production in a region, and by taking the 
share of the relevant sector (e.g. agriculture) with respect to this sum.
Chapter 5 : The Political Economy of Russian Regional Growth 164
• Initial (1993) share of ferrous and non-ferrous metals sector (as % of total 
industrial output)- [lb]
•  Initial (1993) share of chemical sector (as % of total industrial output)-[lb]
•  Initial (1993) share of food sector (as % of total industrial output)-[lb]
Initial Conditions : H12
• Dummy for border with China
• Dummy for border with CIS
• Dummy for border with EU
• Dummy for the presence of a major port (sea or river) in the region
• Dummy for all “European” Russian regions, i.e. excluding regions in the 
Caucasus and East of the Ural
• Degree of longitude on which the regional capital is situated
• Degree of latitude on which the regional capital is situated
• Dummy for “Red Belt” regions, as compiled by Political Scientists Alexei
Sitnikov and Andrei Kounov for this study
• Dummy for regions with an unfavourable climate 
Initial Conditions : H13-H14
• Index proxying a region’s degree of urbanisation, compiled by MFK Renais­
sance 1998
• Population density, as of 1990-[lb]
• Railway density (km per 10.000 sqkm), as of 1990-[la]
General C onclusion
In this thesis we have used a political economy approach to study macro-economic 
stability and structural reform. The choice of this framework was prompted by the 
fact that a number of economic policies in emerging and transition economies are 
hard to understand when comparing actually outcomes to what could optimally 
have been achieved. Hyperinflations and delayed stabilisation are prime examples 
of situations where economic policies led to obviously sub-optimal policy outcomes 
that imposed huge efficiency costs on all economic agents. But it is not only defi­
ciencies in macro-economic management that remain hard to understand if one fails 
to take account of political economy considerations. Structural reform that would 
clearly have improved economic efficiency has also often not been implemented or 
has been implemented with huge delays. Many policies were hard to reconcile with 
an approach that sees all policies simply orientated towards achieving economic 
efficiency.
Many developing countries, for example, kept large enterprises under state- 
ownership long after it had become clear that for economic efficiency private own­
ership would have been preferable by far. Some transition countries privatised their 
state-owned economies in a fairly swift manner, but in a large number of them 
privatisation took far longer than what would have been optimal, in a significant 
number it is still to be finished, and in some this process - even 15 years after the 
beginning of transition - has not really begun in earnest. Moreover, when countries 
privatised, privatisation often was not carried out in fashions that would have been
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considered efficient or just.
Another area where structural reform has been slow in a large number of emer­
ging economies is the reform of institutions. Lack of institutions of sufficient quality 
has been a drain on long-term growth potential. For example a low quality judi­
cial system and - as we have shown in this thesis - the lack of press freedom have 
furthered corruption, with all its negative implications for economic development. 
While most of the above-mentioned inefficiencies are hard to understand in a conven­
tional ’’pure” economic framework, we have shown that a formal political-economy 
approach allows us to gain valuable understanding of why these inefficiencies occur.
To put this thesis in context we have first surveyed the existing literature on sub­
jects related to the political economy of economic crises and structural reform. We 
have then applied a formal political economy framework to investigate the problem 
of high inflation and macro-economic stabilisation, as well as problems connected 
with the implementation of highly important structural reforms. Notably, by endo- 
genising the choice of economic policies into economic models with heterogeneous 
agents (that we regroup in different economic classes - the rich, the middle class 
and the poor) - we have shown how suboptimal policies as high inflation or stalled 
privatisation can be the political outcome, even in a situation where all agents in an 
economy optimise their actions.
More precisely we have shown how in a model with heterogenous agents dis­
tributive conflict and public finance constraints can cause inflation. Different gov­
erning coalitions - favouring different levels of inflation- can arise, and will lead 
to different distributional outcomes - squeezing the poor, a populist coalition (i.e. 
squeezing the middle class) or squeezing the rich. When strong demonetisation res­
ults from chronic inflation, external shocks or budget adjustment traps may lead to 
hyperinflation. Permanent price stability can be achieved when extreme currency 
substitution makes inflation-financed redistribution useless, thus ending distributive 
struggle - and in this respect hyperinflation episodes may help to end monetary
General Conclusion 167
disorder.
In a similar political economy setting with three classes we have investigated 
under which conditions privatisation will proceed, and who will be the political sup­
porters as well as the main winners of the privatisation process. We show that - 
depending on circumstances - governments of all political shades may privatise, and 
often at a substantial discount to the net value of the assets on offer. Left wing 
governments (representing the poor) are less likely to privatise, and if so will gener­
ally do so at smaller ’’discounts”. As in the case of inflation, different coalitions can 
form to further or block privatisation, leading to different distributional outcomes. 
We have also shown that inefficient taxation decreases the likelihood of privatisa­
tion being politically feasible. This is because the possibilities of compensating the 
losers from the discounted asset sale may be insufficient, a feature that may explain 
the general lack of enthusiasm for privatisation especially among the poor in less 
developed countries.
In an application of the political economy approach, we have then investigated 
to what degree institutional and political differences had an impact on short-term 
economic performance in Russian regions.
While our focus has been on emerging economies, we feel strongly that some of 
the insights gained in this thesis are more broadly applicable. In this context we 
would especially mention the link between press freedom and low levels of corrup­
tion. Strengthening press freedom will not only improve the situation in emerging 
economies, but is also an important safeguard against a deterioration of existing 
standards in the developed world.
In a more general sense, we think that studying issues of macro-economic stability 
and structural reform in emerging economies is not only of interest for those that are 
specialising in these countries. These countries expose many links between economics 
and politics that exist everywhere. These links, however, are usually less visible in 
developed countries, where changes both in the economic and political framework
General Conclusion 168
are rarely as radical as those that can typically be observed in emerging economies.
As a concluding remark, we would thus recommend those interested in how 
politics and economics interact to take a closer look at emerging economies.
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